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THE LAW OF CHOICE AND CHOICE OF 
LAW: ABORTION, THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL, 
AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION 
IN AMER ICAN FEDERALISM 
SETH F. KREIMER* 
In American federalism, states differ among themselves in regulating morally con-
tested issues such as abortion, sexual activity, and the right to die. Because of these 
differences, Americans often travel to neighboring states to take advantage of legal 
options unavailable at home. In this Article, Professor Kreimer examines the con-
straints that the American federal structure and the constitutional commitment to na-
tional citizenship place on states that would seek to limit their citizens' abilities to take 
advantage of such options. Professor Kreimer first demonstrates that the constitutional 
structure set in place by the framers of the Constitution and the fourteenth amendment 
did not contemplate extraterritorial state regulation. He argues that although consti-
tutional restrictions on ex traterritorial regulation have been diluted since the New 
Deal, as a matter of federal structure and due process, states do not have the authority 
to forbid their citizens' extraterritorial acts when those acts are permitted by the moral 
commitments of the states in which the acts occur. He then shows that a state 's efforts 
to preempt its citizens' access to such options through restrictions on travel would vio-
late the constitutional commitments to national union and national citizenship. Such 
regulations are barred by the citizenship clause of the fourt eenth amendment, the com-
merce clause, and the privileges and immunities clause of article IV of the 
Constitution. 
INTRODUCTION 
A fragile five-member majority of the Supreme Court has responded 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsy lvania. A.B. , 1974, Yale University; J.D., 1977, 
Yale Law School. This Article benefitted from the comments and criticism generously pro-
vided on earlier drafts by Ed Baker, Jim Blumstein, Steve Bradford, Lea Brilmayer, Nancy 
Fuchs-Kreimer, Frank Goodman, Gerry Neuman, David Rudovsky, Stewart Sterk, Barbara 
Woodhouse, and Linda Wharton. They have my deep thanks, though not always my agree-
ment. Thanks is due as well for the fine research assistance of Seth Galanter and Charles 
Goodwin. Responsibility for any errors of style or substance remains my own. 
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to the challenge posed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey t by reaffirming 
Roe v. Wade after a fashion. 2 The fate of any particular regulation of 
abortion now hangs on the joint evaluation of the three none too liberta-
rian Justices who formed the Casey plurality as to whether the regulation 
constitutes an "undue burden." 3 The four dissenters in Casey announced 
in the strongest possible terms their intent to press for the elimination of 
all constitutional protection of reproductive choice; 4 they await only a 
single vote to make their viewpoint the law of the land. In terms of fed-
eral constitutional protections for reproductive choice, the world of the 
1990s bids fair to resemble mo;e closely the world of the 1950s and 1960s 
than that of the 1980s. 5 
In that world, national uniformity is unlikely. States like Utah and 
Pennsylvania will leave no more room for choice on the abortion issue 
than the governing federal law demands, while the fundamental laws of 
Florida, Massachusetts, California and New Jersey already provide 
greater protection than the federal Constitution did even at the zenith of 
Roe's constitutional protection. 6 The most recent estimates suggest that 
l 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). In the interests of full disclosure, the reader should be aware 
that I was a member of the counsel team for the petitioners in Casey, and remain involved with 
the case on remand. 
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
3 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820. 
4 Id. at 2860 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
5 For purposes of this Article, I assume that Congress will play no active role. In the 
present political constellation, neither proponents nor opponents of reproductive freedom seem 
to be able to generate successful coalitions at the federal level. At the issue's core, neither the 
Right to Life Amendment nor the Freedom of Choice Act have moved to the floor of Con-
gress. See, e.g., Nat Hentotf, The Fading Freedom of Choice Act, Wash. Post, Sept. 12, 1992, 
at A 19. President Bush indicated his intention to veto Congressional efforts to protect repro-
ductive autonomy. President Clinton, by contrast, has proclaimed his support for abortion 
rights. See e.g., E.J. Dionne, Abortion Rights Supporters Claim Election Gains, Wash. Post , 
Nov. 9, 1992, at A9; Ruth Marcus, At Issue: Abortion; On Support for Choice and Limits, 
Bush-Clinton Contrasts Are Sharp, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1992, at A21 ; Elaine Povich, Clinton 
Expected to Reverse Federal Policy on Abortions, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 7, 1992, at I. 
A change in political circumstance sufficient to precipitate Congressional action on either 
side might well obviate the issues I address in this Article. Obviously, if Congress uniformly 
protects or prohibits abortions, as it has the power to do under current commerce clause doc-
trine, disuniformity no longer will be a difficulty. If it exerc ises the commerce power to protect 
interstate choice, the statute will be dispositive. If, however, Congress sought to prohibit inter-
state choice, the issue of whether either the right to travel or the privileges and immunities 
clause bind Congress would arise. Cf. White v. Massachusetts Council of Canst. Employers, 
460 U.S. 204, 215-16 n.l (1983) (Blackmun, J.) (doubting whether Congressional authoriza-
tion could render constitutional privileges and immunities violation); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (finding infringement of right to travel despite Congressional 
authorization). 
6 Massachusetts, New Jersey, and California provide constitutional protection for Medi-
caid funding of abortions . See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Meyers, 625 P.2d 
779, 781 (Cal. 1981); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 397 (Mass. 1981); 
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A .2d 925, 927 (N.J. 1982). The United States Supreme Court 
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roughly fifteen states are committed solidly to protecting abortion rights, 
and an equal number are poised to limit or prohibit abortions to the ex-
tent that the federal courts allow, with the remainder mixed. 7 The with-
drawal of federal constraint would leave a state-by-state patchwork quilt 
of reproductive autonomy, if not, as in the regulation of alcohol before 
and after Prohibition, a pattern in which regulations differ from county 
to county. 
In the years immediately preceding Roe, a similar patchwork of re-
productive autonomy prevailed. 8 In consequence, about 40% of all legal 
abortions performed in the United States in 1972 were performed on 
women outside of their state of residence. 9 Two years after Roe, only 
ear lier had rejected this position in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 ( 1980) (holding that 
the Hyde Amendment, which denies public funding for certain med ically necessary abortions, 
does not viola te establishment clause of first amendment or due process clause of fifth amend-
men t), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977) (holding that eq ual protection clause 
does not requ ire state participating in Medicaid program to pay for nontherapeutic abortions 
when state pays for childbirth). Florida's explicit constitutional protection of privacy has been 
held to bar parental consent requirements of a sort tha t would be upheld under federal stan-
dards. See In re T. W., 551 So.2d 1186, 1195-96 (Fla. 1989). 
7 Na tional Abortion Rights Action League, Who Decides? : A State by State Review of 
Abortion Rights in America 143-46 (3d ed. 1992). 
8 See Nanette J. D avis, From Crime to Choice 260-61 (1985) (survey ing abortion laws as 
of April I, 197 1). According to Davis' survey, Alaska, Hawaii , New York, and Washington 
State were without substantial legal restrictions on pre-viability abortions. On the other hand, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Oregon , South Carolina, and Virginia required that the continuation of the pregnancy "gravely 
impair the ph ysical or mental health" or create a "substantial risk" to the "physical or mental 
health" of the mother. Other states had more rigid prohibitions. See id. ; see also Carole Joffe, 
Portraits of Three " Physicians of Conscience": Abortion Before Legalization in the United 
States, 2 J. Hist. of Sexuality 46, 49 (1991) (characterizing period from 1880s "to the Roe era" 
as one in which abortion regulations produced "enormous variations from state to state, and 
often even within states"). 
Even given a single legal standard, the application of the standard could vary widely. By 
late 1970 in California, for example, under a "gravely impair" standard, 99.2 % of women who 
applied for abortions were granted one, and "one out of every three pregnancies was ended by 
a legal abortion." Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 94, 88 & n. * 
(1 984). 
9 N. Davis, supra note 8, at 228 & tbl. 10.1 (estimating that in 1972 43.8 % of abortions 
performed outside state of pat ient 's residence); id. at 11 9 (describing referral " pipeline" from 
Michiga n to New York Ci ty, Michigan women accoun ting for largest proportion of New 
York's non-resident abortions) ; id. at 122 (describing profit-seeking out-of-state doctors flying 
to New Yo rk City to perform abortions); id . at 199 (calculating that 63.4% of New York City 
abortions from July I, 1970 to June 30, 1972 performed for out-of-state women); Jean Pakter 
et al., Legal Abortion: A Half-Decade of Experience, 7 Fam. Plan . Persp. 248, 248-49 & tbl. 2 
(1 97 5) (noting that, after New York liberalization, which took effect in July of 1970, 131,172 
of the 206,673 abortions performed in New York City in 197 1, or about 63 %, were provided 
for out-of-st ate women; in 1972, 130,592 of 203,247, or approximately 64% , were for non-
residents; by 1974, 32,712 of 120,829, or 27% , were for out-of-state women, 15,562 of whom 
were from Connecticut or New Jersey); Christopher Tietze & Sarah Lewit, Interim Report on 
the Joint Program for the Study of Abortion , 8 J. Sex Res. 170, 171 (1972) (noting that , for 
1970-71 sample, 40% of all abortion patients were non-residents, with 88% of clinic patients 
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13.4% of legal abortions involved women from another state, 10 and by 
1977 the figure had dropped below 10%. 11 Even with legalization, how-
ever, local opposition and reluctance by local medical establishments to 
provide abortions forced a substantial number of women to travel to ob-
tain abortions. 12 
Before Roe, supporters of reproductive autonomy sought to mini-
mize the effect of hostile state law by setting up counseling and referral 
networks that directed women to abortion opportunities in more sympa-
being non-residents, as "defi ned by each [provi der] in terms of its customary area of service"): 
Edward Weinstock et al., Abo rtion N eed and Services in the Unit ed States 1974-1975 , 8 Fam. 
Plan. Persp. 58, 61 ( 1976) (citing Center for Disease Control report that, of reported abortions 
where the patient's state of residence was known, 40% in 1972, 20% in 1973, and 10% in 1974 
were performed on patients from another state). 
The location of illegal abortions is harder to discern. Estimates of the number of illega l 
abo rtions in the years before R oe range fr om 200,000 to 2,000,000 per year. N. Davis, supra 
note 8, at 2 14; see also Lawrence Lade r, Abortion II: Making th e Revolution 20 & n.2 (1974) 
[hereinafter L. Lader, Abortion II] (discussing estimates of 1,000,000 "secret" abortions per 
year); Nancy Howell Lee, The Sea rch for an Abortionist 5 ( 1969) (discussing estimates rangi ng 
from 200,000 to 2,000,000 per year) . Before legali zation, doctors often sent patients for abor-
tions in other states. See Joffe, supra note 8, at 59 (account of out-of-state referrals); Lawrence 
Lader, Abortion 53-54 (1 966) [hereinafter L. Lader, Abortion I] ( 10% of ob/gyns surveyed in 
1964 admitted referring patients to abortion providers, mostly in California, Florida, New 
York, and Washington); id. at Ill (early account of doctors moving patient out of New Hamp-
shire to obtain abortion). Obtaining an illegal abortion before Roe often involved foreign 
travel as well. See, e.g., Joffe, supra note 8, at 50 (documenting referrals to Japan , Puerto 
Rico, England, and Mexico); L. Lader, Abortion I, supra, at 56-57 (1966) (noting many abor-
tions obtained in Mexico and Puerto Rico). 
10 See N. Davis, supra note 8, at 228 tbl. 10. 1 (43.8 % in 1972, 25.2% in 1973, 13.4% in 
1974). 
II Norah Henry & Milton E. Harvey, Social, Spatial , and Political Determinants of U.S. 
Abortion Rates, 16 Soc. Sci. Med. 981, 987 (1982). 
12 See Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope 191 (1991) (in 1973, 150,000 women traveled 
out of state for abortions; in 1982, the figure was 100,000 women, and, in 22 states, 10% or 
more of the women obtaining abortions obtained them out of state); Stanley K. Henshaw et a!. , 
Abortion Services in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19 Fam. Plan. Persp. 63, 66-67 & tbl. 4 
(1987) (in 1982,6% of all abortions, or 101,260 abortions, were performed out of state; and, in 
198 5, 82% of all United States counties were without identified abortion providers); Stanley K. 
Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the Ur.ited States, 1987 and 1988, 22 
Fam. Plan. Persp. 102, 105-107, tbls. 3 & 4 (1990) (in 1985, 6% of all abortions, or 88,820 
abortions, were performed out of state; in 1988. 83% of counties lacked providers); Stanley K . 
H enshaw eta!., Characteristics of U.S. Women Having Abortions, 1987, 23 F am. Plan. Persp. 
75, 80 & tbl. 6 (1991) (in 1987, 6% of all abortions or 90,830 abortions, were performed out of 
state). 
In 1985, 98% of abortions were performed in metropolitan areas. Arkansas, D elaware, 
Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming had fewer than 10 abortion providers. Colorado, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington State had more than 50 providers. California, 
Florida, and New York have more than 100. National Abortion Rights Action League, Amer-
ican Women at Risk: A State by State Ranking ( 1992) (state-by-state analysis examining posi-
tions of executive and legi3lative bodies, restrictions on abortion, and number of in-state 
providers). 
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thetic jurisdictions. 13 The re-establishment of similar networks in the 
next few years is likely. 14 As a first approximation, the late Professor 
John Kaplan probably was correct in predicting that the elimination of 
federal constitutional protection would reduce only marginally the total 
number of abortions and that "[t]he marginal reduction in abortions 
[would] come from among the very poor who are unable to afford trans-
portation to states where the practice is permitted." 15 One should add, 
13 See, e.g., Arlene Carmen & Howard Moody, Abortion Counse ling and Social Change, 
F rom Ill egal Act to Medical Prac tice 88 (!973) (describing the C lergy Consultation Service on 
A bortion, which by 1970 was refer ring 50,000 to 60,000 women per yea r for abortions); id. at 
25 (recounting Service's practice of referring women to physicians in other jurisd ictions) ; N . 
Davis, supra note 8, at 6 1 (describing Michigan referra l networks which referred women out of 
sta te); id. a t 92-96 (describing private referra l network in volved with local organ ized crime); 
id. at 133 (assertin g th at Clergy Consultation Service involved 300 clergy by 1973); id. at 140-
41 (discussing Michigan "clergy brokers" who refe rred women out o f sta te to avoid " police 
surveillance"); id . a t 144 (explaining th at for-profi t referral services in Michigan after New 
York legalization " absorbed" 1/2 to 2/3 of Michigan " market" from Clergy service); L. 
Lader, Abortion II , supra no te 9, at 24-26 (describing Lader's referral ac tivities); id. at 27-28 
(describing Patricia McGinnis' referrals to Mexican doctors); id. at 42-50, 94-96 (describing 
how Clergy Consultation Service was advised to refer women to out-of-st a te doc tors); id. a t 50-
5 1 (describing Minnesota service makin g referrals to Canada and Mexico); id. a t 5!-53 
(describing referrals by William Baird in New York); K. Luker, supra note 8, at 98 (describing 
Society for Humane Abortion, which, during early 1960s in California, referred women to 
abortion providers in Mexico); id. at 122-23 (describing California referral network including 
clergy in late 1960s); id. at 243 n. * (discussing evidence that Mafia considered entering the 
abort ion field during 1960s); Bernard N . Na thanson with Richard N. Ostling, Aborting 
America 42-44 (1979) (providing less admiring account of Clergy Consultation Service, claim-
ing 1,200 counselors "at its zenith"); G. Rosen berg, supra note 12, a t 259-60 (by 1971, Clergy 
Consulta tion Service operated in 18 states with a staff of about 700); Pa uline B. Bart, Seizing 
the Means of Reproduction: An Illegal Feminist Abortion Collective-How and Wh y It 
Worked, 10 Qualitative Soc. 339, 339-40 (1 987) (describing counseling service es tablished in 
1969 by Chicago Women's Liberati on Union, which evolved by 1971 into program which itself 
provided illegal abortions). 
14 See, e.g., Marianne Constantinou, Railroad a Ticket to Abortion, Philadelphia Daily 
News, May 27, 1992, a t 3 (claiming that there are currently 300 volunteers in 31 states ready 
to form "overground railroad" to provide transport,ation to states where abortion is legal); cf. 
Jodi Enda, N .J. Centers Expect an Influx from Pa ., Philadelphia Inquirer, June 30, 1992, at 1 
(observing that referrals to New Jersey ex pected to avoid 24-hour waiting period and parental 
consent requirements in Pennsylvania); Tamar Lewin, Pa rental Consent to Abortion: How 
Enforcement Can Vary, N.Y. T imes, May 28, 1992 at AI (noting tha t Indiana abortion clinics 
advise teenagers seeking abortions without pa rental consent to go to neighboring Kentucky or 
Illinois, and that 100 teenage rs a month ha ve sought abortions outside Massachusetts to avoid 
parental consent requirements of that sta te) . 
IS John Kaplan, Abortion as a Vice Crime: A What If Story, 51 Law & Contemp. Probs., 
151 , 159 (Winter 1988) (footnote omitted); see also Ba rt , su pra note 13, a t 341 (observing that 
middle-class women seeking abortions frequently went to other states once abortion became 
legal there, while " poor Black women" and other poor women continued to seek abortions 
locally); N. Davis, supra note 8, at 199 (noting tha t non-residen ts making use of N ew York 
abortion availability were 87.2% white, in contrast to in-state users, of whom 44.9% were 
white, and that " (o]ut-of-state travel costs prevented most poor minorities from using the new 
abortion broker arrangements"); Carole Joffe, Physician Provision of Abortion Before R oe v. 
Wade, 9 Res. in the Soc. of Health Care 21, 28-30 (1 99 1) (recalling that abortions before Roe 
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in the interests of realism, that the marginal reduction likely would come 
as -yvell from among women who are young, uninformed, dependent, or 
otherwise vulnerable. 16 The narrowing of constitutional protections in 
Casey is likely to be blunted in a similar fashion. The reduction in the 
number of abortions performed will be limited and restricted to certain 
segments of the population; most women in states with restrictive regula-
tions who wish to evade the restrictions upheld in Casey will simply 
travel to neighboring states. 
This situation, I suspect, will be deeply unsatisfying to zealous abor-
tion opponents . In the early 1970s, the United States witnessed numer-
ous state efforts to disrupt referral networks. States prosecuted 
counselors ,17 travel agents, 18 doctors, 19 and newspaper editors20 who 
were more readily available to women with resources or contacts, while "poor, young and 
mi nority women" were "disproportiona tely ... vulnerable"); Tietze & Lewit, supra note 9, at 
172 (non-resident women obtaining abortions more likely to be white than resident women 
obtaining abortions) . In the most extensive study of pre-Roe illegal abortions, Nancy Howell 
Lee concluded that " competent doctors make their services discreetly available to their middle 
class patients and the informal networks circulate this information among people similar in 
background, while poor women find only nonphysicians or self-induced methods available to 
them." N. Lee, supra note 9, at 168-69. 
16 Cf. K. Luker, supra note 8, at 242-43 (predicting that "nominally illegal" abortion 
would still be obtainable by those with "the right combination of money and information"); 
James D. Shelton et al., Abortion Utilization: Does Travel Distance Matter?, 8 Fam. Plan. 
Persp. 260, 262 ( 1976) (noting that negative correlation between abortion rates and distance 
from abortion facilities in Georgia strongest for black teenagers). 
On the barriers befo re R oe, seeN. Davis, supra note 8, at 163-70 (claiming that women 
seeking abortions typically had to go through four intermediaries); N. Lee, supra note 9, at 155 
(indicat ing that networks of contacts crucial for access to abortion). Survey data in Steven 
Polgar & Ellen S. Fried, The Bad Old Days: Clandestine Abortions Among the Poor in New 
Yo rk City Before Liberalization of the Abortion Law, 8 Fam. Plan. Persp. 125 , 125-26 ( 1976) 
suggest that , at least among the women of childbearing age in poverty areas surveyed in 1965 
and 1967, only 4% knew of a physician who could provide an abortion. Of those women who 
sought to terminate pregnancy only 2% used doctors, and 80% attempted to terminate them-
selves. Id. 
17 See, e.g., Landreth v. Hopkins, 331 F. Supp. 920, 921-22 (N.D. Fla. 1971) (involving 
invest igat ion and threatened prosecution of Tallahassee abortion counselors who referred 
women for legal abortions in New York); People v. Orser, 107 Cal. Rptr. 458, 462-64 (CaL Ct . 
. "-.pp. 1973) (s triking down conviction for offering to make arrangements for Mexican abor-
tion); Commonwealth v. Hare, 280 N.E.2d 138, 139 (Mass. 1972) (prosecution of operator of 
Cleveland abortion referral service for referring women to abortions in Massachusetts) ; Lefko-
witz v. Women's Pavilion, 321 N.Y.S .2d 963, 964 (S up. Ct. 1971) (Attorney G enera l's effort to 
subpoena abortion referral service's records in criminal investigation); State v. Abortion Info. 
Agency, 323 N.Y.S .2d 597 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (granting injunction against abo rtion referral ser-
vice), aff'd, 334 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1972); People v. Lovell , 242 N.Y.S.2d 95 8 (Oneida County 
1963) (partially granting defendant's motion to access grand jury records in prosecution for 
abortion referral); A. Carmen & H. Moody, supra note 13, at 55-56 (recounting Massachu-
setts' efforts to prosecute Ohio pastor for referring Ohio woman for abortion in Massachusetts, 
as well as Michigan indictment of Illinois rabbi for referring Illinois woman for abortion in 
Detroit); L. Lader, Abortion II, supra note 9, at 74-76 (describing Massachusetts's efforts to 
ex tradite Cleveland minister for referral to Massachusetts doctor); id. at 76-77 (detailing Mich-
igan's efforts to prosecute Chicago rabbi for referral to Michigan doc tor using undercover 
I 
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provided information or referrals regarding out-of-state abortions. Con-
temporary European governments intent on limiting abortion have taken 
the process a step further. 
Ireland has sought to bar Irish women from leaving the country in 
order to prevent them from taking advantage of more liberal abortion 
laws elsewhere in the European Community. Its courts have enjoined 
student health groups and women's health clinics from proffering infor-
mation about legal abortion providers in England, 21 while Irish prosecu-
agents and searches of rabbi's files). 
IS Cf. State v. Bartlet t, 270 A.2d 168, 171 (Vt. 1970) (prosecution for transpo rting woman 
from Vermont to Montreal to obtain abo rtion); Ads for London Abortions St ir Legal Ques-
tions, N.Y. T imes, January 26, 1970, at 20 (effort by Massachusetts authoriti es to prevent 
advertising by agency offering to arrange for transportation to and from abortion clinics in 
England) ; Lawyer Pleads Not Guilty in Abortion Package Deal, N.Y. Times. Februa ry 3, 
1970, at 40 (prosecution of that agency). 
19 See People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 195-96, 206 (Cal. 1969) (prosecution of doctor who 
referred patients to medical practitioners in Mexico and California for "conspiracy to commit 
abortion"), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); cf. Kudish v. Bd. of Registration in Medicine, 
248 N.E.2d 264, 265-66 (Mass. 1969) (revoking medical license of physician convicted for 
providing an unlawful abortion). 
20 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (reversing newspaper edi tor' s con vic-
tion); cf. A tlanta Coop. News Project v. United States Postal Serv., 350 F. Supp. 234, 238-39 
(N.D. Ga. 1972) (striking down federal statute prohibiting mailing of any writing giving infor-
mation as to how, where, or from whom abortion could be performed); State v. New Times, 
Inc., 511 P.2d 196, 198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (holding unconstitutional Arizona's prosecution 
of newspaper for publishing abortion advertisements). 
I do not address in this paper the problem of private efforts to disrupt referral networks. 
Depending on the resolution of Bray, only state remedies may be available, although presuma-
bly out-of-state providers could invoke federal diversity jurisdiction. See Bray v. Alexandria 
Women's Health Clinic, cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 1070 (Feb. 25 , 1992) (No. 90-985), reargu-
ment ordered, 122 S. Ct. 2935 (June 8, 1992). Since the right to travel has no state ac tion 
requirement, it might be technically possible to bring a Bivens action against private parties. 
2 1 SPUC v. Grogan, (1989] I.R. 753, 766, (1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 689, 700 (Ir. S.C. Dec. 19, 
1989) (granting injunction against student counseling); Attorney Gen. ex rei. SPUC v. Open 
Door Counselling, Ltd., (1988] I.R. 593, 627 [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 443, 452 (Ir. S. C. Mar. 16, 
1988) (confirming injunction against assisting pregnant women in Ireland from traveling 
abroad to obtain abortions, including assistance in form of supplying the identity or location of 
abortion providers). 
In SPUC v. Grogan, (1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849, the European Court of Just ice held that an 
injunction against the dissemination of the location of overseas abortion providers by an Irish 
student group was not an improper restriction on free flow of goods and services under the 
Treaty of Rome, which established the European Community. On the other hand, in that case 
the Advocate General expressed the view that a "ban on pregnant women going abroad or a 
rule under which they would be subjected to unsolicited examinations upon their return" 
would violate the Treaty of Rome as a "disproportionate" interference with free travel rights. 
See id. at 875, 885. The judgment of the Court left the question open. The Advocate General 
also suggested that the Irish prohibition would not infringe on free speech rights, see id . at 883-
84, but the European Court declined to reach the issue. Elizabeth Spahn, Abortion, Speech 
and the European Community, I J. Soc. Welfare & Fam. L. 17, 26 (1992). 
The European Commission of Human Rights in Open Door Counselling, Ltd. v. Ireland, 
7 March 1991 Application No. 1434/88 and 1435/88, expressed the opinion that an injunction 
against abortion counseling entered by the Irish Supreme Court, (1988) I.R. 593, viol ated the 
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tors unsuccessfully sought to prevent a fourteen-year-old rape victim 
from traveling to England to obtain an abortion. 22 
Some German authorities adopted a different tack under the former 
West German abortion law, seeking to impose domestic criminal penal-
ties on women for obtaining abortions in more permissive countries. 
German border guards forced gynecological examinations upon women 
reentering Germany at the Dutch border in the search for evidence of 
extraterritorial abortions, while prosecutors brought criminal charges 
against German women upon their return from abortions obtained in 
other European countries with more permissive laws. 23 
free speech guarantees of Article 10 of the European Human Rights Convention. The judg-
ment was based on a fa ilure by Ireland to provide adequate not ice. Report of The Commission 
13 ; see also Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. at 882. The European Court of Human Rights recently held 
that Ireland 's ban on information about abortions in the U.K. violated Article 10 because the 
restriction was dispropo rtionate to the aim pursued. See Freedom to Receive and Impart In-
formation Violated by Ireland, London Times, Nov. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, INTL File; European Court of Human Ri ghts Court Rules for Pro-Choice Activists, 
United Press Internat ional. Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. 
22 The Irish Supreme Court reversed an injunction prohibiting a fourteen-y ear-old rape 
victim from traveling to England to obtain an aborti on. Four of the five members of the Irish 
Supreme Court held that in this particular case, the danger of suicide made the abortion one 
that could be performed in Ireland itself. Attorney Gen. v. X, [1 992] ILRM 401 (Ir. S. C. 
Mar. 5, 1992), available in LEXIS, Ireland Library, Cases File (opinions of Justices Finley, 
McCarthy, Eagan, and O' Flaherty). It appears, however, that the judgment does not loosen 
the constraints on referral s in other cases, and indeed three of the Justices explicitly rejected 
the proposition that there is a right to leave the country to obtain an abortion that would be 
impermissible in Ireland (opinions of Justices Finley, Hederman (dissenting) and Eagan). 
The Irish efforts have not eliminated foreign abortions. See Anthony Blinken, Womb for 
Debate, New Republic, Jul y 8, 1991 at 12 (citing estimate by "France's Family Planning 
Movement, a pro-choice group" of "some 15,000" Irish women per year receiving abortions); 
Kieran Cooke, European Diary, Ireland, Doubts Over a Small Dublin Hospital Recall a Great 
Poet's Warning, Financial Times (London), July 26, 1990, § I, at 2 (asserting that "many 
thousands of . .. women travel to England each year" from Ireland to have abortions, and that 
recent court judgments make counselors liable to prosecution); Chris Ryder, Irish Torn Over 
Abortion Ban on Rape Girl, Daily Telegraph (Ireland), Feb. 14, 1992, at 4 (estimating that 
6,000 Irish women per year travel to England for abortions); William E. Schmidt, Girl , 14, 
Raped and Pregnant, Is Caught in Web of Irish Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1992, at AI , A7, 
Al3 (estimati ng that 4,000 Irish women per yea r travel to England or Wales for abortions). 
There are also reports that thousands of French women per year also obtain ex traterrito-
rial abortions. Blinken, supra, at 12 (estimating that almost 3,000 French women travelled to 
Britain in 1989 to obtain abortions which would have been illegal in France). 
23 See Debates, 1991 O.J. (Annex 3-403) 202-205 (Mar. 14, 199 1) (Debates of European 
Parliament) (debate on resolutions condemning compulsory gynecological examinations by 
German officials of returning German women at the Dutch-Germ an border); id. at 203 (state-
ment of Rep. Van Den Brink) ("over 6000 German women have had .. . abortion[s] in the 
Netherlands"); id. a t 204 (statement of Rep. Keppelhoff-Wi echert) (defending searches on the 
ground that officials "are required by the code of criminal procedure to investigate illegal 
abortions of this kind carried out abroad where there are grounds for suspecting that such has 
been committed .... ");see also Karen Y. Crabbs, The German Abortion Debate: Stumbling 
Block to Unity, 6 Fla. J. Int'l L. 213, 222-23 & n.l03 ( 1991) (account of prosecutions, 
searches, and examinations of returning German women); Nina Bernstein, Germany Still Di-
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In the United States, constitutional doctrine that developed contem-
poraneously with Roe put an end to such government interdiction. In 
Doe v. Bolton, 24 the Court held that article IV's privileges and immuni-
ties clause protected out-of-state women who entered Georgia in order to 
seek abortions. Under article IV, Georgia could not prohibit doctors 
from providing abortions to non-residents. 2 5 Two years later, in Bigelow 
v. Virginia, 26 the Court overturned a Virginia newspaper editor's convic-
tion for running an advertisement for a New York abortion referral ser-
vice. Because the services were legal in New York at the time, the Court 
announced, in an opinion from which Justices White and Rehnquist dis-
sented, that 
[t]he Virginia Legislature could not have regulated the advertiser's ac-
tivity in New York, and obviously could not have proscribed the activ-
ity in that state .... Neither could Virginia prevent its residents from 
traveling to New York to obtain those services, or, as the state con-
ceded, prosecute them for going there. Virginia possessed no authority 
to regulate the services provided in New York . ... 27 
vided on Abortion, Newsday (New York), March II, 1991, at 5 (providing account of German 
woman returning from Netherlands who was forced to submit to vaginal examination at Cath-
olic hospital near border and charged with illegal abortion; noting that study by Max Planck 
Institute finds that such "inquisitions" are "standard practice"). The European Parliament 
condemned the searches and resolved that "the internal borders of the European Community 
may not be used to threaten citizens with prosecution for activities that are perfectly legal in 
some Members States but not in others. " Resolution on Compulsory Gynecological Examina-
tions at the Dutch-German Border of March 14, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 106) 113. 
Because the national German prohibition on abortion was administered with varying de-
grees of stringency by state authorities, over half of the women who obtained abortions in West 
Germany before German reunification travelled out of their own states to obtain abortions in 
more liberal jurisdictions. Michael G. Mattern, German Abortion Law: The Unwanted Child 
of Reunification, 13 Loyola L. A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 643, 686 & n.360 (1991). With reunifica-
tion , the decision to retain East Germany's substantially more permissive abortion law within 
the old East German borders provided the option of travelling to East Germany as well. I d. at 
686; cf. Tyler Marshall, Abortion Law Split Imperils German Talks, L.A. Times, August 28, 
1990, at A4 (indicating that after unification, Christian Democrats sought to apply law of 
place of residence to punish West German women who obtained abortions in former East 
Germany). 
The conflict in Germany may be ameliorated by the new liberalized uniform abortion law 
which the unified German legislature has adopted, although conservatives have vowed to chal-
lenge the law. Tamara Jones, Abortion is Legalized in Germany, L.A. Times, June 26, 1992, 
at AIO. 
24 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973). 
25 See id. The Court also adverted to the right to travel relied on in Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S . 618, 629-31 (1969). See id. 
26 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
27 Id. at 822-24 (citations omitted). Professor Donald Regan, in Siamese Essays: (I) CTS 
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extrater-
ritorial State Legislation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1865, 1907 ( 1987) [hereinafter Regan, Siamese 
Essays], seeks to treat these statements as dicta, asserting that "there is no ground for claiming 
[Justice Blackmun's] actual argument depends on such a premise ." 
Characterizing the Bigelow principle as dictum is a dubious move. At oral argument in 
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Bigelow might seem dispositive on the question of state interdiction 
or prosecution of women's travel to sympathetic jurisdictions.2 8 One dif-
ficulty with such a quick conclusion, of course, is that, under the Rehn-
quist Court, reliance on previous decisions has become a somewhat 
hazardous enterprise. 29 More is at stake, however, than the vitality of 
precedent under a new regime. 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Bigelow accused the majority of estab-
lishing a "rigid territorial limitation" whose source was "not revealed" 
and which was "at war with prior cases."30 Bigelow has been criticized 
as being out of step with modern thinking in conflict of laws, which tends 
to recognize residence rather than territoriality as the primary determi-
nant of legal obligation. 31 Working from what they regard as general 
Bigelow, the state conceded under questioning that it co uld not regulate abortions performed 
in New York. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Bigelow v. Virginia , 421 U.S. 809 (1975) 
(statement of D . Patrick Lacy, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia). Not only did lower 
courts treat the Bigelow determination as a holding in the year before Professor Regan wrote, 
see, e.g. , Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Friends of C hildren, Inc., 653 F. 
Supp. 1221 , 1227 (N.D. Fla. 1986) (reading state statute so as not to permit ex traterritori al 
jurisdiction of Florida legislature), but Justice R ehnquist in Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism 
Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345 (1986), distinguished Bigelow from a limitat ion on advertising for do-
mestic gambling on the grou nd that "the underlying conduct that was the subject of the adver-
tising restrictions [in Bigelow] was constitutionally protected and could not be prohibited by 
th e state." As the Bigelow Court observed, the underlying for-profit referral services which 
were at issue in Bigelow were subsequently declared illegal by New York, and were not them-
selves constitutionally protected against regulation by New York. Bigelo w, 421 U.S. at 822 
n. 8, 827. The only "constitutional protection" which serves to distinguish Bigelow is the pro-
tection against extraterritorial regulation of conduct legal where it occurs. 
28 See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 160 & n.60 (citing Bigelow for proposition that a state 
cannot prevent its citizens from receiving out-of-state abortions "by inhibiting information as 
to where out-of-state abortions may be performed"). 
29 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, IllS. Ct. 2597,2609-11 (1991) (declaring stare decisis less 
compelling in constitutional than in statutory cases). A quick body count this Term finds 
consti tutional precedent still standing after challenges in Quill Corp. v. No rth Dakota, 112 S. 
Ct. 1904, 1907 (1992); Allied Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2261-
63 (1992); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 ( 1992), Hilton v. South Carolina 
Pub. Rys. Comm., 112 S. Ct. 560, 563-64 (1991); and Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 
( 1992). Constitutional precedent was wounded, but remained viable, in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2808-16 (1992); and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2551 
( 1992) (White, J ., concurring) (majority "casts aside long established First Amendment doc-
trine"). Cases which left precedent critically injured include: Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 
1780, 1791-94 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of "overrulin g without men -
tion ' ' recent precedent); New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2441-44 (1992) (White, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (majority opinion's rul e is inadequately sup-
ported, improperly applies prior test, and omits relevant cases); and Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council , 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2904 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (majority opinion 
remakes traditional rules of review and creates new rules). 
30 Bigelow , 421 U.S. at 834 & 83 5 n.2. 
31 It has not been uncommon for modern conflict of laws scholars to assert that a state has 
unlimited authority over its citizens extraterritorially. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, Equality and 
the Conflict of Laws, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 893, 907 n.94 (1988) ("States may punish citizens for 
criminal acts done outside the state." (citation omitted); Bigelow is the "only decision calling 
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principles, at least two commentators have argued that if Roe were re-
moved, there would be no constitutional obstacle to states' efforts to pro-
hibit their citizen's extraterritorial abortions.J2 
The reach of these arguments transcends the context of abortion. 
As the Supreme Court withdraws from its position as arbiter of funda-
mental national values, we can expect a state-by-state patchwork to 
into question the extraterritorial authority over citizens . . . "). This conclusion is com-
pounded by the contemporary reaction against the territorialism of earlier conflicts methodol-
ogy and the uncritical application of the international law principles which permit the United 
States to apply its own law outside of national boundaries. As this Article will demonstrate, 
the first element fails to take account of a strong tradition of American federalism which terri-
torially limits state criminal authority, and the second ignores the differences between interna-
tional and interstate relations under the American Constitution. 
32 Professor William Van Alstyne, in his essay Closing the Circle of Constitutional Review 
from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of Decision Merely Overruling 
Roe, 1989 Duke L.J. 1677, 1684 n.27, takes the position, without mentioning Bigelow, that 
"nothing in the constitution would hold it amiss" if a state sought to prosecute one of its 
female citizens for an extraterritorial abortion. Professor Van Alstyne relies on Williams v. 
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238-39 ( 1945), which permitted a prosecution for bigamous 
cohabitation to proceed against North Carolina residents divorced and remarried in Nevada, 
who returned to live together in North Carolina. 
Williams is not on point, for the cohabitation which formed the basis for the prosecution 
took place within the borders of North Carolina. Id. at 227 n.l. Indeed, North Carolina 
courts have long held that a statute seeking to punish a resident for a bigamous marriage 
which took place in another state would exceed the constitutional authority of the state, and 
impinge on federally guaranteed constitutional rights. See State v. Batdorf, 238 S.E.2d 497, 
502 (N.C. 1977) (discussing long recognition of territorial limits on criminal jurisdiction of 
state courts); State v. Ray, 66 S.E. 204, 205 (N.C. 1909) (bigamous marriage outside state not 
indictable offense); State v. Cutshall, 15 S.E. 261, 264 (N.C. 1892) (state statute proscribing 
bigamous marriage in another state implicates federal vicinage rights, privileges and immuni-
ties, and unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce). In response to the constitutional 
limitations, North Carolina amended its laws to make cohabitation within its own borders the 
basis for prosecution. State v. Herren, 94 S.E. 698 , 699 (N.C. 1917). Thus, if the facts of 
Williams stand for anything, it is that the constraints of due process and federalism would hold 
it very much amiss for a state to seek to prosecute for an extraterritorial act. See also Thomas 
Reed Powell, And Repent at Leisure, An Inquiry into the Unhappy Lot of Those Whom 
Nevada Hath Joined Together and North Carolina Hath Put Asunder, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 930, 
994 (1945) (" North Carolina did not punish this couple for anything that they did outside of 
North Carolina . . North Carolina's statute does not forbid the getting of an outside di-
vorce, and the unbiased sampler will find no flavor in the Court's opinion suggesting that 
North Carolina has the power to do so."). 
Professor Donald Regan in the course of a broader discussion of extraterritoriality, treats 
Bigelow's protection as dictum, and announces his "stronger intuition" that "if Roe v. Wade 
were overruled, states would be free to forbid their citizens from having abortions elsewhere." 
Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 27, at 1906-12. Still other commentators differ on the 
possibility of such an occurrence. Compare Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion, The Clash of Abso-
lutes 127 (1990) (asserting that if the Constitution permitted a state to regard the fetus as a 
baby, the state in which a woman conceived could forcibly restrain her from traveling to a 
more permissive state to obtain an abortion) with Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal 
and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 
249, 260 (1992) ("[N)o state has yet tried to prosecute resident women who undergo abortions 
out of state, or even forbid insurance coverage for such abortions, and perhaps none will."). 
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emerge in other domains of contested morality. Where the contesting 
moralities are deeply held, we can also expect efforts by each side to pro-
ject its values extraterritorially . In the absence of constitutional con-
straint, not only may Pennsylvania prosecute its citizens for obtaining 
abortions in New Jersey , but N ew Jersey might punish its residents for 
hiring surrogate mothers in Pennsylvania. 33 Georgia could punish its 
residents for traveling to Missouri to engage in consensual sexual prac-
tices, while Missouri might interfere with its citizens' efforts to take ad-
vantage of a right to die in M innesota. 34 California could prosecute its 
citizens for harassing women at abortion clinics in Utah, and Utah in 
turn could press charges against Utah residents for smoking marijuana in 
Al aska, or drinking ~lcohol and reading pornography in N evada. 35 
There are, as I will demonstrate in this Article, profound objections 
of constitutional practice and theory to such scenarios. 36 D espite the 
claims of Justice Rehnquist and some modern commentators, Bigelow is 
a case with strong foundations . T he tradition of American federalism 
stands squarely against efforts by states to punish their citizens for con-
duct that is protected in the sister state where it occurs. T he F ramers of 
the fourteenth amendment inherited a legal landscape in which a state's 
sovereignty was limited to its own borders, and they established a super-
vening national citizenship which guaranteed the right to travel and to 
take advantage of the legal entitlements of neighboring jurisdictions. 
33 Cf. Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy Arrange ments and the Conflic t of Laws, 1990 
Wis. L. Rev. 399, 444- 52 (concluding such prosecution would be an "unfamiliar, untested, and 
perhaps constitutionally problematic experiment"). 
34 See In re Busalacchi , No. 59582, 199 1 Mo. App. LEX IS 315, at * 13-* 16 (Ct. A pp. Mar. 
5, 1991) (order prohibiting guardian from transferrin g ward who was in persistent vegetative 
state to Minnesota hospital because of perception that he was doi ng so to avoid Missouri's law 
and remanding for furth er hearings), remanded, 199 1 Mo. LEX IS 107, * I (M o. Oct. 16, 199 1 ). 
35 Cf. Cap ital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S . 69 1, 694 ( 1984) (invalida ting state regu-
lation requiring cable television operators to delet e all advertisements for alcoholic beverage 
appearin g in out-of-state signals retransmitt ed within state) . 
36 I frame my arguments primaril y in term s of the tex t, history, and struc ture of the Con-
stitution. I leave for a future ar ticle the en terprise of elabo rati ng more full y the theoretica l 
underpinnin gs of the constitutional argu ment and th eir relation to the theo ries of conflict of 
laws . 
Support for my position comes from unlikely sources. See, e.g., Brief fo r U ni ted Sta tes 
A micus Curiae Supporting Peti tioners, Bray v. Alexandri a Women's H ealth C linic, cert. 
granted, Ill S. Ct. 1070 C-l'o. 90-98 5) (Feb. 25), reargument ordered, 112 S. Ct. 2935 (June 8, 
1992) ("For a State either to 'prevent ' its citi zens from travelling to another State, or to prose-
cute them after-the-fac t for making such a trip, would directly and purposefull y in terfere with 
th eir right of interstate travel . . .. "). 
This Article also foc uses on the question of di rect prohibition of travel fo r extraterritorial 
abortions, since the premise of the Bigelow decision, at least as interpreted by Posadas, is tha t 
prohibition of advert is ing is impermissible because prohibition of extraterritoria l abortions is 
unconstitutional. H aving established the arguments for the Bigelow premise in this Article, I 
hope to address in a future article the Bigelow resul t an d the associated first amendment issues 
that arise from efforts to interfere with referral networks. 
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Modern cases have modified, but not eliminated, this basic scheme. Even 
if the Court withdraws its protection of extra-textual constitutional liber-
ties under the due process clause, that withdrawal does not vitiate the 
obligations national citizenship imposes on the states. Indeed, if the 
Court' s decision to abandon protection of reproductive autonomy rests 
on the ground that constitutional decisions must take account of the " rel-
evant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right," 37 
the Court, if it is to be consistent, must also defer to our traditions of 
moral pluralism and mobility among states. 
American citizens may be subject to different moral agendas in dif-
ferent locations. This is the essence of American federalism. But federal-
ism does not entail a moral Balkanization, in which competing moral 
agendas seek without restraint to conquer foreign territories; it should 
not be a system in which citizens carry home-state law with them as they 
travel , like escaped prisoners dragging a ball and chain. 
This Article is divided into two Parts. Part I discusses the con-
straints that the structure of the American federal system and respect for 
neighboring states impose on states that seek to regulate the extraterrito-
rial behavior of their citizens. It examines the history of extraterritorial 
regulation, beginning with a review of the strict conception of territorial 
jurisdiction which accompanied the framing of the Constitution and the 
fourteenth amendment, and which long dominated judicial review of 
state efforts to regulate the extraterritorial behavior. It then traces the 
dilution of these limitations from the New Deal to recent decades. It 
concludes that, particularly in criminal cases, the principle that states 
must respect the disparate moral commitments of other states regarding 
behavior in neighboring territories remains intact. Efforts to prosecute 
citizens for taking advantage of opportunities made available in other 
states violate this principle. 
Part II discusses the constraints on states that inhere in the constitu-
tional commitments to national union and national citizenship. It argues 
that state efforts to control the interstate movement of citizens and serv-
ices in order to limit the ability of citizens to enjoy the full benefits made 
available in neighboring states would be inconsistent with both the com-
merce clause and the privileges and immunities clause of article IV. 
37 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2874 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
also id. (abortion "is not constitutionally protected- because ... the longstanding traditions of 
American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed"); id. at 2876 (abortion cannot be 
protected because it is conduct which has "long been criminalized in American society"); id. at 
2859 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (fundamental right must be linked to the "historical traditions 
of the American people"). 
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I 
MORAL DISSENSUS AND TERRITORIAL JURISDlCTION 
IN A FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
A. The First Republic and Territorial Jurisdiction 
Moral dissensus is not new to America. The most prominent exam-
ple in the period of our founding centered on the question of slavery. 
From the origins of the Republic, disparate commitments regarding the 
morality of slavery threatened national cohesion, and in turn were 
threatened by it. 38 The equilibrium reached in the first period of Ameri-
can history apportioned each state moral sovereignty within its own 
boundaries and obliged neighboring states to accede to that 
sovereignty. 39 
The Constitution was framed on the premise that each state's sover-
eignty over activities within its boundaries excluded the sovereignty of 
other states. The understanding that a citizen of one state venturing into 
another state would be bound by the local law of that other state moti-
vated the adoption of article IV's privileges and immunities clause;4 0 it 
was necessary to guarantee that the host would not use its exclusive 
power to the detriment of visitors from other states in the Union . The 
fugitive slave clause41 was tacit recognition that, absent constitutional 
constraint, local law could emancipate slaves who found their way across 
borders whatever the rules in their home state. 42 On the other hand, the 
38 In the Constitutional Convention, Madison contended "the States were divided into dif-
ferent interests not by their difference of size ... but principally from the effec ts of their having 
or not having slaves." Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James 
Madison 224 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) [hereinafter Federal Convention Debates]. See gener-
ally Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union 22-40 (198 1) (discussing impact of slavery at Con-
stitutional Convention). 
39 SeeP. Finkelman, supra note 38, at IS ("The third option , which most states ultimately 
adopted, was the enforcement of the lex fori (law of the forum) and rej ection of th e lex loci 
(Jaw of the state of residence) of the slaves involved."); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the 
Conflict of Laws 116 (1846) ("foreign slaves would no longer be deemed such after their re-
moval [to free states]"). 
40 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. I. 
41 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
42 Cf. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U .S. (16 Pet.) 539,612 (1842) (Story, J.) ("if the constitu-
tion had not contained [the fugitive slave clause,] every non-slave-holding sta te in the Union 
would have been at liberty to have declared free all runaway slaves coming wit hin its limits"); 
id. at 648 (Wayne, J.) (absent fugitive slave clause, escaped slaves could be freed in North 
(quoting Iredell, J., addressing North Carolina Convention)). 
In the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinck ney first sought to qualify rights of the 
host state under the privileges and immunities clause by including a protection "in fa vo r of 
property in slaves," an effort which was rejected. See Federal Convention Debates, supra note 
38, at 545. He then, along with Pierce Butler, sought to insert the fugitive slave clause. Id. 
This effort succeeded the next day. Id. at 552. See generally P. Finkelman, supra note 38, at 
35 (discussing reasons why Pinckney and other slaveholders at the Convention would have 
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extradition clause of article IV, providing that an accused who flees from 
the state where a crime is committed be "delivered up, and removed to 
the state having jurisdiction of the crime," acknowledged that the sole 
responsibility and prerogative for punishment rests with the state within 
which the crime occurred. 43 
This limitation of jurisdiction to territory was more than a recogni-
tion of the structure of sovereignty. For statesmen who had claimed that 
British efforts "depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of T rial by 
Jury" and "transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended of-
fenses"44 were grounds for revolution, the right to be tried by a jury of 
the vicinage-the place where the crime had been committed-func-
tioned as a bulwark against tyranny. 45 
been concerned about free movement of masters with their slaves). 
43 U.S. Canst. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. Cf. Letter of James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 
10, 1784), 4 Founders' Constitution 517 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) ("Un-
less Citizens of one State transgressing within the pale of another be given up to be punished by 
the latter, they cannot be punished at all."). Madison was discussing the demand by South 
Carolina that Virginia extradite a Virginia citizen for an assault in South Carolina; his assump-
tion was that Virginia would have no authority to punish its citizens for extraterritorial 
wrongs. 
Professor Laycock argues forcefully that, as a matter of constitutional law, "state author-
ity is in fact divided territorially .... State boundaries do what ordinary citizens think they do: 
divide the authority of separate sovereigns." Laycock, supra note 32, at 320. As well as rely-
ing on political thought of the Framers and their opponents, id. at 315-16, he observes, inter 
alia, that the prohibition in art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 of forming new states "within the jurisdiction of 
any other state" equates jurisdiction with territory. Id. at 317. 
44 The Declaration of Independence para. 23, 24 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in 4 Founders' 
Constitution, supra note 43, at 390; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (quoting 
Declaration). 
45 At common law, a crime could be prosecuted only before a jury from the county in 
which the crime occurred. See William Wirth Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: 
Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 60-61 (1944); Drew L. Kershen, 
Vicinage, 29 Okla. L. Rev. 801, 803 ( 1976). British threats in 1769 to extradite colonial 
trouble makers from Massachusetts for trial in England drew immediate and unanimous out-
rage from colonial legislatures. For example, the Virginia House of Burgesses, in a resolution 
passed in 1769, decried the practice as "highly derogatory of the Rights of British subjects; as 
thereby the inestimable Privilege of being tried by a Jury from the Vicinage ... will be taken 
away from the Party accused." Blume, supra, at 64; Kershen, supra, at 814-15. In 1774, the 
Continental Congress asserted the "great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers 
of the vicinage," and claimed that a British Act which authorized violations of the act occur-
ring outside the realm to be tried "in any shire or county within the realm" deprived Ameri-
cans of "a constitutional trial by jury of the vicinage." Continental Congress Declaration and 
Resolves 14 Oct. 1774 in 5 Framers' Constitution, supra note 32, at 258. 
According to Madison, it was the " uniformity of trial by Juries of the vicinage" among 
the states which made extradition under the Articles of Confederation to the place where the 
crime occurred palatable. 
The tmnsportation to G[reat] B[ritain] seems to have been reprobated on very different 
grounds: it would have deprived the accused of the privilege of trial by jury of the vici-
nage ... and have exposed him to trial in a place where he was not even alleged to have 
ever made himself obnoxious to it. 
Letter of James Madison to Edmund Randolph 4 (Mar. 10, 1784), 4 Founders' Constitution, 
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The guarantee of a jury local to the site of the alleged crime was also 
embodied in article III's requirement that, for federal offenses, "[t]he 
trial of all Crimes ... shall be held in the State where said Crimes shall 
have been committed . " 46 As the Supreme Court has noted, fears "that 
Article II I's provision failed to preserve the common law right to be tried 
by a 'jury of the vicinage' ... furnished part of the impetus for introduc-
ing amendments to the Constitution that ultimately resulted in the jury 
trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment . ... " 47 The sixth amendment 
now guarantees that "(i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... " 48 
The strains of moral dissensus survived the framing, and the consti-
tutional pattern of exclusive territorial sovereignty came into play imme-
diately. In 1791, Pennsylvania demanded of Virginia the extradition of 
three Virginia residents charged by Pennsylvania with kidnapping a free 
black man from within its borders; the victim was subsequently sold into 
slavery. Against a background of abolitionist activity in Pennsylvania, 
Virginia refused to recognize Pennsylvania's right to punish Virginia resi-
dents, even though the kidnapping had taken place in Pennsylvania. The 
intervention of President Washington and the Congress, responding with 
legislation that implemented the article IV extradition clause, ultimately 
tempered Virginia's intransigence. 49 
By the time of the Civil War, the territorial equilibrium remained. 
In Kentucky v. Dennison, 50 a unanimous Supreme Court retained the 
principle that the law at place of commission determined criminality, and 
held that the principle worked in favor of slavery as well as freedom. 
supra note 43, at 390. 
46 U.S. Canst. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Article III also provides for cases in which the federal 
crime is committed outside of state territory. This may either simply indicate that it was 
contemplated that the United States would hold sovereignty over territory not within any 
state, or that the nation, unlike the states, could expect to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
in international cases. 
47 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1970) (citatiO;JS omitted). 
48 U.S. Canst. amend. VI. 
49 See California v. Superior Court, 482 U.S. 400,407 (1987) (describing the Pennsylvani a-
Virginia dispute). Accounts of the imbroglio are also contained in P. Finkelman, supra note 
38, at 6; 2 John Cadman Hurd, Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States 386-87 
(1862); James Alexander Scott, Law of Interstate Rendition 5-9 (1917); Correspondence in 9 
National State Papers of the United States 1789-1817, pt. II, 140-46 (Eileen Daney Carzo ed., 
1985); William R. Lesli e, A Study in the Origins of Interstate Rendition: The Big Beaver 
Creek Murders, 57 Am. Hist. Rev. 63, 66-76 (1951). 
Although Virginia took the position that extradition was unnecessary because Virginia 
possessed jurisdiction to punish its citizens for acts committed in Pennsylvania, United States 
Attorney General Randolph responded that "[i]t is notorious that the crime is cognizable in 
Pennsylvania; for crimes are peculiarly of a local nature." Leslie, supra, at 72. 
so 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). 
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Faced with Kentucky's demands that Ohio extradite a free black man 
whom Kentucky accused of assisting in the escape of a slave, the Court 
held that Ohio's anti-slavery commitments failed to justify its refusal to 
honor Kentucky's criminal law. 51 The assistance, though praiseworthy 
in Ohio, was still criminal in Kentucky where it took place. 52 Article 
IV's extradition clause, according to the Court, "included, and was in-
tended to include, every offence made punishable by the law of the State 
in which it was committed .. .. " 53 
Although a state could enforce its morality within its own bounda-
ries, it was not empowered to project that power extraterritorially to ac-
company its citizens. A Virginia citizen, although able to buy, own, and 
sell human beings in Virginia, was not permitted to retain those slaves on 
the territory of free-soil New York. The privileges and immunities clause 
of article IV, according to the leading New York case, meant that 
[a] citizen of Virginia, having his home in that State ... has the same 
rights under our law which a native born citizen, domiciled elsewhere, 
would have . . . . But where the laws of the several states differ, a 
citizen of one State asserting rights in another must claim them ac-
cording to the laws of the last mentioned State, not according to those 
which obtain in his own. The position that a citizen carries with him, 
into every State into which he may go, the legal institutions of the one 
in which he was born, cannot be supported. 54 
51 See id. at 102-03. 
52 See id. 
53 Id. at 103; see also 2 J. Hurd, supra note 49, at 402 ("However contrary the act charged 
may have been to the laws of the State making the requisition, it must also have been commit-
ted within its territorial jurisdiction."). The force of the conclusion in Dennison was somewhat 
diminished by the further determination that this "duty" was not judicially enforceable. Den-
nison, 65 U .S. (24 How.) at 107-10. 
It is worth noting that the Dennison result is at odds with practice in international extra-
dition , where the principle of "double criminality" requires that the acts at issue be punishable 
in both the requesting and sending jurisdictions. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 
280 ( 1933) (offense held extraditable although not a crime under laws of place of asylum be-
cause specifically made extraditable by treaty); Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir. 
1980) (tracing this requirement to Jay Trea ty of 1794). 
54 Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 608-09 (1860). Cf. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 
Pet.) 539, 612 (1842) (Story, J.) ("if the constitution had not contained [the fugitive slave 
clause,] every non-slave-holding state in th e union would have been at liberty to have declared 
free all runaway slaves coming within its limits"); id. at 648 (Wayne, J.) (absent fugitive slave 
clause, escaped slaves could be freed in North (quoting Iredell, J., addressing North Carolina 
Convention)); Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235 , 23 8-39 (1859) (slave manumitted by Mississippi 
owner in Ohio would not be recognized as free by Mississippi law within Mississippi territory). 
The opposite outcome in Lemmon would have paved the way for Lincoln's nightmare of 
the Court extending Dred Scott to protect slavery in free states. See, e. g., P. Finkelman, supra 
note 38, at 318-19 (suggesting that Lincoln had Lemmon in mind when discussing the "next 
Dred Scott case" during political appearances in 1859-1860). While Finkelman believes that 
had Lemmon been appealed, the Supreme Court would have reversed it, id. at 313, the 
Supreme Court cited Lemmon with approval in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 
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At the same time, New York recognized that its ovvn power to de-
feat slavery ended at its borders. New York's judiciary, in People v. !Yfer-
rill,55 dismissed a prosecution of two of its residents for selling into 
slavery in the District of Columbia a free black man who had been "in-
veigled" into leaving New York. The court observed that " [i]t cannot be 
pretended or assumed that a state has jurisdiction over crimes committed 
beyond its territorial limits." 56 Any such assumption, the court noted, 
would be contrary to the constitutional scheme in at least two 
dimensions: 
First. That this state, as a sovereign and independent member of the 
confederacy, cannot protect its citizens beyond its territorial limi ts .... 
Second [in view of the jury venue provision of the sixth amendment, 
and the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV,] [t]he penal 
acts of one state can have no operation in another state . . . . Here, 
laws are local, and affect nothing more than they can reach. 57 
At the time it was announced, the conclusion of the New York court was 
in harmony with virtually unanimous judicial authority in other states 
reaching back to the founding of the Republic. 58 
(1869), overruled on other grounds, United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 
545-49 (1944), where it announced that "if ... the Constitution could be construed to secure 
to the citizens of each State in the other States the peculiar privileges conferred by their laws, 
an extra-territorial operation would be given to local legislation utterly destructive of the inde-
pendence and the harmony of states." I d. at 181. 
Indeed, fourteen years before Lemmon, in Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (IS How.) 591 
(1855), the Supreme Court suggested, in a unanimous opinion, that a statute which affixed 
legal obligations because "those who enter into such contracts are citizens of the state" would 
violate the privileges and immunities clause. ld. at 594. 
55 2 Parker Crim. Rep. 590 (1835). 
56 Id. at 596. In language of some relevance to the theories advanced by Professor Van 
Alstyne, the court continued: "[n]o one can contend that a citizen of this state, who is guilty 
of the murder of another citizen in the state of New Jersey, can be tried for that crime in this 
state." ld. at 601; cf. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 622 (Story, J.) ("state sovereignty could not rightfully 
act beyond its territorial limits"). 
57 Merrill, 2 Parker Crim. Rep. at 602-03; see, e.g., People v. Mosher, 2 Parker Crim. Rep. 
195, 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (in holding that bigamy occurring out of state could not be 
prosecuted, court reasoned that "[a]n attempt of the legislature to subject individuals to trial 
and punishment within this state, for acts done without the territorial limits of the state ... 
would be simply void"); People v. Gardener, 2 Johns. 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807) (New York 
cannot prosecute defendant for stealing horse in Vermont); People v. Schenck, 2 Johns. 479 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807) (New York cannot prosecute defendant for stealing gun in New Jersey); 
cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 614 & n.3 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (construing 1817 
New York case, Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817), to embody the 
"principle that no state will enforce the penal laws of another ... " in refusing to entertain suit 
for assault committed in California). 
58 See State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 565 (1856) ("The laws of Arkansas have no extra-
territorial operation. Each State possesses the exclusive power to provide for the punishment 
of crimes committed within its limits, except so far as this power may have been surrendered to 
the Government of the United States .... "); State v. Grady, 34 Conn. 118, 129-30 (1867) ("It 
is undoubtedly true ... that the courts of this state can take no cognizance of an offense 
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B. The Civil War and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
The Civil vVar and the adoption of the thirteenth and fo urteenth 
amencLT1ents ended the national debate on slavery. Moral dissensus 
committed in another state . . The general proposition [is] that no man is to suffer crimi-
nally for what he does out of the territorial limits . .. . "); Gilbert v. Steadman, I Root 403, 403 
(Conn. ! 792) (prosecution in Connecticut for theft in Massachusetts dismissed as "out of the 
jurisdiction of chi s court. " ); Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421, 424 ( 1862) (" [T]he criminal laws of a 
State do not bind, and cannot affect those out of the territorial limits of the State. Each State, 
in respect of the others , is an independent sovereignty, possessing ample powers, and the exclu-
sive right, to dete rmine, within its own borders, what shall be tolerated and what prohibited. "); 
State v. Haskell , 33 Me. 127, 130 (i 851) ("The offense of embezzlement and all other offenses 
are pu nishable onl y in th e Sta te, within whose jurisdiction they have been committed."); 
G ordon v. State, 6. iV.[o . 375, 376 (1836) (prosecution for challenge to fight duel dismissed 
because of lack of evidence that offense was committed within the state); State v. Wyckoff, 31 
N.J.L. 65, 69-70 (1864) (on "general and recognized principles of law," defendant who com-
missions theft in New Jersey from New York cannot be prosecuted in New Jersey since the 
defendant "czm only be punished by the authority of the state of New York, to whose sover-
eignty alone he was subject at the time .... "); State v. Carter, 27 N.J.L. 499, SO 1-03 ( 1859) 
(murder committed in New York cannot be prosecuted in New Jersey; New Jersey statute 
authorizing prosecution for murder committed in New York "would necessarily be void" since 
"[t]he act was a crime against [New York's] sovereignty .... [t]hat was supreme within its 
territorial limits and in its ve ry nature, and in fact is exclusive .... We may exercise jurisdic-
tion over the wastes of ocean or of land, but we must necessarily stop at the boundary of 
another."); Sta te v. Knight, 1 N.C. (1 Tay.) 44, 45 (1799) ("Crimes and misdemeanors com-
mitted with the limits of each are punishable only by the jurisdiction of the state in which they 
arise."); Simpson v. State, 23 Tenn. (I Hum.) 456, 462-63 (1844) ("The state authority is. 
omnipotent and co-extensi ve with the limits of the State but no further . So soon as this bound-
ary is passed, another rule of action, based upon a different authority, the sovereign power of 
another State, springs into existence, exercising its control over a different section of country, 
unrestricted and uncontrolled by that of the other."); cf. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 
627, 65 5 (1829) ("The legislative and judicial authority of New Hampshire were bounded by 
the territory of that state and could not be rightfully exercised to pass estates lying in another 
state."); Commonwealth v. VanTuyl, 58 Ky. (I Met.) I, 4 (1858) (noting that, where fraud 
was begun in Ohio and consummated in Kentucky, Kentucky had jurisdiction because the 
crime "was committed therefore in this State ... ");Commonwealth v. Uprichard, 69 Mass. (I 
Gray) 434, 439 (1855) ("Laws to punish crimes are essentially local, and limited to the bound-
aries of the state prescribing them."); State v. Lord, 16 N.H. 357, 359 (1 844) (stating that, if 
erection of dam in Maine had been the offense, prosecution would fail because it "would have 
been committ-ed without the jurisdiction of the court"). 
Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320 (1 860), is sometimes cited as contrary early authority. In 
fact, the case merely held that a state could punis h extraterritorial acts which took effect 
within the state. See id. at 333-34 ("[T]he crime, though commenced in Canada was consum-
mated in Michigan .... Had death not ensued, he would have been guilty of an assault and 
battery ... and would have been criminally accountable to the laws of Canada only."); cf. id. 
at 342 (Campbeli , J., dissenting) ("I do not conceive that any state of this Union has any such 
extraterritorial power over its citizens."). 
State ex rei. Chandler v. Main, 16 Wis. 422 (1863), which is cited for the claim that 
American state jurisdictions, like English, have long recognized extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over citizens, stands virtually alone in its time. In the course of upholding the right of Wiscon-
sin to authorize Union soldiers to vote in state and federal elections while serving in the Civil 
War, the case announced in dicta that Wisconsin could punish the filing of illegal absentee 
ballots. Id. at 446- 47. The pressure of Republican self-interest in such a situation is palpable. 
M oreover, Chandler relied on the proposition that, like treason, illegal voting was "peculiarly 
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among the states, however, continued. During the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court continued to draw tight 
boundaries around states' endeavors to project their public moralities 
into other states. 
In the year that the fourteenth amendment was enacted, Thomas 
Cooley articulated the received wisdom that, as a matter of constitutional 
structure, 
[t]he legislative authority of every state must spend its force within the 
territorial limits of the State. The legislature of one State cannot make 
Jaws by which people outside the State must govern their actions .... 
It cannot provide for the punishment as crimes of acts committed be-
yond the State boundary .... 59 
Within a decade after the fourteenth amendment's adoption, the 
Supreme Court began to read these territorial restrictions into the defini-
tion of due process. 60 At the state level, courts likewise continued to 
view state criminal authority as limited to acts that occurred or reached 
fruition within the prosecuting state. 61 
injurious to" the rights of the sovereign. Id. at 444. 
The only antebellum case I have found upholding a strictly extraterritorial prosecution is 
Commonwealth v. Gaines, 2 Va. Cas. 172 (1819), which by a 4-3 opinion rejected a constitu-
tional challenge to a statute asserting extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 182. That 
assertion of jurisdiction had already been repealed at the time the case was argued. See id. ; I 
Rev. Code of Laws of Va. ch. 162 Para. 8 (I 819) (limiting jurisdiction to crimes "committed at 
any place in this Commonwealth"). 
59 Thomas Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 127-28 (1868); see also David 
Rorer, American Inter-State Law 228 (Levy Mayer ed., reprint 1983) (relying both on extradi-
tion clause and on colonial hostility to being tried in England). 
Justice Scalia repeatedly has suggested that the understanding that prevailed at the time 
of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment should be given substantial weight in construing 
the reach of legitimate state power. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611 
( 1990) (in defining due process under fourteenth amendment, "crucial time" for determining 
legality of jurisdiction was 1868); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2 (1989) 
(purpose of due process clause is "to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside 
important traditional values"); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724-27 ( 1987) (arguing 
that, for full faith and credit purposes, statute of limitations questions should be answered 
using historical context at time Constitution was adopted as a guide and that issue is whether 
"the society which adopted the Constitution" regarded practice as acceptable); id. at 730 
(maintaining that for due process purposes as well, courts should look to the "tradition in 
place when the constitutional provision was adopted"). 
60 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) ("[E]very state possesses exclusive 
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory .... [and] no state 
can exercise direct jurisdiction and auth ority over persons or property without its territory. 
The several States are of equal dignity and authority and the independence of one implies th e 
exclusion of power from all others."). 
61 See, e.g., Stewart v. Jessup, 51 Ind. 413, 415 (1875) (stating that " it is settled ... that 
[appellant] cannot be ... convicted and punished" in one state for a crime committed within 
another state); In re Carr, 28 Kan. I, 5-6 (1882) (holding that Kansas cannot prosecute for 
extraterritorial forgery); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W. 365, 365 (Ky. 1887) (dismissing 
prosecution for extraterritorial bigamy because second marriage "like any other criminal act, 
l 
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By the turn of the century, the Court established, as a command of 
the due process clause, the principle that states could not legislate extra-
territorially-even with respect to their own citizens. In 1892, the Court 
gave controlling effect to the maxim that "crimes are in their nature local 
and the jurisdiction of crimes are local" because "[l]aws have no force of 
themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the state which enacts them . . .. " 62 
Five years later, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 63 the Court addressed a statute 
by which Louisiana sought to punish one of its ci tizens for entering into 
an out-of-state insurance contract. A unanimous opinion rejected the 
claim that the penalty was necessary to save the "sovereignty of the 
state" from "mockery" by "compel[ling] its citizens to respect its 
laws." 64 The statute violated due process because it " prohibits an act 
which under the federal constitution the defendants had a right to per-
form. " 65 The state's power "does not and cannot extend to prohibiting a 
citizen from making contracts . . . outside the limits and jurisdiction of 
the state. " 66 
must transpire here in order to be subject to indictment and punishment"); W. Transp. & Coal 
Co. of Mich. v. Kilderhouse, 87 N.Y. 430, 435 ( 1882) (invoking principle that "(i]t is very well 
settled that penal laws have no extra-territorial force" in deciding that usury statute has no 
effect on extraterritorial contract); Ormes v. Dauchy, 82 N.Y. 443,448 (1 880) (rea ffirming that 
New York legisl ature has no extraterritorial jurisdiction over contract to advertise lotteries 
legal in place of advertisement); State v. Cutshall, 15 S.E. 26 1, 265 (N.C. 1892) (statute punish-
ing extraterritorial bigamy by citizen unconstitutional); State v. Mitchell, 83 N.C. 674, 676 
(1880) (dismissing charges for ex tra territorial assault and battery since " [t]he courts of this 
state have jurisdiction only of offenses committed within its territori al boundaries"); State v. 
Stuart, 92 S.W. 878 (Mo. 1906) (statute construed not to punish act of extraterritorial biga-
mous marriage "which of course is punishable in the state where it occurs," but only to punish 
subsequent cohabitation within state); State v. Gritzner, 36 S.W. 39, 41 (Mo. 1896) (dismissing 
prosecution of ex traterritorial gaming, reasoning that state cannot constitutionally "provide 
for the punishment, as crimes, of acts committed beyond the state boundary" (quoting Justice 
Cooley)); cf. State v. Morrow, 18 S.E. 853, 860 (S.C. 1893) (although "none will dispute" the 
proposition that "the legislature of this State cannot define and punish crimes committed in 
another state," sending abortifacient from Washington to woman in South Carolina produced 
effect in South Carolina which could be punished). 
62 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1 892); see also id . at 681 (citing rule of interna-
tional law that "breaches of public law ... were only cognizable and punishable in the country 
where they were committed"). The issue at stake in Auri/1 was ac tually whether the full faith 
and credit clause required Maryland to take cognizance of an allegedly penal judgment entered 
in New York under New York law against a Canadian ci tizen . See id. at 666. 
63 165 U.S. 578 (1 897). 
64 Id. at 585 (reciting opinion of Louisiana Supreme Court). 
65 Id. at 591. 
66 Id. The Court distinguished Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1 895), on th e ground 
that Hooper involved an agent who brokered foreign insurance contrac ts within the territo rial 
jurisdiction of California, see A!!geyer, 165 U.S. at 587, and that Hooper assumed that an effort 
to regulate contracts by citizens " beyond (the] confines of the state" would be unconstitutional. 
Hooper, 155 U.S. at 659. 
Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553, 558 (1902), reaffirmed this distinction by uphold-
ing a prohibition on the domestic activities of brokers for out-of-state insurance, emphasizing 
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In several post-Allgeyer cases the Court affirmed the states' power to 
punish "acts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce and pro-
ducing detrimental effects within it. " 67 The principle that state legisla-
tion seeking to control extraterritorial actions violates due process, 
however, remained controlling through the first third of the twentieth 
century. 68 
the "vital distinction between acts done within and acts done beyond a state's jurisdiction." 
Sec also New York, Lake Erie and W. R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628, 646 (1894) 
(holding that Pennsylvania had no power to compel corporation doing business in the state to 
co l:ect money from bond-holders in New York); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47,61 (1 891) 
(s tating that "when the commercial power of Congress ... or some other exc lusive power of 
the federal government, is not in question, the poiice power of the state extends to almost 
e·;,crything within its borders") . 
67 Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620, 624 (1927) (quoting Strassheim v. Daily, 221 
U .S. 280, 285 ( 1911) (holding that extraterritorial conspiracy to import liquor into United 
Stiltes is within United States jurisdiction)); see also Strassheim v. Dail y, 221 U.S. 280, 285 
( 1911) (concerning extraterritorial scheme directed to defraud state government on bids within 
the state). 
This exception is perhaps inconsistent with strict common law territorialism based on the 
limits of sovereign power. However, if the theory of the territorial limitation of criminal law is 
based on the heritage construing crimes as acts against "the king's peace," guaranteed to those 
within the realm, it is perfectly sensible to view acts which come to fruiti on within the territory 
as interfering with the sovereign interests of the state. The prospect of al lowing a defendant to 
bombard the receiving state with impunity from over the state line was simply unacceptab le in 
a country containing automobiles, telephones, and railroads. 
A sufficiently broad conception of in-state "effects" would, of course, eliminate all territo-
r ial !imitat ion on jurisdiction: every action by a citizen is likely to have some distant repercus-
sions back in her home state. An understanding which permits the non-existence within New 
Jersey of a murder victim who would exist but for a murder in Pennsylvania, the existence 
within New Jersey of a woman who had committed an immoral act in Delaware, or the effect 
on citizens of New Jersey of the knowledge that persons outside of New Jersey can contract as 
surrogate mothers to count as "effects" justifying punishment by New Jersey would relega te 
the territorial limitation to impotence. The cases which have recognized local effects, however, 
have relied on intended and much more palpable physical or economic impacts. 
In Hyatt v. People ex rei. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 719 (1903), the Court held that ex tradi-
tion under art icle IV required proof that the accused "was in fact within the demanding State 
at the time when the alleged crime was committed," and that an alleged fugitive who had re-
entered Tennessee after the alleged crime could not be extradited where there was "no ev i-
dence or claim that he then committed any act which brought him within the criminal law of 
the State of Tennessee." Note, however, that the Court acknowledged th at the "exercise of 
jurisdiction by a State to make an act committed outside its borders a crime against the State" 
is another issue. Id. at 712. 
68 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930) (holding that Texas cannot affect the 
terms of a contract entered into by Texas res ident in Mexico without violating due process); 
Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 435 (1926) (striking down a statute seeking to 
prohibit out-of-state payments by corporations doing business in New Mexico); Saint Louis 
Cotton Compress Co. v. A rkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 349 (1922) (striking down a statute imposing 
a tax upon persons placing insurance extraterritorially); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 
U.S. 357, 376-77 (1918) (holding that state cannot control contract entered into by resident 
and fore ign corporation in foreign state); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 
(1914) ("[I]t would be impossible to permit the statute of Missouri to operate beyond the 
jurisdiction of that State and in the State of New York ... without throwing down the consti-
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C. The J'lew Deal Court and Extraterritorial Regulation 
The principle began to erode by the mid-1930s. From one direction, 
increasing academic skepticism under the banner of legal realism ate 
away at the theoretical underpinnings of strict territoriality as a basis for 
conflict of lmvs decisions. 69 From another, doubts about dual federalism 
and the propriety of judicial value choice under substantive due process 
undermined the principle that the Constitution implicitly constrained ap-
plication of state law. 70 
The emerging weakness of territorial limits was most sharply mani-
fest in the international arena. In B lackmer v. United States, 71 the Court 
rejected a due process challenge to a contempt citation issued against an 
American ci tizen living in France for his failure to obey a court order 
that required him to return to the United States in order to give evidence. 
" By virtue of the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its 
authority over him, and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him 
in a foreign country. " 72 As the doctrine has evolved, the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of the United States over its citizens is today constrained 
only by a statutory construction requirement that extraterritorial juris-
tutional barriers by which all the States are restricted within their orbits of lawful authority."); 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 543 (1914) (finding that state statute cannot 
impose tort liability for acts outside of state territory in District of Columbia); cf. The Hamil-
ton, 207 U.S. 398, 403 (1907) (upholding extension of Delaware tort law to citizens domiciled 
within the state with respect to actions on the high seas, "a place belonging to no other sover-
eign"). 
The Court also appeared to contemplate imposing similar territorial limitations to crimi-
nal prosecutions by the federal government. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. , 
213 U.S. 34 7, 355-56 (1909) (stating that generally "the character of an act as lawful or unlaw-
ful must be de term ined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done") . 
69 The proposition-underlying strict territoriality in conflict of laws decisions- that liti-
gants are entit led to rights which "vested" in the state where the last relevant actions occurred 
was dissected by the legal realists in the 1920s and 1930s. See generally David F. Cavers, A 
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 H arv. L. Rev. 173 (1933); Walter Wheeler Cook, 
The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L.J. 457 (1924); Walter Wheeler 
Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 368 
(1931 ); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale 
L.J. 736 (1924). The American Law Institute, however, retained the theory in the 1934 Re-
statement of Confl ict of Laws. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws: Foundations and 
Future Directions 22-24 ( 1991) (discussing strong territorialist philosophy in First Res tate-
ment of Conflict of Laws); Harold Korn, The Choice of Law R evolution: A Critique, 83 
Colum. L. Rev. 772, 779, 807 (1983) (same); James R. Pielemeier, Why We Should Worry 
About Full Faith and Credit to Laws, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1299, 1304 (1987) (same). 
70 See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century 
1888-1986, at 242-43 ( 1991) (linking decline of territorial ism, substantive due process and 
emergence of the Erie doctrine); Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on Conflict of Laws 272 
(1963) ("The choice between the competing interests of coordinate states is a political function 
of the highest order, which ought not in a democracy to be committed to the judiciary."). 
71 284 U.S. 42 1, 438-~·0 (1932). 
72 Id. at 436. 
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diction be asserted by a clear congressional statement. 73 
At the same time, the extraterritorial authority recognized in states 
expanded, though with a greater sense of restraint. 74 Alaska Packers 
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission 75 cited Allgeyer as good law, but 
upheld California's use of its Workers Compensation law to redress an 
injury that took place in Alaska by invoking the fact that the underlying 
employment contract was formed in California. 76 In Skiriotes v. Flor-
ida , 77 the Court confronted the prosecution of a Florida resident under a 
73 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., IllS. Ct. 1227, 
1235 (1991) (holding that United States discrimination law does not apply to discrimination by 
American corporations in other nations); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 574-75 (1953) 
(holding that jurisdiction exists over maritime accidents); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 
280, 289 (1952) (holding that jurisdiction exists over trademark infringement in Mexico); cf. 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (upholding kidnapping of Mexican 
national to be tried in United States for conspiracy to torture United States government agents 
in Mexico); see also Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth 
Amendment Due Process, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1229 (1992) (account of rules on federal 
extraterritorial criminal prosecution); Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Mis-
conduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 598, 655-62 
(1990) (same). 
An earlier version of the doctrine held that, at least as a matter of statutory construction, 
"crimes against private individuals ... which affect the peace and good order of the commu-
nity, must of course be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the government where it 
may properly exercise it," but that crimes against the United States government itself would be 
enforceable against American citizens wherever found. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 
98 (1922); cf. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (arguing 
that cases immediately affecting national interests may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over citizens). 
74 In part this is a function of the fact that the Constitution generally has not played the 
same limiting role in the assertion of United States jurisdiction as it has in the limitation of 
state jurisdiction. See Lea Brilmayer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Meth-
odological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 Law & Con temp. Probs., 11, 24-26 (Summer 
1987). 
75 294 U.S. 532 (1935). 
76 Id. at 550; cf. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 157 n.7 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J.) (stating that the effect of Vermont workers compensation statute in denying 
relief for injury sustained in New Hampshire was not illegally extraterritorial, because it "does 
not undertake to prohibit acts beyond the borders of the State"). 
With respect to amenability to suit, the Court has declared 
[a]s in the case of the authority of the United States over its absent citizens, the authority 
of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from 
the state .... [T]he relationship is not dissolved by mere absence from the state .... One 
such incident of domicile is amenability to suit .... 
Milliken v. Myer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). However, as Justice Scalia has recently reminded 
us, jurisdiction to adjudicate is not the same as jurisdiction to legislate. Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1923 (1992) (Scalia, J. concurring) ("I do not understand this to 
mean that the due process standards for adjudicative jurisdiction and those for legislative ... 
are necessarily identical; and on that basis I join Parts I, II, and III of the Court's opinion."); 
cf. Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Eval-
uation, 75 Nw. L. Rev. 1112, 1114 (1981) (arguing that, although concept of federalism is 
properly considered a limit to application of laws, concept does not limit personal jurisdiction). 
77 313 u.s. 69 (1941). 
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Florida statute that punished sponge fishing in diving suits in the Gulf of 
Mexico. Although the violation occurred outside Florida's territorial 
waters, the Court upheld the conviction, commenting that "[i]f the 
United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, 
we see no reason why the State of Florida may not likewise govern the 
conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in 
which the State has a legitimate interest, and where there is no conflict 
with acts of Congress." 78 
Skiriotes made a point of the fact that the conduct in question oc-
curred "on the high seas," rather than in some other state 's territory; it is 
far from a blanket approval of state extraterritorial jurisd iction. 79 Still, 
at the close of the Court's New Deal revolution, the due process question 
78 !d. at 77; cf. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I, 78-79 (1960) (stating that regulation 
of fishing constituted "police power measures which a State can enforce against its citizens 
beyond its boundaries"). 
79 There is language early in the Skiriotes opinion analogizing Florida's power to the au-
thority of the United States government "in foreign countries." Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 73. That 
language relies on the construction of federal power in Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 
(1932). The holding of Skiriotes, however, is carefully phrased in terms of conduct on "the 
high seas." !d. at 77, 79. It relies on Holmes' opinion in The Hamilton , 207 U.S. 398 (1908), 
and quotes the section which characterizes the conduct as "within no other territorial jurisdic-
tion." Skiriotes, at 78. 
The accepted wisdom on which Th e Hamilton was predicated was sketched by H olmes' 
opinion for a unanimous Court in Ameri can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 
355-56 ( 1909): "No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas ... co untries 
may treat some rela tions between their citizens as governed by their own law. But the 
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done." (citing The Hamilton) . A 
contrary rule would "not only be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of 
another sovereign." Id. at 356. 
Contemporary commentators divide on the reach of Skirioies. Compare Brilmayer & 
Norchi, supra note 73, at 1241-42 (" It is also fairly well established th at a state may regulate 
its residen ts, even when they are acting outside the state. " ) (citing Skiriotes, but conceding that 
"[!]ewer cases exist .... ") and Gergen, supra note 31, at 907 n.94 (stating that Skiriotes stands 
for proposi tion that "(s]tates may punish citizens for criminal acts done outside the state") 
with Lea Brilmayer et a!., An Introduction to Juri sdiction in the American Federal System 
326-27 (I 986) ("It is not clear, however, whether [Skiriotes J should be read so broadly. 
Bigelow v. Virginia casts some doubt on a state 's authority to regulate the activities of residents 
while in other states."); Robert A. Lefiar, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Criminal Cases, 
25 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 44, 50 (1974) (maintaining that, in light of Skiriotes, "[p]robably 
forum state citizenship alone would be too little [to all ow punishment consistent with due 
process] if the defendant ci tizen's act were done in a sister state, so that the sister state's law 
could be deemed to govern it"); James A. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of 
Law, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 185, 197 (1976) (arguing that Skirioles relies on the fact that ac tivity 
regulated is "not within the border of another sovereign"); Daniel L. Rotenberg, Extraterrito-
rial Legislative Jurisdiction and State Criminal Law, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 761 , 781 ( 1960) (asserting 
Skiriotes reasoning not applicable to interstate situation, and "shibboleth of territorial ity re-
mains"); and Larry Kramer, Note, Jurisdiction Over Interstate Felony Murder, 50 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1431, 1448 n. 91, 1451 n. Ill ( 1983) (stating that application of Skiriotes to conduct within 
another state would violate the full faith and credit clause). 
No Supreme Court case has extended Skiriotes to conduct wholly within another state. 
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for states had become in large measure the " reasonableness" of the state's 
concern, not solely the territorial reach of the state's regulation. 80 While 
doubts concerning the propriety of states' extraterritorial regulation of 
their citizens have persisted, 81 the free-form evaluation of state " inter-
ests" casts doubt on the principle, dating to the republic's birth, that 
states do not have the authority to project their moral judgments into 
their neighbors' territory. 82 
80 Some commentators tend to view Alaska Packers as an abandonment of constitutional 
concerns with extraterritoriality. See, e.g., Gary Simson, State Autonomy in Choice of Law: A 
Suggested Approach, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 61, 62-64 (1978). This is something of an exagge r:l -
tion. 
The cou rts of the 1940s retained at least a nominal allegiance to the extraterritoriality 
principle. The Court in Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940), upheld Virginia's insurance 
regul at ions, emphasizing that "the qu estion is not whether what Virginia has done will res trict 
appellant' s freedom of action outside of Virginia by subjecting the exercise of such freedom to 
finan cia l burdens, [but) whether Virginia has reached beyond her borders to regulate a subj ect 
that was none of her concern because the Constitution has placed control elsewhere." T he 
Court still felt compelled to distinguish Allgeyer, Tafoya, and St. Louis Compress . Id. 
Likewise, in Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943), the Court annou nced 
that in "determining the power of a state to apply its own regulatory laws to insuran ce busi-
ness act ivities," the crucial determinan t was "the protection of state interests" as judged by 
"highly realistic considerations," but again distinguished Allgeyer as a case in which " no act 
was done in the state of Louisiana." I d. at 316; see also Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 
461 (rejecting due process challenge to California's insurance regulations because "nothing 
which California requires touches or affects anything the society or the appellant may do or 
wish to do in Arizona or elsewhere than in California"), reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 8 18 (1946). 
8! See FTC v. Traveler's Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 , 302 (1960) (noting doubts which 
constitutional limitations might create as to Nebraska's power to regulate extraterritorial ac-
tivity of Nebraska corporation) (citing Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 249 
U.S. 532 (1985)); Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649-51 (1950) (noting 
dubious constituti onality of efforts to punish extraterritorial violations); cf. State Bd . of Ins. v. 
Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. 451, 455 (1962) (Allgeyer principle incorporated into McCarran-
Ferguson Act limited state regulation of insurance) . The Todd Shipyards conclusion is of 
some relevance where a state seeks to interfere with the provision of medical insurance for 
abortions. 
82 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403 ( 1987) (eight factors de-
termine "unreasonableness" which would bar application of law). Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law § 402 cmt. 5 ( 1987) takes the position that while states "generally exercise 
jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality," they "may apply at least some laws to a person 
outside [state) territory on the basis that he is a citizen." It acknowledges, however, that such 
cases "have generally involved acts or omissions that also had effect within the state." I d. 
The Model Penal Code § 1.03( !)(a), approved in 1962, generally requires that conduct 
which is an "element of the offense" or a "result that is an element of the offense" occur within 
a state as a predicate for criminal liability. It also provides, howeve r, in § 1.03(l)(f), that 
liability can be imposed if "the offense is based on a statute of this state that expressly prohibits 
conduct outside the state when the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest 
of this state." (emphasis added). 
The Comments to this Section observe that "[S)o long as sovereignties are spatially de-
fined, their reciprocal interests imply, at least in general, a limitation of their regulatory goals 
to influencing what occurs within their borders." American Law Inst itute, Model Penal Code 
Commentary § 1.03 cmt. 1, at 37-38. They state that the "reasonable relation to legitimate 
interests" requirement "expresses the general principle of the fourteenth amendment limitation 
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The last generation of Supreme Court cases has provided no sub-
stantial clarification. The Court has not directly addressed the constitu-
tionality of state criminal statutes aimed at regulating extraterritorial 
behavior, although at least one Warren Court case implies thc.t extrater-
ritorial criminal regulation is constitutionally dubious. 83 The only ex-
plicit guidance comes from civil cases, and that guidance is less than 
cnsp. 
In the civil context, the Court has held that neither the fu ll faith and 
credit clause, nor the due process clause, requires a state " to substi tute 
for its own [laws] , applicable to persons and events within it, the confli ct-
ing law of another state, " even if the other state is the residence of the 
parties or the place in which the relationship began. 84 It has held as well 
that mere residence is not talismanic: a home state "may not abrogate 
the rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything 
done or to be done wi thin them" simply on the basis of residence of one 
of the parties. 8 5 
Between these poles, a state's effort to apply its own law m ust be 
based on "a significant contact ... creating state interests, such that 
on state legislative jurisdiction" and "affords the courts the opportunity to reexamine antece-
dent extraterritorial regulation in light of a standard that takes due account of the problem of 
federalism that is inescapably involved." I d. § 1.03 cmt. 6, at 55. 
In discussing this section, Professor Wechsler observed that "[i]f the state wants to make 
gambling criminal, for example, when the wager is to be placed in another state ... it may do 
so far as that is constitutional." 1962 Proceedings of the American Law Institute 64. 
The Comments to Tentative Draft No. 5 § 1.03 observed that "Control over citi zens is of 
more significance in the relations between nations than it is in the relation between states of the 
Union . . The question of constitutionality will have to be considered in relation to the 
individual statute." Id. at 12-13. In his comments at the 1956 Proceedings of the A meri can 
Law Institute, Professor Wechsler stated that the tentative draft "does not legitimize any-
thing," but "relies on the constitutional bar" to limit extraterritorial jurisdiction. i 956 Pro-
ceedings of the American Law Institute 97-99. 
83 My colleague Steve Morse kindly pointed out to me that in Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660, 665-66 (1962), reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1965), the Court took as given the con-
straint that California could punish legitimately only for the actual use of narcotics "within the 
state." In Robinson, although the evidence clearly demonstrated the recent use of narcoti cs, 
the jury did not necessarily find use within California. The Court, therefore, treated the pun-
ishment as resting impermissibly on status, rather than conduct. 
84 Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (quoting Pac. Employees Ins. Co. 
v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493, 502 (1939)). 
85 Id. at 820-22 (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-09, 311, 313 (1981) (stating in dicta that residence "standing alone" 
is inadequate, and, citing Dick, stating that application of the law must be neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 971 (1981). The residence at issue in Dick, 
Shutts and Hague was that of the plaintiff, and the claim on behalf of choice of in-state law 
was that harm to a state resident is a basis for regulating extraterritorial activities that produce 
such harm. The cases do not directly address a claim based on residence of the defendant, nor 
the theory that the state has a right to regulate the extraterritorial activities of its own citi zens 
by virtue of their citizenship. 
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choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 86 The 
evaluation of "unfairness" may apparently be informed by "the tradition 
in place when the constitutional provision was adopted [or by] subse-
quent practice. "87 
Under this schema, the extent of Bigelow's continued vitality in the 
face of the erosion of Roe will turn on the level of "significance" the 
Court is willing to accord to the state "interest" offered as justification 
for the efforts to prevent or punish extraterritorial abortions. The inter-
ests must be such that the application of home-state law is "neither arbi-
trary nor fundamentally unfair." If past arguments are any guide, the 
Court will be required to evaluate two such "interests": the interest of 
the home state in preventing state residents from engaging in activities 
the state deems immoral, and the interest of the home state in protecting 
the well-being of the fetus. 
If the interest the Court recognizes in regulating abortion is primar-
ily the interest in preventing the woman from engaging in what is re-
garded by her home state as an immoral act, then the "unfairness" of 
punishing an act approved by the jurisdiction in which it occurs might 
well raise sufficient due process concerns to invalidate prosecutorial ef-
forts. 88 The O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter bloc in Casey viewed the state's 
86 Shutls, 472 U.S. at 818 (quoting Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13). 
87 Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988); cf. Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 
U.S. 604, 611 (1990) ("[J]udging by the evidence of contemporaneous or near-contemporane-
ous decisions, one must conclude that [Justice] Story 's understanding was shared by American 
courts at the crucial time for present purposes: 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted."). 
88 Cf. Hague, 449 U.S. at 334 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.) ("The State 
has a legitimate interest in applyi ng a rule of decision to the litigation on ly if the facts to which 
the rule will be applied have created effects within the State, toward which the State 's public 
policy is directed."); see also note 95 infra (discussing Nielsen). 
Precedents involving taxation cast doubt on the claim that a state may regulate all extra-
territorial act ivi ties of a person domiciled within the state. In the tax area, due process re-
quires both a "minimum connection between a state and the person, property or transact ion it 
seeks to tax" and a "relation to the benefits obtained" from the taxing state. Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992); see also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of 
Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251, 2258 (1992); ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 
307,316 (1982); Ex xon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep' t of R evenue, 447 U.S. 207,219-20 (1980); 
Mobil Oil v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 , 436-37 (1980). 
With respect to corporations, "there must be a connection to the activity itself, rather 
than a connection only to the actor the State seeks to tax." Allied-Signal, 112 S. Ct. at 2258; 
see also ASARCO Inc., 458 U.S. a t 346 (O'Connor, J ., dissenting) (under due process clause, 
"a domiciliary State [like a nondomiciliary State] may tax investment income only if it confers 
benefits on or affords protection to the investment ac tivity"). It is precisely the relat ion to the 
activity of obtaining an abortion that is lacking in German-style prosecutions. 
A state may tax a natural person's income from out-of-state activities on the theory that a 
natural person owes a reasonable degree of support to the state she inhabits in exchange for the 
protection that makes th e receipt of income possible. See New York ex rei. Cohn v. Graves, 
300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 281 (1932); Seth 
I 
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interest as one of providing a "structural mechanism by which the State 
or the parent or guardian of a minor may express profound respect for 
the life of the unborn." 89 The adverse impact on home state expression 
of respect for the unborn does not warrant the state control of conduct in 
other states which have different priorities. 90 In a nation which guaran-
tees the right to travel among states and proclaims a national citizenship 
"entitling" visitors to take advantage of the "privileges and immunities" 
enjoyed by local residents, such efforts to export moral jurisdiction are 
dubious in the extreme. 91 
The "significance" of the state's second possible interest, fetal pro-
tection, will turn in the first instance upon whether the Court is willing to 
regard a fetus as a protected "person" in the teeth of the situs state's 
determination that fetuses are unprotected. This is precisely the morass 
Goldstein, Note, "Resident" Taxpayers: Internal Consistency, Due Process and State Income 
Taxation, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 119, 129 ( 199 1). The obligation to pay a fair share of the costs of 
government, however, does not speak to an obligation to obey state policy beyond state bor-
ders. The tax on income is an assessment based on what the state regards as the ability to pay, 
an ability related to the ultimate receipt of income within the jurisdiction, see Graves, 300 U.S. 
at 312-13, and does not reflect an effort to control the extraterritorial actions of the resident. 
The wealth of domestic corporations is not localized in the same fashion as is the wealth of 
natural persons, but rather consists in a network of interactions. As a result, under the due 
process clause, the state may tax only income proportional to those interactions which take 
place within the district. With respect to the actions of natural persons, a similar concept 
suggests that the state may only tax or control activities that take place within the taxing 
jurisdiction. 
Thus, although a state may impose an income tax on its residents' extraterritorial income 
on the theory that the increment to the wealth of the resident ultimately takes place within the 
jurisdiction, it cannot impose extraterritorial excise, inheritance, or use taxes, which attach to 
particular extraterritorial activities or tangible property. Cf. American Oil Co. v. Neill , 380 
U.S. 451 (1965) (excise tax); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (use tax); 
Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949) (inheritance tax on tangible property); Frick v. 
Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (I 925) (inheritance tax on tangible property). States must impose 
use taxes on property used within the jurisdiction because they are barred from collecting sales 
taxes on extraterritorial purchases by their residents. See National Geographic Soc'y v. Cali-
fornia Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 , 555 (1977) (noting state practice of limiting use taxes 
to consumption within state so as to avoid problems of due process that might arise from the 
extension of the sales tax to interstate commerce); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 
586 (1937) (holding that tax on use within state not vulnerable to constitutional objections to 
tax on foreign sale). Extraterritorial regulation is more like an excise or sales tax than an 
income tax. 
89 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 11 2 S. Ct. at 2791 , 2820. Elsewhere the opinion refers to 
an "important and legitimate interest in potential life," id. at 2817, and to an "interest ... in 
promoting prenatal life." I d. at 2818. 
90 At one extreme, the point seems clear. Abortions performed for California residents in 
California may have an "effect" of providing role models that undercut the morality or "con-
cern for the life of the unborn" which Utah wishes to promote. This effect, however, does not 
give Utah authority to prosecute California residents for feticide, even if they subsequently 
enter Utah. If the woman in question is a Utah resident, the effect of her extraterritorial 
conduct on the moral climate of Utah seems no different. 
91 See Part liB infra. 
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of value choice from which Justice Scalia's rejection of Roe, joined in 
Casey by three other Justices, has sought to extricate the Court, on the 
theory that the Constitution has nothing to say about abortion rights. 92 
If nothing else, the mobility of American citizens and the moral plural-
ism facilitated by American federalism suggest that no such line of re-
treat is available. The state-by-state moral dissensus surrounding 
abortion will confront the Court with different voices in which "the peo-
ple" of different states have spoken. In passing on state efforts at extra-
territorial interdiction in the wake of the continuing erosion of Roe, the 
Court will be forced to confront squarely the moral status of the fetus. 93 
If the Court defers to the state of origin in viewing the fetus as not 
simply a "potential" but an "actual" person, the "home" state might 
have an interest in fetal well-being sufficient to extend its prescriptive 
jurisdiction to the conduct of its citizens in other states. 94 Characteriza-
92 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (abortion unprotected because "the 
Constitution says absolutely nothing about it," and "longstanding traditions of American soci-
ety have permitted it to be legally proscribed"); id. at 2884-85 (accusing majority of using a 
"process of constitutional adjudication that consists primarily of making value judgments," 
and lamenting "if we can ignore a long and clear tradition clarifying an ambiguous text ... the 
people know that their value judgments are quite as good as those taught in any law school-
maybe better.") (emphasis in original); see also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. 
Ct. 2972, 2984 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (right to abortion cannot "be logically deduced 
from the text of the Constitution-not, that is, without volunteering a judicial answer to the 
nonjusticable question of when human life begins. Leaving this matter to the political process 
is not only legally correct, it is pragmatically so."); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 
2960-61 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("One will search in vain the document we are supposed 
to be construing for text that provides the basis for argument over [abortion rights ... or in 
our society's tradition for] any indication how a constitutional argument about them ought to 
be resolved. The random and unpredictable results of our consequently unchanneled individ-
ual views make it increasingly evident, Term after Term, that the tools for this job are not to be 
found in the lawyer's- and hence not in the judge's-workbox."); Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793-94 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he fact that many men and women of good will and high commitment to constitutional 
government place themselves on both sides of the abortion controversy strengthens my own 
conviction that the values animating the Constitution do not compel recognition of the abor-
tion liberty as fundamental."); id. at 796-97 (White, J., dissenting) ("Abortion is a hotly con-
tested moral and political issue. Such issues, in our society, are to be resolved by the will of the 
people .... I would return the issue to the people by overruling Roe v. Wade."). 
93 Cf. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2854 n.12 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (accusing Justice Scalia of 
being "uncharacteristically naive" in assuming that overruling Roe would take the Court out 
of the arena of abortion, arguing that "[s]tate efforts to regulate in a post-Roe world" would 
raise issue of the "effect .. . differences among States in their approaches to abortion [would] 
have on a woman's right to engage in interstate travel"). 
94 Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 318 (1981) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (state 
interests in "safety and well-being" of residents and work force justify application of local law 
to out-of-state insurer). Such an approach might raise what are now law school hypotheticals 
to a form of high-stakes scholasticism. Can Utah claim that a fetus conceived in Utah by two 
visiting Californians is a Utah citizen? What if the male is a resident of California and the 
female from Utah or vice versa? Does prosecution require proof beyond reasonable doubt of 
the citizenship of the father and the locus of conception? The fact that the fourteenth amend-
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tions with less moral force would have correspondingly lower levels of 
"significance" in justifying extraterritorial regulation. Furthermore, in 
terms of "fairness," there is a difference between seeking to deter acts 
that both states agree are evil and seeking to punish an action that is 
regarded as protected by the constitution of the state in which it occurs. 95 
Such constitutional suspicions are amplified if "history" or "tradi-
tion" is relevant. 96 At the time of the framing of the fourteenth amend-
ment, it was clear and settled law that the structure of the Union did not 
permit states to punish extraterritorial conduct that was not intended to 
produce tangible in-state effects. Citizens could be punished by the law 
of the state where the act occurred, but they also had the right to rely on 
that law if it gave them permission to engage in the act. Until the 1930s, 
the Court clearly continued this principle in both civil and criminal cases 
under the rubric of substantive due process. And while such limitations 
have not applied to federal prosecution since the 1930s, no Supreme 
Court case has upheld an extraterritorial state prosecution for conduct 
occurring entirely in another state. 
It could be argued that giving weight to this history would make an 
anachronistic hash of modern conflict of laws approaches. These ap-
proaches allow states to apply their own law to issues arising from occur-
ment defines "citizenship" in terms of persons "born" in the United States might well suggest 
that the Court should decline to recognize assertions of the "citizenship" of fetuses by states 
seeking to protect them. 
95 In Neilsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315,320 (1909), the Court dismissed an Oregon prosecu-
tion of a Washington resident for fishing, in violation of an Oregon statute, in a portion of the 
Columbia river subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of Oregon and Washington. The Neilsen 
Court said "( w ]here an act is malum in se, prohibited and punishable by the Jaw of both States, 
the one first acquiring jurisdiction of the person may prosecute .... Doubtless the same rule 
would apply if the act were (malum prohibitum] prohibited by each State separately." ld. 
But where "the opinion of the legislatures of the two States is different ... the one State cannot 
enforce its opinion against that of the other at least as to an act done within the limits of that 
other State." I d. at 321. 
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), is the only modern case in which the Court ad-
dressed Neilsen and the question of conflicting state sovereignties in the criminal context. The 
Court upheld Alabama's efforts to punish a kidnap-murder which began in Alabama but ended 
in Georgia. Although Justice O'Connor recognized Alabama's "interest in vindicating its sov-
ereign authority through enforcement of its (criminal] Jaws," id. at 93, that interest arose by 
virtue of the crime's Alabama origin rather than by virtue of the defendant's Alabama citizen-
ship. Id. at 92-93. Indeed, the defense would apparently have succeeded had the jury accepted 
its argument that the kidnapping did not begin in Alabama. 
96 Justice Scalia's insistence on the importance of a "specific relevant tradition protecting 
or denying protection to, the asserted right" in his dissent in Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874, (quot-
ing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989)), is mirrored by a series of other 
opinions relying on historical practice in construing the demands of due process. See note 59 
supra; see also Casey, I 12 S. Ct. at 2859-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that "historical 
traditions of the American people" do not support classifying abortion as a fundamental right); 
Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572,2577 (1992) (holding that historical practice is probative 
of whether criminal rule of procedure regarding burden of proof is constitutionally mandated). 
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rences outside of their borders on the basis of an appropriate state 
"interest," even where traditional "lex locus delicti" principles would 
dictate application of the law of the situs of the injury. The proposition 
that a state's relationship with its own citizens often serves as an ade-
quate interest to allow it to apply its own law occurs frequen tly in mod-
ern confl icts discussions. The tacit acceptance by the Supreme Court of 
"interest analysis," one might say, effectively dispenses with the claims of 
history. 97 Thus, several conflicts scholars to whom I have shown this 
Article have adduced a series of leading cases in which home states have 
applied their own law to accidents involving their residents which occur 
in foreign territory. 98 
I am not a conflicts scholar. Still, to the untrained eye, the historical 
concern for allowing states to determine their own moral climate seems 
in fact to be incorporated into much of modern judicial conflicts method-
ology. The cases applying home law to extraterritorial occurrences usu-
a lly do not involve the issue of moral dissensus which is at the heart of 
the abortion debate; instead, they involve issues regarding loss distribu-
tion from actions which both of the conflicting states regard as impermis-
sible. Most cases adopting any of the "modern" conflicts methods 
acknowledge the power of the law of the place where primary conduct 
occurs to determine its basic permissibility or wrongfulness. 99 
97 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 314-15 nn.19-20 (Brennan, J., for four Justices) ("Numerous 
cases have applied the law of a jurisdiction other than the situs of the injury where there exists 
some other link between that jurisdiction and the occurrence . . . . The injury or death of a 
resident of State A in State B is a contact of State A with the occurrence in State B."). The 
Court in Hague held that neither the due process clause nor the full faith and credit clause 
barred Minnesota from applying its own rules regarding stacking of automobile insurance poli-
cies to a claim regarding a Wisconsin accident under policies issued in Wisconsin to a Wiscon-
sin resident. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion relied on the facts that the driver insured 
under the policy commuted to Minnesota, that the beneficiary had later taken up residence in 
Minnesota, and that the insurance company was registered to do business in Minnesota. Id. at 
313-20. 
Hague is obviously not a decision that gives great weight to the territory in which the 
operative acts occurred. However, a decision regarding the legal effects of a contract made in 
another state is different from an effort to apply controversial moral norms to forbid conduct 
permitted in the state where it occurs. See text accompanying notes 100-05 infra (discussing 
"conduct regulating rules"). Justice Stevens' concurrence in Hague relied on the failure of the 
insurance company to establish "any direct or indirect threat to Wisconsin's sovereignty." Id. 
at 325. 
98 Frequently mentioned cases include: Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 722-26 
(Cal.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976) (applying California dramshop statute to tavern own-
ers who served California resident in Nevada); Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967) 
(refusing to apply Missouri damage limitation to accident occurring in Missouri); Tooker v. 
Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 398-400 (N.Y. 1969) (refusing to apply Michigan guest statute to auto 
accident occurring in Michigan); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. 1963) 
(refusing to apply Ontario guest statute to accident occurring in Ontario). 
99 There are, of course, exceptions. The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Labree v. Major, 
306 A.2d 808, 817 (1973), in the course of refusing to apply what it regarded as a moribund 
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Babcock v. Jackson 100 is the leading case rejecting "lex locus 
delicti, " in favor of an " interest analysis." Although the New York 
Court of Appeals used an " interest analysis" approach in reaching a de-
cision not to apply the guest statute of Ontario in adjudicating an action 
between two New York residents regarding an accident in Ontario, the 
court emphasized that the issue was one of loss distribution, rather than 
primary conduct: 
\Vhere the defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his auto-
mobile is in issue, the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful con-
duct occurred will usually have a predominant, if not exclusive 
concern. In such a case, it is appropriate to look to the law of the place 
of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest in regulating 
conduct within its borders, and it would be almost unthinkable to seek 
the applicable rule of law in some other place. 10 1 
Likewise, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently adopted the ap-
proach embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts over the " lex 
locus delicti" approach, and, accordingly, applied Connecticut law to de-
termine compensation for an auto accident between two Connecticut res-
idents in Quebec. The court noted, however, that 
Quebec, as the place of injury, has an obvious interest in applying its 
standards of conduct to govern the liability, both civil and criminal, of 
persons who use its highways . . . . If the issue at stake in the present 
controversy were whether the defendant's conduct was negligent, we 
might well conclude that Quebec's interest in applying its law was of 
paramount significance. 102 
Finally, in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 103 a "comparative impair-
ment" approach to conflict of laws was used by the court to apply Cali-
fornia law concerning dramshop liability to a sale of liquor that took 
place in Nevada. The California Supreme Court relied on the fact that 
" [a]lthough the State of Nevada does not impose such civil liability on its 
tavern keepers, nevertheless they are subject to criminal penalties under 
a statute making it unlawful to sell or give intoxicating liquor to any 
Massachusetts rule requiring "gross negligence" for recovery by a guest against a driver for an 
accident in Massachusetts, took the posi tion that Rhode Island's " interest in imposing upon its 
drivers a duty of ordinary care towards their passengers transcends consideration of the gues t's 
res idence and of the state in which the vehicle is operated. " 
!GO 19 1 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963) . 
101 Id . at 284. Babcock was later quoted with approval by Tooker, 249 N.E. 2d at 396 ("We 
were careful to distinguish the interest of Ontario in this case from what it would have been, 
had the issue related to the manner in which the defendant had been driving his car at the time 
of the accident."), and Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. 1985) 
("[W)hen the conflicting rules involve the appropriate standards of conduct ... the law of the 
place of the tort 'will usually have a predominant, if not exclusive, concern.' "). 
102 O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 23 (Conn. 1986). 
103 546 P.2d 719 (Cal.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976). 
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person who is drunk." 104 It seems that it would do no great damage to 
the structure of modern conflicts law to take these courts at their words; 
the widespread rejection of strict territoriality is not equivalent to an 
open invitation to apply controversial regulations to extraterritorial con-
duct in cases of moral dissensus. 105 
The sixth amendment further exacerbates doubts regarding the con-
stitutionality of criminal prosecutions for extraterritorial abortions. 
Adopted in part in recollection of George III's threats to transport the 
American colonists to England for the prosecution of acts committed in 
Massachusetts, the amendment guarantees "an impartial jury of the state 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." An abortion 
" committed" in the state of California could not, if the sixth amendment 
applies, be prosecuted before a jury of the state of Utah. 106 
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue 
of whether this vicinage requirement of the sixth amendment applies to 
104 Id. at 725. This was in accord with Chief Justice Traynor's opinion in Reich v. Purcell, 
432 P.2d 727 , 728-31 (Cal. 1967). In the course of refusing to apply a Missouri damage limita-
tion to an automobile collision which occurred in Missouri, Chief Justice Traynor observed : 
"Missouri is concern ed with conduct within her borders and as to such conduct she has the 
predominant interest of the states involved. Limitations of damages for wrongful death , how-
ever, have li tt le or nothing to do with conduct. They are concerned not with how people 
should behave, but with how survivors should be compensated." Id. at 730-31. It is also 
worth noting that the accident in Harrah 's occurred within California, and the court relied on 
California's interest to "prevent tavern keepers from selling alcoholic beverages to obviously 
intoxicated persons who are likel y to act in California in the intoxicated state." Id. at 725. 
105 One founder of modern confl icts law, Walter Wheeler Cook, seemed to assert that "only 
a blind foll owing of unsound territorial notions would lead to the conclusion" that any effort 
by a state to apply its criminal law extraterritorially is necessarily unconstitutional. Walter 
Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 16 ( 1949). The charge 
that my con tentions are inconsistent with Cook's, however, should not troubl e us unduly. 
Brainerd Currie, scarcely a dyed-in-the-wool territorialist, viewed it as " into lerable" for Geor-
gia to invalidate a contract entered into on Sunday in Kansas by two Georgia residents. 
The Georgia Court would hardly have taken the position that the parties in entering into 
this transaction in Kansas had committed an offense against the criminal laws of Geor-
gia. This is true even though it happens that both parties were Geo rgia residents at the 
time. The court gave that circumstance no weight, and would doubtl ess have fou nd 
uncongen ial the "cosmopolitan principle" whereby a state may punish its citizens .... 
for acts abroad which if committed within the state would be punishable. 
B. Currie, supra note 70, at 59-60 (1963). For more modern commentary, see, e.g. , Korn, 
supra note 69, at 805 (" When conduct and injury do occur at the same place, there has never 
been any question under either the traditional or modern learning that the lex loci delicti 
should be applied to resolve conflicts involving the so-called "conduct regulating" rules of to rt 
law.") . 
106 This leaves aside the limitations that may be imposed by state constitutions. Professor 
B.J. George, Jr., in Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 M ich. L. Rev. 609, 
630, 635-36 ( 1966), suggested, without much analysis, that states may prosecute their citizens 
for extraterritorial conduct without violating federal due process constraints. He nonetheless 
notes that state constitutional vicinage requirements are an obstacle to nat iona lity jurisdiction 
in 29 states, albeit an obstacle that "preserv[es] in constitutional amber the rote thinking" of a 
bygone era. 
I 
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the states by virtue of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, 107 dicta in two ·warren and Burger Court cases strongly support 
incorporation. 108 Further, while there is controversy regarding the man-
ner in which the sixth amendment's requirement of a "jury of the dis-
trict" applies to state prosecutions, a solid line of recent state cases 
supports the proposition that sixth amendment principles stand in the 
way of state prosecutions of acts committed entirely in another state. 109 
107 Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96, 101 (1888), 
holds that the art icle III requirement that crimes be prosecuted where they are committed is 
inapplicable to the states, but makes no mention of the sixth amendment. Since the application 
of the sixth amendment to the states through the fourt eenth amendment lay eighty years in the 
future, see Duncan v. Lou isiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the failure to address the sixth amend-
ment is hardly either surprising or dispositive. In addition, Nashville involved an Alabama 
prosecution of an out-of-state company for employing a conductor to operate a train within 
Alabama in violation of state licensing laws. Nashville, 128 U.S. at 97-98. 
Likewise, Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77-79 ( 194 1 ), which approved a Florida prose-
cution for sponge diving in international waters outside of Florida, was decided a generation 
before the incorporation of the sixth amendment. Compare Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 
81, 85 ( 1928) (holding that sixth amendment does not apply to state criminal prosecutions); 
Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321, 326-27 (1868) (same). 
108 In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92, 94-98 (1 970), the Court held that a 12-member 
jury was not constitutio;J.ally required, emphasizing that the contrast between the common law 
tradition of twelve jurors and the explicit constitutional protection of the vicinage requirement 
shows that "where Congress wanted to leave no doubt that it was incorporating existing com-
mon-law features of the jury system, it knew how to use express language to that effect." 
Williams' emphasis on the jury as a vehicle for "community participation," id. at 100, and the 
need for a size sufficient to allow a "fair possibility of obtaining a representative cross section 
of the community," id. , requires a definition of which "community" is to be represented. In 
light of the vicinage req uirement, the relevant community would seem to be the community 
where the crime occurred. 
Likewise, Duncan v. Louisiana, in tracing the lineage of the jury trial right as applied to 
the states, recounted the American colonial subjects' outrage at being deprived of the "inesti-
mable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage." Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152. 
109 See, e.g. , People v. Jones, 510 P.2d 705, 709-10 (Cal. 1973) (sixth amendment vicinage 
provisions apply to California state courts to require jury from judicial district where crime 
occurred), modified by Hernandez v. Mun. Court, 781 P.2d 547, 549 (Cal. 1989) ("[W]e hold 
that vicinage is defined as the county in which the crime was committed"); Patterson v. 
Balkcom, 266 S.E.2d 179, 180-81 (Ga. 1980) (sixth amendment requires jury drawn from vici-
nage within Georgia); Mareska v. State, 534 N .E.2d 246, 248-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (use of 
city-drawn jury to try offense in county violates sixth amendment vicinage standards); Hayes 
v. Commonwealth, 698 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Ky. 1985) (applying sixth amendment to forbid 
state's prosecution of out-of-state theft); State v. Smith, 421 N. W.2d 315, 318, 321 (Minn. 
1988) (finding that sixth amendment embodies territorial jurisdiction principle and refusing 
jurisdiction over murder where none of the elements were alleged to have occurred in Minne-
sota); cf. Mississippi Publishers Corp. v. Coleman, 515 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Miss. 1987) (vici-
nage requirement of sixth amendment applies agai;J.st states); State v. Beuke, 526 N.E.2d 274, 
287-88 (Ohio 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 ( 1989) (applying sixth amendment, but con-
cluding that Ohio trial for murder in which death occurred in Indiana does not violate sixth 
amendment because sufficient elements of crime occurred in Ohio); State v. Harrington, 260 
A.2d 692, 698 (Vt. 1969) (sixth amendment applies to interstate jurisdiction and requires that 
an element of the crime be committed in state to support jurisdiction); see also Davis v. War-
den, 867 F.2d 1003, 1007 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Davis v. O'Leary, 493 U.S. 920 
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The reaffirmation last Term of governmental authori ty to abduct 
criminal defendants forcibly from foreign countries and other states 110 
provides a final reason for caution regarding extraterritorial state crimi-
nal jurisdiction. Given the exigencies of the international arena, we may 
be willing to allow the federal government to extend its authority to ac-
tions in foreign countries by hook or by crook. We may countenance 
occasional abductions from overseas of those who violate U .S. laws and 
rely on diplomatic processes to compensate for excesses. But >vithin a 
federal republic characterized by moral pluralism, a similar result be-
tween states should be unacceptable. An approach that would permit 
prosecution for extraterritorial acts legal in the state of commission 
would, under current doctrine, justify forcible abduction as well. The 
image of state agents or private parties seeking to carry doctors or 
women across state borders to be tried for feticide has too chilling a re-
semblance to our memory of ante-bellum slave catchers to be within the 
range of constitutional permissibility. 
The same objections, however, do not apply as forcefully to efforts 
to prohibit women who seek abortions from leaving their home state of 
the sort attempted by Irish authorities. 111 Because such efforts address 
conduct initially within a state's own boundaries, they do not run afoul 
of the constraints on extraterritoriality. Nonetheless, efforts by states to 
deny a United States citizen the right to travel in order to take advantage 
of opportunities available in neighboring states face overwhelming objec-
tions rooted in the nature of "our federalism," objections which also 
strengthen the case against attempts at extraterritorial criminal prosecu-
(1989) (applying sixth amendment vicinage clause to determine whether a venire-area was 
sufficiently large; noting that "the 'district and state' language of the sixth amendment places 
some parameters on a [state]legislature's power to draw the jurors but does not per se prevent 
a legislature from delineating a smaller area from which to draw a jury"). 
Only one court has refused to apply the sixth amendment's requirement regarding "state 
of offense" juries to state prosecutions in recent years. People v. Caruso, 51 9 N.E.2d 440, 446 
(Ill. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988) (sixth amendment does not forbid Illinois from 
exercising jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime of child abduction because amendment per-
tains only to venue and not to jurisdiction); cf. Caudill v. Scott, 857 F. 2d 344, 345-46 (6th Cir. 
1988) (sixth amendment "district of offense" requirement does not apply to K entucky state 
courts); Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d 593, 595-96 (5th Cir. 1986) (sixth amendment "district of 
offense" requirement does not apply to Texas state courts); State v. Bowman, 588 A .2d 728, 
730 (Me. 1991) (sixth amendment is inapplicable to any state for crime occurring within its 
borders). 
110 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 21 89 (1992), reaffirming authority of 
F risbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Frisbie, the latest of a line of similar cases, upheld the 
conviction in Michigan of a defendant who had been kidnapped in Chicago by M ichigan of-
ficers. Frisbie, 342 U .S. at 519-20. Frisbie, unlike Alvarez-Machain, involved a crime that had 
been committed within the kidnapping jurisdiction. 
111 See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra. 
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tion analogous to recent German efforts. 112 
II 
NATIONAL UNION AND NATIONAL C ITIZENSHIP 
IN "OUR FEDERALISM" 
487 
The decay of substantive due process limitations on legislative juris-
diction over citizens has left the federal government essentially without 
territorial constraints on its power to legislate in regard to the behavior 
of i\mericans abroad. Despite some loose language in the writings of 
both courts and commentators, however, the power of states to legislate 
the behavior of their ci tizens in other American states is distinct from the 
Federal government' s power to legislate overseas. States, as members of 
a federal union, are not free to treat other states as foreign countries. 11 3 
By the explicit terms of our national compact, states are obliged to 
give to one another's public acts "full faith and credit." 114 They must 
extradite fugitives to neighboring states on demand, 115 and cannot resort 
to war or diplomatic processes to resolve grievances among them-
selves.116 Under the fourteenth amendment states may not define their 
own citizenship; they are obliged to accept as citizens any national citizen 
who may seek to reside within their borders. 117 Visiting citizens from 
sister states are entitled to the privileges and immunities of local citi-
zens.11 8 The territories of the states are determined by national 
mandate. 119 
Whereas a national sovereign has plenary control over the passage 
of goods and persons across its borders, explicit constitutional limits bar 
states from taxing imports or exports. 12° Furthermore, as the Court has 
construed the mandates of national union and the commerce clause, 
states are not permitted in any way to cut themselves off from the tides of 
112 See note 23 and accompanying text supra. 
11 3 A separate reason for circumspection in applying international norms to interstate 
problems is that in ternat iona l law recognition of jurisdiction over crimes committed by citizens 
abroad is "justified on the ground that a State's treatment of its nationals is not ordinarily a 
matter of concern to other states or to international law. " Draft Conven tion on Jurisdiction 
with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. In t'l Law 439 , 519 (Supp. 1935). Adopt ion of the fourteen th 
amendment makes it difficult to maintain that the U.S. Constituti on is similarly indifferent to 
the relat ions between a state and its citizens. 
114 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
i 15 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2. 
116 See U.S . Const. art. I, § 10. 
117 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
118 See U.S. Const. art. IV,§ 2. 
11 9 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3 (return of fugitive slaves); art. III , § 2 (conflicting land 
grants in original jurisdiction of Supreme Court). 
120 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. 
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the national economy of which they and their neighbors are a part. 121 It 
is no surprise, therefore, that, unlike the federal government in its rela-
tions with foreign nations, the states are constrained by the commerce 
clause, article IV, and the principles of federalism in their dealings with 
one another and m thei r ability to regulate their citizens 
extraterritorially _1 22 
A. The Commerce Clause 
For state citizens who seek more hospitable jurisdictions in which to 
engage in morally-contested activities barred to them at home, the fed-
eral protection of interstate commerce offers shelter. Although the exact 
parameters of the activities protected as "interstate commerce" have 
changed over the years, the two methods by which states might endeavor 
to prevent their citizens from obtaining out-of-state abortions are both 
repugnant to the commerce clause. 
First, states might seek to follow the Irish example and bar women 
from departing for "immoral" purposes. American courts, from Gibbons 
v. Ogden 123 forward, have found the interstate movement of persons to 
be a form of interstate commerce that is protected against state obstruc-
tion.1 24 Thus, a leading case, Edwards v. California, 125 invalidated Cali-
fornia's criminal prohibition on knowingly bringing indigent non-
residents into the state. The commerce clause barred such efforts: 
It is difficult to conceive of a state statute more squarely in conflict 
with [the theory of the commerce clause]. . .. Its express purpose and 
inevitable effect is to prohibit the transportation of indigent persons 
across the California border. The burden upon interstate commerce is 
intended and immediate; it is the plain and sole function of the 
121 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1942) (stating that of all limits on state ac tiv-
ity "none is more certai n than the prohibition against a ttempts on the part of any sin gle State 
to isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them by restraining the transportation of 
persons and property across its borders"). 
122 Cf. Brilmayer, supra note 69, at 28 (noting that neither commerce clause nor a rticle IV 
limit assertion of federal extraterritorial jurisdiction). In this regard, the Restatement (Thi rd) 
of Foreign Relations Law is in error when it states that "exercise of jurisdiction to presc ribe by 
States is governed by the same principles whether the exercise of jurisdiction has international 
or inter State implications." Restatemen t (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402 cmt. 5 
(1986). 
123 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824). 
124 See, e.g., Pickard v. PullmanS. Car Co., 117 U.S. 34, 48 (1 886); Head Money Cases, 112 
U. S. 580, 591-94 (1 884); Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1 875); cf. Chy Lung v. F ree-
man , 92 U.S. 275,2 80 (1875) (California statute seeking to exclude immoral immigrants struck 
down); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 42-43 (1867) (passenger trains consti tute 
commerce, but not clear that dolla r per person exit tax constitutes impermissible burden); 
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1850) (tax and inspection of passengers violates the 
commerce clause). 
125 314 u.s. 160 (1942). 
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statute. 126 
Statutes that directly forbid citizens from departing for "immoral" pur-
poses would similarly constitute impermissible interferences with inter-
state commerce. 127 
Second, a state might follow Germany's example and seek to punish 
women who travel to more permissive locales only upon their return 
home. As we will see, this tactic would also be of doubtful constitutional 
validity under current commerce clause doctrine. 
The offer of services by out-of-state providers and women's purchase 
of them, insofar as women travel across state iines to make the purchases, 
are both forms of interstate commerce. 12 8 Since the mid-nineteenth cen-
126 Id. at 174. 
127 Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981 ), in uph olding an enhanced penalty agai nst a non-
supporting father who fled the state, suggests that a state co uld inhibi t the ex it of a person who 
has already committed a crime within the state, a t least where "departure aggravates the con-
sequences of conduct that is otherwise punishable[,] " id. at 422, just as it could arrest her, or 
have her remitted by extradition. But, by hypothesis, when a citizen departs from the state to 
obtain an abortion , no crime has yet been commi tted (unless interstate travel is a criminal 
offense) and the abortion itself will occur on the other side of the border. 
Similarly, a number of quarantine cases which reject commerce clause challenges rest on 
the power of the state to protect agai nst dangerous consequences within its own borders. See 
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 152-53 ( 1902) (upholding inspection of potentially infected 
cattle); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186 
U.S. 380, 396-97 (1902) (upholding exclusion of Ita lian immigrants from area decla red to be in 
quarantine for infectious diseases); Railway Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1 878) (striking 
down statute prohibiting importation of Mexican cattle, but in dictum suggesting that "when 
absolutely necessary for its self protection ," a state may "prevent persons and animals suffering 
under contagious diseases or convicts, &c, from entering the state" (and paupers and lewd 
women as well)); see also text accompanying note 160 & accompanying text infra (discussing 
"local" effects). 
One colleague has suggested that a state could avoid a commerce clause attack by making 
it a crime to travel over any road within the state for the purpose of obtaining an abortion , and 
seek to punish the travel leading up to interstate movement rather than the movement itself. 
In addressing a similar stratagem in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natu-
ral Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2024 (1992), the Court recently observed, "our prior cases 
teach that a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the 
Commerce Clause by curtai ling the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of 
the State, rather than through the State itself. " The principle, presumably, applies to the move-
ment of people as well. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 195 (1 824) ("Can a 
trading expedition between two adjoining sta tes commence and terminate outside of each? ... 
[The commerce power] must be exercised within the jurisd iction of the several states."). 
128 Professional services were not considered to be "commerce" for much of the nation's 
history. See, e.g., Blumenstock Bros. Ad vertis ing Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 
436, 442-44 (1920) (services of advertising agency not "commerce"). Today, however, a ci ti-
zen seeking to patronize a foreign abortion clinic would be held to be engaged in interstate 
commerce. See, e.g., Summit Health v. Pinhas, Ill S. Ct. 1842, 1847 (1991) (opthamologic 
surgery performed on out-of-state residents for pay is interstate commerce); United States v. 
Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 337-39 (1952) (provision of medical services by doctor-
sponsored corporations constitutes interstate commerce). See generally United States v. 
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944) ("Commerce," as referred to in 
the commerce clause, refers to any trade or business in which people "bought and sold, bar-
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tury, the commerce clause has been held to be a barrier to state statutes 
that seek to "obstruct" or regulate commerce in other states. 129 In an era 
when due process was thought to limit a state's authority strictly to its 
own territory, the doctrine could hardly have been otherwise. The states' 
inherent "police power" might permit the burdening of interstate com-
merce under some circumstances, but if the state's authority stopped at 
its borders, its "police power" could reach no further. When the morals 
of one state conflicted with those of its neighbor, moralizing efforts to 
interfere with commerce necessarily had to stop at the state boundary. 
This issue was fought out in the struggles over attempts by states to im-
pose Prohibition.130 In reasserting the commerce clause as a barrier to 
Imva's efforts to deny its citizens access to liquor from neighboring 
states, for example, the Court characterized its prior limitations on inter-
state prohibition as resting upon "the obvious want of power of one State 
to destroy contracts [by its citizens] concerning interstate commerce, 
valid in the States where made." 131 
gained and contracted," including the sale of fire insurance). 
Likewise, while certain "deleterious or injurious" articles were held "to lose all benefit of 
protection as articles or things of commerce," Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 60-61 
(1891); see also Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 60 (1915) (rotten fruit), items which are the 
subject of moral debate have always remained subjects of commerce. See, e.g., Leisy v. Har-
din, 135 U.S. 100, 110 (1890) (alcohol); License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 576-86 (1847) 
(Taney, C.J.) (alcohol). See generally Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023, n.3 (quoting Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978)) ("All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce 
Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset."). 
129 The first case to strike down a state law on commerce clause grounds was State Freight 
Tax Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 281-82 (1872) (striking down Pennsylvania tax on railroads 
operating through state on per-ton basis). 
130 See Leisy, 135 U.S. at 159 (Gray, J. , dissenting) (Iowa liquor laws should be upheld 
because "they are not aimed at interstate commerce . but operate only on intoxicating 
liquors within the territoria1limits of the state"); id. at 153 (police power to "secure the safety 
of persons and property within their territorial limits" allows regulation of railroads); Bowman 
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 479, 498-99 (1888) (striking down state prohibition on 
importation of liquor because "[i]t is not an exercise of the jurisdiction of the State over per-
sons and property within its limits ... it is an attempt to exert that jurisdiction over persons 
and property within the limits of other states"); cf. Crossman v. Lurman 192 U .S. 189, 198-200 
( 1904) (New York food and drug law could apply to shipment of coffee from Brazil to resi-
dents of Maryland without violating commerce clause because "the contract of sale was made 
in New York, the storage and delivery in the City of New York was therein provided for"). 
131 American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U.S. 133, 143 (1904); see id. at 143-44 ("To sustain, 
therefore, the ruling of the court below would require us to decide that the law of Iowa oper-
ated in another state so as to invalidate a lawful contract as to interstate commerce made in 
such other state ... it would subject contracts made by common carriers and valid by the laws 
of the State where made to the laws of another State."). 
Similarly, in Shafer v. Farmer's Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 196, 199 (1925), the Court 
reviewed a state statute that regulated in-state sales of grain with a goal of preventing "unrea-
sonable margins of profit" on out-of-state resales, struck it down, and proclaimed that "a state 
statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens commerce is a 
prohibited regulation and invalid regardless of the purpose with which it was enacted." See 
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Even though strict territoriality has faded in the due process area, 
the Court has continued to regard efforts to regulate commerce in other 
states as usurpations under the commerce clause. To some extent this is 
analytically inevitable. From the point of view of the market partici-
pants, a situation in which Utah prohibits its residents from entering into 
transactions in California is the same as the situation in which California 
prohibits residents of Utah from competing in local California markets. 
In either case, Utah citizens cannot do business in California. The com-
merce clause prohibition against "discriminatory" regulations by Califor-
nia barring Utah residents from local markets is clearly established. 
Whether this clarity results from Court recognition of the adverse impact 
of such quasi-tariffs on the national market, 132 or national unity, 13 3 the 
commerce clause should also prevent Utah from erecting barriers with 
similar effects. 134 
Western Un ion Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914) (Holmes, J. , for a unanimous 
Court) (state statute imposing tort liability for negligent delivery of telegram outside of state 
territory violates commerce clause). 
132 See American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987) ("we have 
steadfastly adhered to the central tenet that the Commerce Clause 'by its own force created an 
area of trade free from interference by the States,'"); Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 
539 ( 1949) ("Our system, fostered by the commerce clause, is that every farmer and every 
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every 
market in the Nation . .. every consumer may look to the free competition from every produc-
ing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any."); cf. Dennis v. Higgins, IllS. 
Ct. 865, 871-72 (1991) ("Commerce Clause ... confer[s] a 'right' to engage in interstate trade 
free from restrictive state regulation ... 'intend[ed] to benefit'" those engaged in interstate 
commerce, not only to promote national economic union). 
133 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (commerce clause "reflected a cen-
tral concern among the Framers ... the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union 
would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization"); Baldwin v. GAF Seelig, 
294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) ("The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political 
philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the 
several states must sink or swim together and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are 
in union and not division."). 
134 The legitimacy of import barriers and extraterritorial regulation differs if the negative 
commerce clause focuses exclusively on protecting unrepresented outsiders, see, e.g., South 
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 ( 1938), and avoiding eco-
nomic protectionism, see, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 122 S. Ct. 789, 800 ( 1991) (statutes 
invalid when they "amount to simple economic protectionism"). Cf. Tyler Pipe Indus. Inc. v. 
Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 258-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that protection should be limited to "rank discrimination against citizens of other states" ); 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 ( 1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (only 
discriminating statutes or those which impose risk of inconsistent regulation violate commerce 
clause). Extraterritorial regulation of citizens does not raise the concern for state exploitation 
of non-citizens. 
An exclusive focus on protecting outsiders, however, is inconsistent with the proposition, 
recently reaffirmed in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 
11 2 S. Ct. 2019, 2025 (1992), that "a burden imposed by a State upon interstate commerce is 
not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all the 
states, including the people of the State enacting such statute" (quoting Brimmer v. Rebman, 
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The modern touchstone is Baldwin v. GAF Seelig, 135 where New 
York sought to condition intrastate milk sales on a New York milk dis-
tributor's payment of a minimum price for milk that it purchased in Ver-
mont. The Court declared that under the commerce clause it was 
undisputed that "New York has no power to project its legislation into 
Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired 
there," even when regulating a New York milk dealer. 136 The New York 
prohibition sought to do exactly that: the statute's "avowed purpose" 
was to affect the price of milk in Vermont, and, under the commerce 
clause, "[o]ne state may not put pressure of that sort upon others to re-
form their economic standards." 137 
Although commerce clause jurisprudence has evolved since Bald-
win , the proposition that extraterritorial commercial interventions vio-
late the clause has remained intact. 138 In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 13 9 the 
Court struck down an Illinois statute that regulated take-over bids for 
138 U.S. 78 (1891)). See also Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (!951) (Wisconsin 
statute protecting local dairy industry against out-of-state competition by imposing lim it that 
bore on both in-state and out-of-state marketers struck down as violation of commerce clause). 
Nor is economic exploitation of other states the only evil at which the commerce clause is 
directed. If California had rested its desi re to exclude indigents in Edwards v. California, 314 
U.S. 160 ( 1942), exclusively on claims about "[t]he increase of rape and incest traceable to the 
crowded conditions in which these people are forced to live" and the "petty crime among them 
[which] has featured the criminal calendars of every community into which they have moved," 
id. at 168 (argument for appellees), the non-economic nature of the state purposes would not 
make the prohibition of immigration any less an impermissible burden on commerce. Simi-
larly, if a public-spirited state wholly without self-interest forbade its residents from exporting 
wastes in order to save the landfill capacities of its neighbors, the burden on commerce would 
not be less for the lack of discrimination or desire to benefi t in-state merchants at the expense 
of out-of-staters. Cf. Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 784 F. Supp. 641, 644 (D. Minn. 
1992) (emphasizing that purpose of regulation prohibiting export of wastes is not necessarily 
dispositive on issue of regulation being impermissible burden on commerce); Stephen D . De 
Vito Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775 , 780 
(D.R.I.) (same), aff'd per curiam, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991). 
135 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
136 Id. at 521. 
137 Id . at 522-24; cf. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 556-57 (!949) (Black, J. , 
dissenting) ("It was because New York attempted to project its law into Vermont that even its 
admitted health purpose was insufficient to outweigh Vermont 's interest in controlling its own 
local affairs" ); id. at 570 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The nakedness of New York's purpose 
to reach into Vermont was ill-concealed by the tenuous justification that if Vermont farmers 
got cheap prices for their milk they would be tempted to save the expense of sanitary preca u-
tions and thereby affect the health of New York consumers.") . 
138 In New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U .S. 269, 275 (198 8), Justice Scalia, who is usually 
un enthusiastic about negative commerce doctrine, cited Baldwin for a unanimous court as a 
"leading case." See also Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024 (citing Baldwin as one example of 
what was termed in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978), a "presumably 
legitimate goal sought to be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from the 
national economy"). 
139 457 u.s. 624 (1982). 
I 
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Illinois-affiliated corporations, no matter where the bids were initiated or 
where the takeover was consummated. Justice White's plurality ob-
served that while "not every exercise of state power with some impact on 
interstate commerce is invalid," 140 "direct regulation is prohibited." 141 
The Illinois Act "directly regulates transactions which take place across 
state lines" and hence was held invalid. 142 The commerce clause "pre-
cludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place 
wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has 
effects within the state." 14 3 
In his opinion in CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America ,144 Justice Pow-
ell appeared to limit MITE. He emphasized that the MITE opinion did 
not represent the views of the full court and went on to interpret MITE's 
commerce clause analysis as resting not on extraterritoriality but on the 
possibility that the takeover statute would lead to inconsistent regulation 
of interstate commerce, 14 5 as well as on Illinois's absence of interest in 
protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations. 146 The 
Indiana statute at issue in CTS, which structured the voting rules for 
Indiana corporations with substantial blocs of Indiana shareholders, was 
vulnerable on neither count. Indiana, the Court held, had established the 
corporate charter it was seeking to regulate, and "[had] a substantial in-
terest in preventing the corporate form from becoming a shield for unfair 
business dealing." 147 
CTS, however, was not the end of the matter. In Healy v. Beer In-
stitute, Inc., 148 a majority of the Court relied on MITE for the proposi-
tion that " the 'Commerce Clause . .. precludes the application of a state 
statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders 
whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.' " 149 The 
140 Id. at 640. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 641 (joined by Burger, Stevens, & O'Connor, J .J .) . 
143 Id. at 642-43. The plurality went on to characterize the statute in the alternative as a 
"burden on interstate commerce" whose effects where excessive in relation to Illinois ' interests. 
Id. at 643. 
144 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
14 5 Id. at 88. 
146 ld. at 93. 
147 ld . 
148 491 U.S. 324 ( 1989). 
149 Id. at 536 (citing MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982)); see also id. at 536 n.13 (citing MITE) 
("any attempt 'directly' to assert ex traterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property .. 
exceed[s] the inherent limits of the State's power"); id. at 333 n. 9 (MITE "significantly illumi-
nates the contours of the constitutional prohibition on extraterritorial legislation"). 
Arguably support for the reaffi rmation of the MITE principle was even broader, since 
Justices Stevens and O'Connor, who joined in MITE , joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent in 
Healy , which was based on the absence of "concrete evidence that the Connecticut regulation 
will have any effect on the beer prices charged in other states." Id . at 347. In his concurrence 
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Court invalidated Connecticut's efforts to link the price of beer that in-
terstate brewers sold within Connecticut to the prices that those brewers 
charged in neighboring states. The Court observed that the scheme "has 
the undeniable effect of controlling commercial activity occurring wholly 
outside the boundary of the State." 150 It thus violated the stricture that 
"a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the 
boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's 
authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial 
reach was in tended by the legislature. " 15 1 
Most recently, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 152 a majority of the 
Court reaffirmed the existence under the commerce clause of a "safe har-
bor for vendors 'whose only connection with customers in the [taxing] 
State is by common carrier or the United States mai l. ' " 1 53 The Quill 
Court's proposition that the commerce clause mandates a " physical pres-
in Hea ly , Just ice Scalia explicitly declined to join in the MITE analysis, calling it "dubious and 
unnecessary" since it rested on the " mere economic reality" that the brewers could be expected 
to change their policies in neighboring states. Id. at 345. This position does not directly ad-
dress the question of the status of an explicit effort to regulate out-of-state transactions. 
ISO ld. at 33 7. 
15 1 Id . at 336; see, e.g., Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. Sta te Corp. Comm'n , 489 U.S. 
493, 523 (1989) (" We have applied a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity' ... when a state law 
'directly regu lates or discriminates against interstate commerce.'") (cita tions omitted); K-S 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easter-
brook, J.) (''No state may require sellers to charge the same price within its borders as they 
charge elsewhere. Such statutes, the Supreme Court has held , assert extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion of a kind denied to the states by the 'negative' or 'dormant ' commerce clause."). 
Healy was prefigured both by the Court's summary affirmance of the invalidation of Con-
necticut 's predecessor statute in United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275, 279 (2d 
Cir. 1982), aff 'd, 464 U.S. 909 (1983) ("If the purpose or effect of a state's law is to regulate 
conduct occu rring wholly outside the state, the burden on commerce is generally held imper-
missible, and the fact that the law may not have been intended as protectionist or discrimina-
tory will not save it. "), and by the invalidation of New York's price affirmation law in Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Auth. , 476 U.S. 573, 579-80 (1986) ("When a 
state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce ... we have gener-
ally struck down the statute without further inquiry. Our inquiry, then, must center on 
whether New York's affirmation law regulates commerce in other states. " ). Cf. Wyoming v. 
Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 n.12 (1992) (citing Brown-Forman with approval). 
152 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992). 
153 Id. at 19 14 (citing National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U .S. 753, 758 
(1967), overruled by Quill) (with respect to due process clause)). The Court suggested that the 
"physical presence" requirement had its root in aspects of the test enunciated in Complete 
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) , " requir[ing] a substantial nexus and a 
relationship between the tax and State-provided services (which]limit the reach of State taxing 
authority so as to ensure that State taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce." 
Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1923. 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas concurred only on grounds of stare decisis, declin-
ing to reach the merits of the " safe harbor" approach. See id. at 1923. Justice White dis-
sented, characterizing a "physical presence" requirement as "anachronistic," in light of the 
benefits that mail order sellers derive from the customer state' s court and commercial credit 
systems. See id. at 1920. 
I 
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ence" prerequisite for jurisdiction-to-tax supports the parallel proposi-
tion that the clause embodies a "physical absence" limit on direct 
extraterritorial regulation. If a state may not impose tax collection obli-
gations on interstate vendors' transactions, even when one end of the 
transaction is within the taxing state, because one party to the transac-
tion is absent, then a state certainly may not tax a transaction occurring 
entirely outside its borders. 154 A fortiori, it may not prohibit that 
transaction. 
Efforts to punish or regulate legal extraterritorial abortions seek to 
control commercial activity in other states. They do not seek to prevent 
the exercise of state-created intangible privileges as a "shield for unfair 
business dealing" as in CTS, for the women whose futures are at issue do 
not owe their existence to the state in which they reside . Attem pts to 
regulate extraterritorial abortions do not attach consequences only tan-
gentially to events occurring in other states, for they are intentionally 
directed at wholly preventing transactions that are legal in the states 
where they occur. 155 Such efforts would thus transgress commerce 
clause limits even if the due process clause would permit the exertion of 
" legislative jurisdiction." 156 
This conclusion, however, is subject to two limitations. First, it is 
154 Under the commerce clause, domicile alone does not give a state authority to tax the 
out-of-state transactions of the domiciliary . See, e.g., D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 
U.S. 24, 30 (1988) (use taxation of domiciliary corporation's activities must meet test art icu-
lated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977): "activity [must have] 
a substantia l nexus with [the state), and the tax [must be] fairly apportioned, [must] not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce, and [must be] fairly related to benefits provided by the 
State"); id. at 32 ("fair apportionment" required that state "not attempt to tax that portion of 
the catalogs that went to out-of-state customers"); see also Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 
263 (1989) ("We believe that only two States have a nexus substantial enough to tax a con-
sumer's purchase of an interstate telephone call": the state of the service address where the call 
is billed, and the state of origination); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 314 ( 1938) 
(gross receipts tax on Indiana domiciliary corporation's out-of-state sales violated commerce 
clause); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. , 300 U.S. 577, 583 (1937) (use tax on domestic use of 
product permitted although tax on extraterritorial purchase by state resident would not be). 
Indeed, Complete Auto Transit, the case that enunciated the currently governing standard, 
itself involved a domiciliary corporation. See Goldstein, supra note 88, at 136. 
According to Quill, the "substantial nexus" and "relat ionship" requirements of Complete 
A uta Transit "limit the reach of State taxing authority so as to ensure that State taxation does 
not unduly burden interstate commerce," while the "fair apportionment" and "non-discrimi-
nation" elements prohibit imposing "an unfair share of the tax burden" on interstate com-
merce. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1913. 
155 Cf. Healy v. Beer lnst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (discussing "direct regulation"); 
text accompanying notes 99-105 supra (discussing "conduct regulating" rules) . 
156 Cf. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1913-14 (tax invalid under commerce clause for lack of physical 
contact with seller, even though valid under due process as exhibiting requisite "nexus"); Tyler 
Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,253 (1987) (multiple activi-
ties exemption of state tax invalid, even though due process "nexus" challenge to wholesale tax 
rejected). 
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well recognized that Congress may intervene to alter commerce clause 
constraints. 157 A right to seek an out-of-state abortion premised , on the 
commerce clause is only as solidly rooted as the Congressional majority 
or Presidential veto which prevents the imposition of limitations. In 
some ways, however, this factor is an advantage of the commerce clause 
theory. It allows the Court to constrain state imposition, while at the 
same time permitting the Justices to disavow efforts to impose their own 
constitutional vision upon the democratic process. If Congress can al-
ways override the Court's decisions, the Court can claim at least the 
shadow of majoritarian legitimacy. The recent Quill case highlights the 
Court's attraction to this aspect of the doctrine. The net effect of the 
commerce clause theory is to put the ability to protect the rights of 
women who can travel in the hands of any blocking coalition at the na-
tional level. Under this theory a national consensus is necessary before 
any individual state can attempt the tactics tried by Ireland or Germany. 
The hypothesis upon which this Article has proceeded is that such a con-
sensus is unlikely to develop. 
Second, although it has been said that "direct regulations" of inter-
state commerce are subject to a rule of virtual "per se invalidity," and 
extraterritorial limitations "exceed the limitations of the enacting state's 
authority," all of the cases in which statutes have been invalidated have 
involved laws which in some sense could be characterized as economic 
protectionism or predation. Commerce clause doctrine is scarcely a taut 
and unchanging framework; it might be soft enough to allow the Court 
to invoke the proposition that while exclusionary regulations are subject 
to "strict scrutiny," such regulations may be acceptable if they are "de-
monstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protection-
ism."158 Such a modification would, like the due process theories 
canvassed earlier, directly confront the Court with the question of what 
weight to give the state's interest in fetal protection as against the inter-
157 See, e.g., Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1912, 1916 (describing four-prong test Court uses to sustain 
tax against commerce clause challenge and deferring to Congress's "ultimate power to resolve" 
the matter); Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 523-24 
(1989) (citing Congress' power to identify state action that does not violate commerce clause, 
despite its effect on interstate commerce). 
158 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986) (Maine statute prohibiting im-
portation of live baitfish upheld to prevent environmental risks to wildlife population), cited in 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 (1992), and New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 
269, 274 (1988); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 
112 S. Ct. 2019, 2024 (1992) (quoting New Energy); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. 
Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2015 (1992) (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex 
rei. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (striking down Nebraska statute banning transport of 
water without a permit for use in adjoining state, noting that "[f]or Commerce Clause pur-
poses, we have long recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the one hand, 
and health and safety regulation , on the other"). 
}! 
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ests of national economic union and unimpeded interstate commerce. 
The modern cases which have successfully invoked this justification 
for burdening interstate commerce, however, have involved efforts to 
protect against in-state health and welfare dangers. 159 Indeed, the kinds 
of justifications which might meet the test often have been described as 
"local" ones, in keeping with the earlier definitions of police power. 160 
To the extent that states seek to interfere with abortions which occur in 
other states, it is difficult to characterize the effects they seek to avoid as 
"local" ones. 
This conclusion is strengthened by considering the privileges and 
immunities clause, the constitutional provision which the Court has de-
scribed as having a "mutually reinforcing relationship" with the goals of 
union embedded in the commerce clause doctrine. 161 
B. Privileges, Immunities, and National Citizenship 
One of the concerns reflected in the commerce clause is a concern 
with preserving the opportunities of citizens in a federal system com-
posed of states with competing public agendas. The text of the clause, 
however, seems an unlikely vehicle with which to regulate interstate con-
tests of morality. There is, however, a constitutional provision whose 
words more directly address the issue of what it means to be a citizen of a 
federal republic afflicted or blessed with moral dissensus. Article IV's 
privileges and immunities clause provides that "[t]he citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States." 162 
The text's apparent meaning is that when American citizens travel 
outside of the territory of their home state-and thus "in the several 
states"-they are "entitled" to partake of the "privileges and immuni-
ties" of local citizens. In cases of moral dissensus, all American citizens 
present in a state are equally entitled to the privileges and immunities of 
the local climate. 
159 See Maine, 477 U.S. at 140-41 (protection of Maine's fisheries); Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 
954-55 (conservation of diminishing ground water sources). Note that Sporhase struck down a 
reciprocity requirement that sought to obtain comparable water from another state. Sporhase, 
458 U.S. at 960. 
160 See Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2028 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that dormant 
commerce clause should not apply to "law[s] directed to legitimate local concerns"); Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (applying "strictest scrutiny [to] any purported legitimate 
local purpose"), quoted in Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2014; Hunt v. Washing-
ton State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (state must be able "to justify 
[statute] both in terms of the local benefits flowing from statute and the unavailability of non-
discriminatory alternatives"), quoted in Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2014. 
161 Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978). 
162 U.S. Const. art. IV,§ 2, cl.l. 
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1. Constraints on Inhospitable Hosts 
At its most uncontroversial, the privileges and immunities clause 
constrains discrimination against out-of-state citizens. The "privileges 
and immunities" granted to residents cannot be denied to out-of-state 
citizens. Beginning with Ward v. Maryland , 163 in which the Court deter-
mined that Maryland could not tax foreign traders at a higher rate than 
it imposed on domestic traders, and culminating most recently in a trio 
of cases in which the Court invalidated states' refusals to allow local 
practice by out-of-state attorneys, 164 the Court has regularly interpreted 
the clause to place constitutional barriers in the path of states' efforts to 
deny citizens of other states rights or privileges granted to their own resi-
dents.165 Thus, even if Roe is overruled and abortion becomes merely 
another regulated medical procedure, Doe v. Bolton's conclusion that the 
privileges and immunities clause prevents a state in which abortion serv-
Jces are available from denying access to non-residents 166 seems well 
163 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430-32 (1871). 
164 See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 559 (1989); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Fried-
man, 487 U.S. 59, 70 (1988); Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 
(1985). 
165 The barriers are not absolute. The most recent Supreme Court articulation of the test is 
found in Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. at 552 ("When a challenged restriction deprives 
nonresidents of a privilege or immunity protected by this Clause, it is invalid unless ' (i) there is 
a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced 
against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's objective' in light of less 
restrictive means available to accomplish the objective."). 
In Piper, Justice Rehnquist voiced dissent from the "least restrictive means" branch of the 
analysis. See Piper, 4 70 U.S. at 294-95. His dissent in Friedman "on the same basis as Piper" 
was joined only by Justice Scalia, who did not join the Rehnquist dissent in Barnard. See 
Friedman, 487 U.S. at 71. The dissent in Barnard, joined by Justices White and O'Connor, 
was based on the "unique circumstances of legal practice in the Virgin Islands." See Barnard, 
489 U.S. at 560. Justice Rehnquist's own articulation seems to be found in United Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222 ( 1984) (the clause "does not preclude 
discrimination against citizens of other States where there is a 'substantial reason' for the dif-
ference in treatment ... (and) the degree of discrimination bears a close relationship to (the 
reason].") 
Thus, in dealing with the problem of extraterritorial regulation of abortion, the members 
of the Court who seek to avoid taking a position on abortion by treating it as a question 
entirely for the legislature will be thrown back by doctrine to the task of determining whether 
the effort to prevent extraterritorial abortions is a "substantial" interest. In this regard, the 
holding in Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 668 (1975), that under the privileges and 
immunities clause "the constitutionality of one State's statutes affecting nonresidents [cannot] 
depend upon the present configuration of the statutes of another State," suggests that a simple 
desire to honor the home state's anti-abortion policy would not justify prohibiting out-of-state 
residents obtaining abortions on a basis of equality with dom estic residents. See also Travis v. 
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 82 (1920) ("A State may not barter away the right, 
conferred upon its citizens by the Constitution of the United States, to enjoy the privileges and 
immunities of citizens when they go into other States."), quoted with approval in Austin, 420 
U.S. at 667. 
166 410 u.s. 179, 200 (1973). 
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grounded. The opportunity to obtain an abortion is no less a "privilege 
and immunity" than the opportunity to practice law or to fish for 
shrimp. 167 Article IV's long-standing obligation to " place the citizens of 
each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States" 168 will 
constrain efforts to bar inhabitants of other states from the abortion op-
portunities permitted to locals.169 
167 This seems particu lar ly to be the case in states which regard abort ion as a right pro-
tected under their own constitutions. It would be difficult to argue that a state const itutional 
right is not a "privilege or immunity'' of state citizenship. The exclusions from the definition 
of "privi lege and immunity" which the Court has explicitly recognized in recent years have 
included: ( I) an exception for activities that are not "basic and essential" in Baldwin v. Mon-
tana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1978) (elk hunting license); (2) an excep-
tion dictated by the structu re of fed eralism for the ri ght to vote and hold political office, in 
Piper, 470 U.S . at 282 n.l3 (right to vote and to hold political office); and (3) an exception for 
goods and services created by the state itsel f, in Martinez v. Bynum, 46 1 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) 
(upholding residence requ irement for tuition-free public education). In Sosna v. Iowa, 4 19 
U.S. 393, 407 ( 1975), the Court also upheld a one-year residence req uirement for divorce on 
the ground that Iowa had an interest in avoiding extraterritorial attack on its divorce decrees. 
l 68 Friedman, 487 U.S. at 64 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869), 
overruled on other grounds by United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 
533 (1944)). 
The obliga tion is mirrored with respect to aliens by 42 U.S.C. § 198 1 (1988) which pro-
vides that "(a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in 
every State ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishmen t, pains, penalties ... and to no other." M ost recent litigation has 
focused on equality with white citizens. However, equality with white citizens was also con-
templated . See Takahashi v. F ish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 41 9 (1948); Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 11 8 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Bhandari v. First Nat'! Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 
1099, reh'g en bane, 829 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Truax v. R aich, 239 U.S . 33, 39 
( 1915) (legally admitted alien admitted "with the privilege of entering and abiding ... in any 
State in the Union."). 
169 Indeed, even if aborti on were considered to be the equivalent of homicide, it seems 
doubtful that a state could deny the advantages of its own law to out-of-state residents. Sup-
pose that New Jersey recognizes a "battered wife" defense. It would plainly violate the privi-
leges and immunities clause to make that defense available only where a New Jersey killing 
was committed by New Jersey residents. 
Assume further that Pennsylvania does not offer such a defense, and a Pennsylvania bat-
tered wife kills her Pennsylvania husband while on vacation in New Jersey. Would not the 
pri vileges and immunities clause prevent New Jersey courts or legisla ture from denying the 
defense to the non-resident wife in a New Jersey prosecu tion? (Conversely, if Pennsy lvania 
punishes marital rape but New Jersey does not, New Jersey could not provide for the prosecu-
tion of on ly Pennsylvania husbands who rape their wives in New Jersey.) . 
A general statute that all defend ants are to be governed by the law of their place of origi n 
might raise different issues. Even so, in A ustin v. New Hampshire, 420 U .S. 656, 668 (1 97 5), 
the Court held that "the constitutionality of one State's statutes affecting nonresidents [cannot] 
depend upon the presen t configuration of the statutes of another State. " More important ly, in 
a crimina l context it is inconceivable that New Jersey would say conduct is governed "only" 
by the law of the state of origin, for that could mean that a Pennsylvan ian coming into New 
Jersey would be immu ne from New Jersey criminal sanctions. 
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2. The Right to Travel: Constraints on Barriers to Entry and Exit 
American citizens are entitled under article IV's privileges and im-
munities clause to avail themselves of reproductive options in neighbor-
ing states on a "footing of equality" with residents of those states; a 
refusal by host states to accord such equality would violate the clause. 
California could not deny women from Utah the right to obtain abor-
tions that would be lawful for California citizens. To take advantage of 
this entitlement, of course, a Utah woman must get to California. The 
question thus arises, in light of Ireland 's recent efforts, whether Califor-
nia or Utah could prohibit women from traveling to California for that 
purpose. One answer, as we have noted, lies in the commerce clause, 
which limits the states' powers to interfere with interstate transit of per-
sons and products. Yet the right to interstate travel has deeper roots.170 
The predecessor of the privileges and immunities clause was con-
tained in article IV of the Articles of Confederation, which provided: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual fr iendship and intercourse 
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabit-
ants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from 
justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of 
free citizens in the several States; and the people of each state shall have 
free ingress and regress to and from any other state . ... 171 
Although there is little legislative history of this provision, it appears that 
the Articles of Confederation generally sought to fuse disparate states 
into a whole, not only by protecting a right to relocate one's residence to 
another state, but by ensuring the ability to travel among the states for 
purposes other than permanent migration. 172 
Although the current privileges and immunities clause was modeled 
on the Articles' provision, 173 it omits explicit mention of "free ingress 
170 It is worth highlighting these roots in view of the Supreme Court 's decision to rehear 
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, Ill S. Ct. 1070 ( 1991), and of the re-emergence of 
state statutes which seek to impose durational residency requirements on welfare benefits. 
Given the limits of stare decisis in the Rehnquist court, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 
(1 969), may soon be relitigated. Cf. Nord linger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 ( 1992) (decl in-
ing, on standing grounds, to reach right to travel challenge to "welcome stranger" tax 
assessment). 
171 Articles of Confederation art. IV ( 1777) (emphasis added). Professor Bogen traces the 
right to "ingress and regress" back to the Magna Carta and inter-colonia l movement. David S. 
Bogen, the Privileges and Immuniti es Clause of Article IV, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 794, 811-
14 (1987). 
172 The draft presented to the Continental Congress entitled inhabitants "going to res ide in 
[] other State[s]" to the "rights and privileges" of "natural born free Citizens" of their des tina-
tion. Bogen, supra note 171, at 820 n. 70 (citing 9 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-
1789, at 889 (W. Ford ed., 1907)). The Congress broadened the Article to protect the "privi-
leges and immunities" of all free inhabitants in foreign states, not only those "going to reside." 
173 Charles Pinckney, who claimed to have drafted article IV section 2 of the Constitution, 
told the convention that this article was "formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th Article 
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and regress." It has been accepted for the better part of two centuries, 
however, that the current Constitution incorporates a right of interstate 
travel. Initially, the right was rooted in the "ingress and regress" heri-
tage of the Articles of Confederation embodied in the privileges and im-
munities clause of article IV. 17 4 The purpose of the privileges and 
immunities clause, like its predecessor in the Articles of Confederation, 
was to recognize a national identity that made states fellow-members of a 
broader polity. One of the constituents of that identity was the right of 
citizens of each of the newly-formed United States to travel among the 
states on a basis of equality. 
The dimensions of this right formed part of the matrix for the con-
troversy that swirled through the middle of the nineteenth century over 
whether free blacks were citizens of the states in which they resided. 
D uring the first half of the eighteenth century, many states sought to 
exclude free blacks from their borders or to prevent their interstate 
of the present Confederation." 3 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787, at 106, 112 (1937); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79 ( 1982) (O'Connor, J. concurring); 
cf. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920) ("The text of Article IV, § 2, of the 
Constitution makes manifest that it was drawn with reference to the corresponding clause of 
the Articles of Confederation and was intended to perpetuate its limitations. "); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75-76 (1872) ("there can be but little question that the 
purpose of both these provisions is the same," referring to the fourth article of the Articles of 
Confederation and article IV of the Constitution). 
174 The earliest assertion was that of Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 
546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (article IV privileges and immunities include "[t]he 
r ight of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of 
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise"). See United Sta tes v. Wheeler, 254 
U.S. 281, 297-98 (1920) ("Undoubtedly the right of citizens of the States to reside peacefully 
in , and to have free ingress into and egress from, the several States (against both their own and 
other states]" fused into one by article IV, section 2); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 
4 18, 430 (1871) ("(T]he clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a 
citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in 
lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestat ion."); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 
168 , 180 ( 1869), overruled on other grounds by United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (privileges and immunities clause "gives (citizens of each state] the 
right of free ingress into other States, and eg ress from them"). 
More recent opinions relyin g on the article IV heritage include: Zobel v. Williams, 457 
U.S. 55, 79 (1982) (O'Connor, J. concurring); Shapi ro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 
( 1969). Justices Stevens and Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's opinion in Attorney Gen. v. 
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 920 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (article IV, section 2 provides 
relevant basis for analysis in evaluating claims of right to interstate travel or migration), even 
though Justice Rehnquist had previously rejected the analysis in Zobel, 457 U.S. at 84 n.3, on 
the basis of the Slaughter-House objection. See text accompanying note 190 infra. 
Professor David Bogen argues that a right to inters tate travel is implici t in the entitlement 
to exercise privileges and immunities in the host state because "(i]f the state of origin prohibits 
leaving, it will prevent a citizen from obtaining article IV privileges. Similarly if the state of 
destination excludes the citizen, it also obstructs obtaining the privileges." Bogen, supra note 
171, at 84 7. Whether or not the argument will support a generally applicable right to travel, it 
certainly casts doubt on travel limitations that are designed to interfere with extraterritorial 
abortion. 
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travel. 175 It was conceded on all sides, however, that such efforts would 
be impermissible if free blacks were state citizens. The issue was initially 
tested in controversies over an 1821 South Carolina statute restricting 
the rights of free black seamen to debark from their vessels while in port. 
If blacks were "citizens," article IV was conceded by both North and 
South to give them the right to travel into other states. 176 
A decade later, arguments in the case of Prudence Crandall, who 
was convicted of running a school for free black immigrants to Connecti-
cut without a license, turned on whether the blacks were "citizens"; if so, 
their right to immigrate was conceded by the prosecutors. 177 According 
to legal learning common at the time of the Civil War, state citizenship 
entailed the right to travel among the states. 178 I t was this understanding 
175 See, e.g., Ill. Const. of 1848, art. XIV (requiring exclusi on of ' 'free persons of color"), 
reprinted in Francis N . Thorpe, 2 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and 
Other Organic Laws of the State, Territories and Colon ies Now or Heretofore Forming the 
United States of America 1009 (1909); Ind. Const. of 1851, art. XIII, § 1 ("No negro or mu-
latto shall come into, or settle in the State"), reprinted in F. Thorpe, supra, at 1089; Mo. 
Const. of 1820 Art III § 26, reprinted in F. Thorpe, supra, at 2154 (excluding "free negroes 
and mulattoes"); Or. Const. of 1857, art. I, Bill of Rights, § 36 ("No free negro or mulatto ... 
shall come, reside or be within this State"), reprinted in 5 F. Thorpe, supra, at 3000. 
By the Civil War, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia all pro-
hibited or punished by statute the entry of free blacks who were not already residents of the 
state, and Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia prohib-
ited free black residents from traveling outside of their own state with an intention to return. 
See J. Hurd, supra note 49, at 279-80. Louisiana also sought to prohibit the travel of masters 
with slaves to free states. P. Finkelman, supra note 38, at 211-12. 
176 See House Comm. on Commerce, Report on Free Colored Seamen, H.R. Rep. No. 80, 
27th Con g., 3d Sess. 2 ( 1843); The Reconstruction Amendments' Debates ii-iii (Alfred Avins 
ed., 1967) [hereinafter The Reconstruction Amendmen ts' Debates]; Don E. Fehrenbacher, 
Slavery, Law, and Politics 37-38 (1981); P. Finkelman, supra note 38, a t 233; J. Hurd, supra 
note 49, at 279-80. 
177 Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 344-47 (1 832); see Harold M. Hyman & William M. 
Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law 94-95 (1982). 
17 8 See Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 30 I, 304 (1 866) (invalidating Indiana's constitutional 
prohibition on entry of blacks into the state, under article IV privileges and immunities clause, 
holding that Dred Scali had been effectively overruled by, inter alia, Civi l Rights Act confer-
ring cit izenship); Case of Andrew Hatfield, 3 Western L. J ., July 1846, at 477-78 (discharging, 
under privileges and immunities clause, free black arrested for coming from Pennsy lvania to 
Missouri without license); J. Hurd, supra note 49, at 279 ("So far as judicial opinion has been 
expressed on the question, it seems almost unanimous that these laws would be unconstitu-
tional, were negroes to be held citizens of a State."); cf. Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509, 510 
(1846) (upholding sta tute to exclude free blacks as against Article IV attack on ground that 
blacks could not be citizens); Tennessee v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (I Meigs) 331, 339, 341 (1838) 
(conviction of free black for illegal immigration to Tennessee upheld against Article IV attack 
on ground that blacks could not be citizens); id. at 333 (argument of Attorney General conced-
ing states "cannot pass laws to exclude citizens of one of the Component States"). Compare 
Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (9 How.) 13, 18 (1852) (stating that states bordering slave states have 
the right "to protect themselves against the influx either of liberated or fugitive slaves"), with 
Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 610-11 (1860) (arguing that "any law which should attempt 
to deny [citizens] free ingress or egress would be void," and explaining Moore, supra, as resting 
r 
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that gave particular salience to Justice Taney's strained conclusion in 
Dred Scott that blacks could not become state or national citizens. 179 
The understanding that citizenship brought with it the right to 
travel among states was common currency in the political branches as 
well. In 1821, Congress faced the question of whether to admit to the 
Union the State of Missouri, whose constitution excluded from its 
boundaries "free negroes and mulattoes." 180 If blacks could be citizens, 
the constitution of Missouri would be inconsistent with the Constitution 
of the United States. Congress ducked the issue; Missouri's admission 
was secured by the adoption of a proviso recognizing that such exclusion 
was applicable only to individuals who were not "citizens of the states in 
the union," without defining whether blacks could be members of that 
cla.ss.181 
Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott purported to resolve that is-
sue. Still , in the 1858 and 1859 Congressional debates on the admission 
of Oregon, the would-be state's draft constitutional provision excluding 
all black persons from the state was challenged as a violation of article 
IV. 182 In order to establish the validity of the restrictions, Oregon's suc-
cessful proponents relied on Dred Scott's repressive conclusion that 
on the proposition that slaves are not citizens). See also Willard v. People, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 461 , 
472 (1843) (the Law of Nations states that "the citizens of one government have a right of 
passage through territory of another ... without the latter's acquiring any right over the 
person or property .... Much less would we disregard their constitutional rights, as citizens of 
one of the states, to all the rights, immunities and privileges of the citizens of the several 
states"); Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 193, 194 (1833) (under article IV "it is the right of every 
citizen of the United States to pass freely through every other state with his property of every 
description, including negro slaves without being in any way subject to forfeit his property"). 
179 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,417 (1857) (Taney, J.) (if blacks were state 
citizens, "it would give [them) the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased"). 
130 Mo. Const. of 1820 art. III, § 26, reprinted in 4 F. Thorpe, supra note 175, at 2154. 
l SI See Joint Resolution of March 2, 1821, 16th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 Stat. 645, 645 (1821) 
("No law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any citizen, of either [sic) of the 
states in this Union, shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immuni-
ties to which such citizen is entitled under the constitution of the United States."); see also J. 
Hurd, supra note 49, at 168, 280 (discussing Joint Resolution); Leon F. Litwack, North of 
Slavery: The Negro in the Free States 1790-1860, at 34-39 (1961) (discussing "the legislative 
debates of 1820-21 on the admission of Missouri" and "the matter of negro citizenship"). 
182 See Cong. Globe, 35th Cong. , 1st Sess. 1964 (1858) (statement of Sen. Fessenden of 
Maine) (viewing prohibition on travel as unconstitutional); Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 
952 ( 1859) (statement of Rep. Granger) (arguing that exclusion violates constitutional right 
"of the people of one State going to another either on business or to remain there" under 
privileges and immunities clause) (emphasis omitted); id. at 974 (statement of Rep. Dawes) 
(exclusion is "plainly and ... palpably" unconstitutional under the privileges and immunities 
clause); id. at 984 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (arguing that Oregon exclusion violates privi-
leges and immunities clause; "[t]his guaranty of the Constitution of the United States is sense-
less and a mockery, if it does not limit State sovereignty and restrain each and every State from 
closing its territory ... against citizens of the United States."). 
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blacks could not be citizens. 183 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, but before authoritative rejection 
of Dred Scott, the Supreme Court reached beyond article IV to construe 
the right to interstate travel as an element of political union. In striking 
down a Nevada tax on railroad passengers leaving the state, the Court 
adopted the views of Justice Taney: 
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was 
formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all 
citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, 
must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without 
interruption, as freely as in our own States. 18 4 
The fourteenth amendment was intended to provide explicit consti-
tutional warrant for a right to travel that extended to both blacks and 
whites, overturning the regime under which southern states excluded free 
blacks and abolitionists. 18 5 The issue of state citizenship as a predicate 
!83 Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., lst Sess. 1965 (1858) (statement of Sen. Douglas of Illinois) 
(arguing that exclusions of blacks is permissible); Con g. Globe, 35th Con g., 2d Sess. 970 ( 1959) 
(statement of Rep. Clark of Missouri) (relying on proposition in Dred Scott that "the negro is 
not, and cannot be, a citizen of the United States," and, therefore, cannot claim privileges and 
immunities). 
184 Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, J., dissenting) (quoted in 
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 48-49 (1868), as stating more clearly "the principles 
here laid down"). Justice Rehnquist has commented approvingly on Crandall's use of infer-
ences from the constitutional framework "that the power to obstruct totally the movements of 
people is incompatible with the concept of one Nation." Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 441 , 
reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 ( 1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Charles Black, Structure 
and Relationship in Constitutional Law 27-29 (1969) (explaining Crandall and Edwards: "the 
fact that the United States is a single nation warrants inference as to mobility of population, 
quite aside from strictly governmental needs .... [It is) a unitary nation, to which, because of 
its nationhood, internal barriers to travel are unthinkable."). 
A parallel protection was provided in the decade after Crandall by the interpretation of 
the commerce clause which made the regulation of interstate transportation of passengers a 
matter of national concern, while reserving under the police power the right to exclude "con-
victs, paupers, idiots, and lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge." Railroad 
Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 , 471 (1877); see notes 123-27 and accompanying text supra. 
The Crandall outcome in Nevada was prefigured by In re Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 162 (1858), 
which enunciated a right to vacation with slaves in California on the ground that "this right of 
free passage [is] a right that necessarily flows from the relation that the States sustain to each 
other, under the general bond of the Union[.) We are one government, for certain specified 
purposes; and is not the right of transit across the territory of a sister State one of the necessary 
incidents of the purposes and ends for which the fed eral government was created?" 
185 See, e.g., Chester J. Antieau, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 33 ( 1981) ("The denial of the opportunity to move freely throughout the land was one of 
the badges of servitude imposed upon the slave ... and, in ratifying the Fourteenth Amend-
ment the people intended that the privileges and immunities clause of that Amendment would 
protect Blacks, as well as Whites, in their freedom to move and travel around the country, 
without restriction by the States and their political subdivisions."); P. Finkelman, supra note 
38, at 342-43 ("Perhaps the most important legacy of Aves, Dred Scott, Lemmon ... is [the 
Fourteenth Amendment]. The men who witnessed these cases and others drafted an amend-
ment that not only made freedmen citizens, but also demanded that their privileges and immu-
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for the article IV privileges was laid to rest with the fourteenth amend-
ment's grant of residency-based state citizenship. After that grant, the 
right to travel between states could not be denied to blacks on the ground 
that they were not "citizens. " The Framers' expectation for the four-
teenth amendment was that blacks, like other citizens, would be able to 
lay claim under its aeg1s to the article IV right to interstate travel. 18 6 
nities be respected nationwide .... In making the freedmen citizens of the states in which they 
resided, the amendment ... required that the individual states recognize the rights of citizen-
ship and therefore grant comity to blacks entering from other sta tes. No longer could a south-
ern state imprison a free black sailor from the North or, indeed, prohibit free blacks from 
entering their domain."). 
!86 Senator Howard introduced the first sentence of the fourteenth amendment as an 
amendment on the floor on May 30, 1866 to "settle the great question of citizenship and 
remove all doubts as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States." See Con g. 
Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1 866) . 
It was clear to all concerned that the status of citizenship would entail a right to interstate 
travel. Discussing Howard's amendment, Senator Cowan of Pennsylvania observed, "[a)s I 
understand the rights of the States under the Constitution at present, California has the right, 
if she deems it proper, to forbid the entrance into her territory of any person she chooses who 
is not a citizen of some one of the United States. She cannot forbid [a citizen's] entrance." Id. 
at 2891. Cowan argued against the amendment because he was "unwilling on the part of my 
state to give up the right ... of expelling [Gypsies]. " Id. Senator Conness of California 
responded that California's efforts to curtail Chinese immigration had been struck down as 
vi olating the commerce clause by the California Supreme Court. Id. at 2892. 
Representative Bingham, drafter of the phrase "privil eges and immunities, " was on rec-
ord as believing that citizenship entailed the right to interstate travel. See note 182 supra 
(Bingham arguing that Oregon's exclusion of blacks violated their privi leges and immunities as 
citizens) . 
Senator Reverdy Johnson, who had represented the prevailing party in the Dred Scott 
case, see The Reconstruction Amendments' Debates, supra note 176, at xi, thought that How-
ard 's proposed definition of federal citizenship was both necessary and appropriate "if there 
are to be citizens of the United States entitled everywhere to the character of citizens of the 
United States. " See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. , 1st Sess. 2893 (1866). It is unclear whether this 
is a reference to the article IV privileges or immunities to which citizens are "entitled" upon 
traveling "everywhere" in the Union, and which Dred Scott had denied to blacks, or the four-
teenth amendment privileges and immunities. In the absence of the amendment, Johnson con-
tinued to maintain that the Civil Rights Bill exceeded Congress's powers. See id. 
Others manifested similar understandings. See, e.g., id . at 4 75 (statement of Sen. Trum-
bull of Illinois, Chair of Judiciary Committee, draftsman of Civil Rights Act) ("A person who 
is a citizen in one state ... is entitled to ... the right to travel, to go where he pleases. This is a 
right which belongs to the ci tizen of each state. A law that does not allow a colored person to 
go from one county to another is certainly a law in derogation of the rights of a freeman."); id. 
at 1757 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (citi zen has a right "to go into any state in the union and 
to reside there, and the United States Government will protect him in that right"); id. at 941-
42 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (objecting to pass system in Texas by which freedman found 
at large without a pass is whipped); id . at 2765 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard of Michigan, 
author of Citizenship definition) (arguing that "right to pass through or reside in any state" is 
among the "privileges and immunities spoken of in the second section of the fourth article of 
the Constitution") (quoting Corfield v. Coryell , 6 Fed. Cas., 547, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)); id. 
at 497 (statement of Sen. Van Winkle, opposed to Civil Rights bill) (arguing that if blacks were 
citizens, Indiana exclusion and other state exclusions would be illegal under article IV, and 
concluding: "I think it needs a constitutional amendment to make these people citizens of the 
506 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIE W [Vol. 67:451 
The fourteenth amendment went on to establish birthright citizen-
ship in the nation, and explicitly to forbid states from "abridging" the 
privileges or immunities of that national citizenship. National union en-
tailed national citizenship as the primary allegiance, a fac t expressly rec-
ognized in the adoption of the citizenship clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. The definition of state citizenship was derived from na-
tional citizenship: any United States citizen was ipso facto a citizen of the 
state in which she resided. 187 Regardless of the vagaries of state law, the 
United States citizen was protected against "abridgments of the privi-
leges or immunities" of national citizenship. 
Debate surrounding the privileges and immunities clause was 
marked by references to the experience of Representative Samuel Hoar of 
Massachusetts, which was notorious at the time in Republican circles. In 
1844, Representative Hoar was dispatched from New England to South 
Carolina to challenge that state's laws forbidding the entry of black 
seamen. He was driven out of the state by threats of violence with the 
connivance of South Carolina authorities, a result that was widely viewed 
by Congressional Republicans as a violation of his rights as a national 
citizen. 188 The protection of the fourteenth amendment's privileges and 
immunities clause was designed in part to alleviate Congress's perceived 
lack of power to enforce article IV's protection of the right to travel 
freely among the states. 189 
United States"); id. at 1082 (statement of Sen. Stewart) (suggesting that privileges or immuni-
ties clause was unnecessary, and arguing that exclusion by Illinois of free blacks violated arti-
cle IV); id. at 1263 (statement of Rep. Broomall of Pennsylvania) ("rights and immunities of 
citizenship" denied by southern states to northerners included "right of transit" and "right of 
domicile"). 
187 This was contrasted, in the debates on the definition of citizenship, with the preexisting 
law by Senator Reverdy Johnson: "[a]s it now stands[,) ... [w)ho is a citizen of the United 
States is an open question. The decision of the courts and the doctrine of commentators is that 
every man who is a citizen of a state becomes ipso facto a citizen of the United States; but there 
is no definition as to how citizenship can exist in the United States except through the medium 
of a citizenship in a State." Id. at 2893. 
188 P. Finkelman, supra note 38, at 109 n.28; H. Hyman & W. Wiecek, supra note 177, at 
81 ; The Reconstruction Amendments' Debate, supra note 176, at 1-2, 4, 6-7 , 11-12; William 
M. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America 1760-1848, at 139-40 
(1977). 
189 See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865) (statement of Sen. Sherman of Ohio) 
(arguing that under article IV, "a man who was recognized as a citizen of one state had the 
right to go anywhere within the United States and exercise the immunity of a citizen of the 
United States; the trouble was with enforcing it .... This constitutional provision was in effect 
a dead letter as to [Hoar)."); Cincinnati Commercial, Sept. 29, 1866, at I (Sherman, Speech of 
29 Sept. 1866, in Cincinnati) ("Everybody born in this country or naturalized ... should have 
the right to go from county to county and state to state."); see also Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (arguing that Hoar had right to travel under 
article IV privileges and immunities, but without enforcement it was to no avail); id. at 1066 
(statement of Rep. Price) (arguing that goal of protecting privileges and immunities in early 
draft of fourteenth amendment was to protect the "rights of citizens of one state in going into 
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Subsequent case law has firmly established that one of the privileges 
of national citizenship is the right to travel within the nation without 
interference from its constituent subdivisions. 190 What is sometimes 
overlooked, however, is that this protection is not rooted solely in infer-
ences from constitutional structure, but stems directly from the concrete 
expectations and historical experience of those who drafted and ratified 
the fourteenth amendment. 
Let us return to the example of a Utah woman who seeks to travel 
another"); Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 31, 1866, at 2, (Rep. Delano speaking at Coshocton, 
Ohio, on Aug. 28, 1866) (amendment provides protect ion to right to travel in south, referring 
to Hoar). 
Some Republicans took the position that even without the fourteenth amendment, article 
IV protected ''fundamental rights which every citizen of the United States holds as gift of his 
national government," among which were thought to be the right "to pass through or reside in 
the State at pleasure." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., l st Sess. 1293 (1866) (statement of Rep. 
Shellabarger) (discussing bill protecting travelers' civil rights). 
190 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("unquestioned his-
toric recognition of the principle of free interstate migration" finds "its unmistakable essence 
in that document that transformed a loose confederation of States into one Nation"); Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1971) (right to travel is "fundamental personal right"); Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 106-07 (1971) (right to pass freely from State to State protected by 
national citizenship, although it does not necessarily rest on the fourteenth amendment); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) ("This Court long ago recognized that the nature 
of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that 
all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land. "); United States v. 
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) ("A right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to 
be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union."); id. at 764-67 (Harlan, J.) ("The right to 
unimpeded interstate travel, regarded as privilege and immunity of national citizenship was 
historically seen as a method of breaking down state provincialism, and facilitating the crea-
tion of a true federal union."); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J. , 
concurring) ("The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizen-
ship."); id. at 185-86 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Rich or penniless, Duncan's citizenship under 
the Constitution pledges his strength to the defense of California as a part of the United States, 
and his right to migrate to any part of the land he must defend is something she must respect 
under the same instrument."); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) ("right to pass 
free ly from state to state" is a privilege of national citizenship); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 
270, 274 (1900) ("Undoubtedly ... the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the 
territory of any State is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment . ... "); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 WalL) 36, 79 (1872) (rights recognized by Crandall v. Nevada, 73 
U.S. (16 WalL) 35 (1867), are privileges of national citizenship) ; Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 169, 
180 (1869) (article IV gives citizens of each state the right of free ingress into other states and 
egress from them), overruled on other grounds by United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 
322 U.S. 533 (1944), quoted in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978), in Baldwin v. 
Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 380 (1978), in United States v. Wheeler, 254 
U.S. 294, 295 (1921), in Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60,78 (1920), and in Blake 
v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 ( 1898)). 
As a matter of statutory grant, the same privileges attach to aliens. 42 U.S. C. § 1981 
(Supp. 1992) provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every state to ... make and enforce contracts ... as enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties ... and no other." If a state 
is barred from interdicting travel by citizens, the "pains and penalties" of interdiction cannot 
be inflicted on aliens within its jurisdiction. See note 168 supra. 
508 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:451 
to California to obtain an abortion. Because of article IV's privileges and 
immunities clause, the fourteenth amendment's own privileges and im-
munities clause, and the nature of national citizenship, California cannot 
exclude prospective residents because they threaten to take advantage of 
its employment opportunities 19 1 or welfare system. 192 Neither would it 
be able to exclude residents of other states who travel to avail themselves 
of its abortion laws. 
On its own side of the border, Utah has no greater right to interfere. 
In Crandall v. Nevada, 193 the Court held that Nevada could not tax resi-
dents leaving the state without interfering with the rights of national citi-
zenship. Should Utah seek to emulate Irish efforts to prohibit its citizens 
from leaving the state to obtain an abortion, the effort would be inconsis-
tent with the Constitution's guarantees of interstate travel rights. 194 
191 See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 163-64. 
192 See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-31; cf. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 
269-70 ( 1974) (conditioning indigent's right to non-emergency hospitalization on residency 
requirements impermissibly impinges on right of interstate travel by denying newcomers basic 
necessities of life). 
193 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867). 
194 Under current law, a substantial infringement of interstate travel rights is invalid unless 
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634 (right to travel 
cannot be penalized without "a compelling state interest") (emphasis in original); id. at 643-44 
(Stewart, J. , concurring) (same). A nine month prohibition on departure from the state is 
clearly a substantial infringement and at present, the state's interest in preventing previability 
abortions is not compelling. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 , 2811-12, 2817 
(1992). Indeed, the Casey dissenters seem to rely on claims that the abortion right is either 
unprotected or not fundamental rather than that the fetal protection is compelling. Id. at 
2860, 2867 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding abortion right "a form of liberty protected by" 
but not classified as "fundamental" under due process clause of fourteenth amendment); id. at 
2874 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The issue is whether [abortion] is a liberty protected by the 
Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not. "). 
In Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981), the Court held that while a "simple penalty for 
leaving a State is plainly impermissible," the right to travel is necessarily qualified by a state's 
right to prevent criminals from fleeing the jurisdiction. Id. at 421-22 and n.l8; cf. Zobel, 457 
U.S. at 78-79 n.8 (O'Connor, J. , concurring) (substantial reason necessary for durational resi-
dency requirement); see also U.S. Canst. art. IV § 2, cl. 2. (extradition clause); New York v. 
O'Neill, 359 U.S. I, 7 ( 1959) (detaining material witness in criminal proceeding justified "tem-
porary interference with voluntary travel"). Thus, Jones upheld a Georgia statute which en-
hanced the penalty for child abandonment when the defendant left the jurisdiction after 
committing the offense, on the theory that "if departure aggravates the consequences of con-
duct that is otherwise punishable, the state may treat the entire sequence of events from initial 
offense to departure" as more serious. Jon es, 452 U.S. at 422-23. 
Unlike the defendant who abandoned a child in Jones, a woman who seeks to leave Utah 
to obtain an abortion has engaged in no "misconduct" in Utah that "qualifies her right to 
interstate travel." Id. at 420. Nor would it warrant her extradition unless Utah has the consti-
tutional power to punish a Utah resident for either obtaining a California abortion, or travel-
ling through Utah to the border to obtain an abortion. As demonstrated elsewhere, Utah has 
no power to punish the woman for wholly extraterritorial conduct. See Part I supra; Part IIA 
supra; Part IIB(3) infra. The effort to prohibit travel toward the border would be in both 
intent and effect an effort to prohibit the protected travel itself. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
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3. Constraints on Extraterritorial Prosecution 
Article IV and the principles of federalism establish that California 
may not deny a resident of Utah the "privilege" or " immunity" of ob-
taining an abortion that California extends to its own citizens. The Utah 
citizen is "entitled" under article IV to the "privilege" of obtaining an 
abortion on a basis of equality with the citizens of California.195 The 
whole point of national citizenship is that citizens of one state who enter 
another are not aliens, but fe llow citizens of the nation, entitled to func-
tion on a basis of equality with native residents. As the modern Court 
has articulated it, the purpose of article IV "was to help fuse into one 
Nation a collection of independent sovereign states. It was designed to 
insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privi-
leges which the citizens of State B enjoy." 196 In light of this constitu-
tional " entitlement," can Utah nonetheless adopt the stratagem tried in 
German jurisdictions and prosecute its citizens for exercising their "enti-
tlement" in California? 
On its face, article IV is directed impartially against any interference 
with the privileges to which citizens are "entitled." The fact that Utah 
would like to project its moral standards into California would be no 
more cognizable a reason for denying Utah residents who venture into 
California the "same privileges" as Californians than would be a desire 
on the part of California to prevent an influx of Utah residents fleeing 
local strictures. Utah and California are not independent sovereigns. 
T hey lack the prerogatives granted under international law to define their 
own citizenship, to exclude one another's citizens, and to limit the enti-
tlements of immigrants and visitors from other states. The states of the 
Union are, rather, members of a single nation. Any United States citizen 
residing within a state's boundaries can demand recognition as a state 
citizen. Any national citizen residing in another state can claim free en-
try and exit and the right to the privileges and immunities of fellow citi-
zens rather than be forced to suffer the disabilities of an alien. 197 Just as 
(9 Wheat.) I, 196 (1 824) ("Can a trading expedition between two adjoining states commence 
and terminate outside of each? ... (the commerce power) must be exercised within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the several states."). 
195 See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 n.ll (1985) (noting 
that Court has never held that privileges and immunities clause protects only economic inter-
ests) (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (state statute limiting in-state abortions to 
residents violates privileges and immunities clause)). 
196 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 ( 1948), quoted in Supreme Court of Virginia v. 
Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1 988); in Piper, 470 U.S. at 279-80; in United Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 216 (1984); and in Zobel, 457 U.S. at 74 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
197 Cf. The Federalist No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It 
may be esteemed the basis of the Union that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States."); see also Lemmon v. People, 20 
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a California citizen is entitled, under the California Constitution's right 
of privacy, to obtain an abortion, Utah cannot reduce the Utah citizen 
who visits California to second class alien status. 
This, indeed, was the New York judiciary's conclusion in the era of 
national moral dissensus before the Civil War in People v. Merrill. 198 De-
spite the state's anti-slavery commitments, an effort to prosecute New 
York residents who sold a free black man from New York in Washing-
ton, D.C. was held to violate article IV, section 2: 
The Constitution was intended to be binding, as it regards the rights of 
the citizens of the several states, upon the people of the whole union. 
It was never intended that a legislature should violate state comity or 
national rights, as the section in question does, by assuming to punish 
as a felony a sale of property in a state or district where the right exists 
by the laws of the locality to make such a sale. 19 9 
If this conception of supervening national citizenship was, in some mea-
sure, disputed during the Union's first eight decades, the Civil War and 
the Reconstruction amendments embedded it firmly in the national 
structure. Whatever obligations a citizen owes to her home nation while 
abroad in a foreign land, after the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, a state citizen, when in another state, cannot be regarded as an 
alien. United States citizenship is "paramount and dominant instead of 
being subordinate and derivative." 200 
With the memory of the struggle for Union raw in the national con-
sciousness, the Court set the course for future interpretation by articulat-
ing article IV's role in the federal system in no uncertain terms. 
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the 
citizens of each State upon the same footing with the citizens of other 
States so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those 
States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage 
N .Y. 562, 607-09 (1860) ("No provision in [the Constitution] has so strongly tended to consti-
tute the citizens of the United States one people as this .... Every citizen of every other state 
shall have the same privileges and immunities-that is the same rights-which the citizens of 
that State possess . In the first place, they are not to be subjected to any of the disabilities of 
alienage .. . . The position that a citizen carries with him into every State into which he may 
go the legal institutions of the one in which he was born cannot be supported. " ), cited with 
approval in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S . (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869), overruled on other grounds by 
United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
198 2 Parker's Criminal Cases 590 (1855). 
199 Id. 
200 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 388-89; see also Edwards v. California, 31 4 
U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson , J., concurring) ("This clause was adopted to make United 
States citizenship the dominant and paramount allegiance among us."); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 
U .S. 496, 510 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring) ("The first sentence of the Amendment settled 
the old controversy as to citizenship . ... Thenceforward citizenship of the United States 
became primary and citizenship of a State secondary."); note 186 supra (statement of Sen. 
Reverdy Johnson). 
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in other States ... it insures to them in other states the same freedom 
possessed by citizens of those States .... It has been justly said that no 
provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the 
citizens of the United States one people as this. Indeed, without some 
provision of the kind removing from the citizens of each State the disa-
bilities of alienage in the other States .. . the Republic would have 
constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have consti-
tuted the Union which now exists. 201 
511 
The goal of replacing a "league of states" with a "republic," com-
prised of "one people" whose allegiance is primarily national, requires 
that American citizens who go from state to state should not be identified 
as aliens by a personal law they carry with them from their home state. 
Members of the national polity are Americans first and state citizens only 
derivatively. As such, they are "entitled" by article IV to move from 
state to state, and to take advantage of the local privileges and immuni-
ties "upon the same footing" with local residents. Efforts by their home 
states to prevent the exercise of those privileges by prosecuting citizens 
upon their return are destructive of the capacity to travel as free and 
equal members of "one people." 20 2 
This line of reasoning faces two sets of objections. The first is a 
countervailing claim that federalism and article IV's full faith and credit 
clause permit-and perhaps require-that state citizens be governed by 
their home state law while out-of-state. California's article IV obligation 
201 Paul, 75 U.S. at ISO. This passage was quoted with approval in Supreme Court of 
Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1988), in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978), 
in Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 380 (1977), in United States v. 
Wheeler, 254 U.S. 294, 295 (1921), and in Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78 
(1920). 
In State v. Cutshall, 15 S.E. 261 (N.C. 1892), the court held that an effort to prosecute a 
North Carolina resident for a bigamous marriage contracted in South Carolina would be un-
constitutional, commenting, "[t]he attempt to evade the organic law, by making the coming 
into this state (after committing an offense in another) a crime is too palpable, in view of the 
admitted fact that the constitution of the United States gives to citizens of all the states the 
immunities and privileges of its own citizens .... " ld. at 264. See also Detroit v. Osborne, 
135 U.S. 492, 498 (I 890) ("A citizen of another State going into Michigan may be entitled 
under the federal Constitution to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of that State; but 
under that Constitution he can claim no more. He walks the streets and highways in that 
State, entitled to the same rights and protection, but none other, than those accorded by its 
laws to its own citizens."). 
202 This proposition does not necessarily mean that the home state can never exert the au-
thority of its laws beyond its borders. Corporations, for example, cannot claim the protection 
of the privileges and immunities clause. See Paul, 75 U.S. at 177-82. Furthermore, where a 
home state's rules as to natural persons are identical with those of the foreign state, there is no 
infringement of the "entitlement" to local privileges and immunities. Likewise, where the ba-
sic rules of conduct imposed by the home state are identical, differences in the rules regarding 
loss allocation or contractual liability would not impair the basic commitment to establishing a 
national citizenship. In cases of moral dissensus, however, the effort to impose home state 
morality conflicts with the citizen's entitlement under article IV. 
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to accord " full faith and credit" to Utah's restrictive laws might trump a 
Utah citizen's article IV "entitlement" to California's privileges and im-
munities. 203 This objection suffers two defects, however. T o begin with, 
it can be stood on its head. \rVhen Utah punishes its citizen for an action 
California regards as protected, one could equally well argue that Utah 
itself fails to grant full faith and credit to California's more permissive 
"public acts." Indeed, commentators occasionally have taken the posi-
tion that efforts at extraterritorial regulation of locally protected conduct 
are violations of the full faith and credit clause. 204 More importantly, 
settled law holds that " the full faith and credit clause does not require a 
state to apply another state's law in violation of its own legitimate pol-
icy;" visiting citizens under the full faith and credit clause are generally 
governed by laws implementing local policy. 205 
The second objection to the proposed interpretation of article IV is 
somewhat better rooted in precedent. Advocates of this objection would 
argue, relying on the Slaughter-House Cases, that when Utah prosecutes 
its citizens for taking advantage of their article IV entitlements in Cali-
fornia, there is no article IV violation because the privileges and immuni-
ties clause "does not profess to control the power of State governments 
203 Since California cannot be required to waive its criminal regulat ions for visitors, this 
would mean that full faith applies only to the visitor's disadvantage. This is, to say the least, 
an odd result given that the privileges and immunities clause encompasses interstate equality. 
204 See Kramer, supra note 79, at 1448 n. 91, 1451 n. l1l ( 1983) (asserting that the full faith 
and credit clause limits the ability of states "to justify punishing citizens for acts committed in 
other states" ); Rollin Perkins, The Territorial Principle in Criminal Law, 22 Hastings L.J. 
1155, 1164 (1971) ("California could not validly make it a crime for its citi zens to 'play the slot 
machines' in Las Vegas, Nevada, where this is lawful. Such a statute would violate the full 
faith and credit clause."). 
Professor Laycock's recent account of the interplay among the full faith and credit clause, 
the privileges and immunities clause, and the concepts of federalism does not take a direct 
position on the validity of extraterritorial criminal prohibitions, but his analysis suggests their 
invalidi ty under the full faith and credit clause. See Laycock, supra note 32. Under his view, 
the full faith and credit clause imposes a requirement that "there are occasions when the law of 
a sister state applies and occasions when it doesn't." Id . at 297, 327. He states, " [w]hen I fl y 
from Texas to California, I knowingly leave the territory that Texas is em powered to gove rn 
and submit myself to the authority of California," id. at 318, which apparently would allow a 
visitor to take advantage of California's permissions as well as its prohibitions, because "[i]t is 
no answer to say that I can usuall y comply with the more restrictive rule, because that elimi-
nates the political authority of the more permissive state." I d. at 319. F inall y, he emphasizes 
that under his view of the federal system, a citizen does not "carry her own law with her like a 
Roman citizen visiting the barbarians. " I d. a t 326. 
205 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,422 (1979); see also Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident 
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1939) (" In the case of statutes, the extra-state effect of which 
Congress has not prescribed, we think the conclusion is unavoidable that the full faith and 
credit clause does not require one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons 
and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state.") . Indeed, even earlier, the Court 
held in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1 892), that the clause does not require en-
forcement of penal statutes. 
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over the rights of its own citizens."206 While the language has been re-
peated regularly, 207 the quotations have been in either dicta or dissent; 
the language has only been grounds for one Supreme Court decision. 208 
In recent years, Justice O'Connor-joined on occasion by both Justices 
Brennan and Rehnquist-has manifested skepticism regarding the 
soundness of this argument, at least insofar as it is invoked to uphold the 
home state's efforts to interfere with the exercise of article IV's historical 
privileges of "ingress and regress." 209 
Justice O'Connor's skepticism is well-founded. There is no textual 
warrant for concluding that article IV's privileges and immunities clause 
fails to bind a citizen's state of origin. The rest of article IV is regularly 
applied against a citizen 's home state: the full faith and credit clause 
would entitle a Utah citizen to enforce at home a judgment obtained in 
California; the strictures of the extradition clause would protect a Utah 
206 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S . (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873) (asserting that article IV's guar-
antee of privileges and immunities provided "no security for the citizen of the State in which 
they were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the power of the State Govern-
ments over the rights of its own citizens"). 
207 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 84 n.3 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 666 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding article IV irrelevant to 
right to travel claim, "for it appears settled that this clause neither limits federal power nor 
prevents a State from distinguishing among its own citizens"); United States v. Wheeler, 254 
U.S. 281,298 (1928) (holding article IV inapplicable to private action); United States v. Harris, 
106 U.S. 629, 643 (1883) (same); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 252 (1898) (holding article 
IV forbids priority to state residents in bankruptcy); cf. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. 
Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217 (1983) (citing Slaughter-House Cases for proposition that 
New Jersey residents had no claim against New Jersey under the privileges and immunities 
clause, but also citing O'Connor in Zobel); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.5 (1982) (discrimination 
among residents not "the kind of discrimination against which the Privileges and Immunities 
clause was designed to prevent"); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1942) (Douglas, 
J., concurring) (implying that article IV does not apply to rules burdening domestic citizens). 
Holmes' opinion in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 353 (1908), is 
characteristically aphoristic. Although the syllabus characterizes it as asserting in the alterna-
tive that an article IV claim cannot "be raised by a citizen of the State itself," the opinion, after 
denying that any violation of the clause exists goes on to make the statement "[b]ut this ques-
tion does not concern the defendant, which is a New Jersey corporation." Id. at 358 . Since 
corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the clause, it is hard to tell whether 
Holmes is adverting to the fact that defendant is a corporation or a New Jersey corporation, or 
both . 
208 See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 138 (1872) (because "[t]he protection designed by 
that clause, as has been repeatedly held, has no application to a citizen of the State whose laws 
are complained of," an Illinois woman seeking admission to bar of Illinois could not claim that 
exclusion of women violated article IV privileges and immunities). 
209 Justice O'Connor's concurrence relied on her view that article IV applied to home-state 
actions in Zobel, 457 U.S. at 74-75, to strike down Alaska's classifications among its residents 
that imposed a disability on new residents who had "ventured into Alaska" from out of state. 
Justice Brennan proffered support in his concurrence. Id. at 66. Justice O'Connor reiterated 
her views in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Rehnquist in Attorney General v. Soto 
Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 920 (1986). Cf. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades, 465 U.S. at 217-18 
(Rehnquist, J., citing Justice O'Connor's Zobel concurrence with approval). 
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resident against improper extradition by his home government; the fugi-
tive slave clause obligated a state of refuge to return the fugitive regard-
Jess of the citizenship of the master. 
The seemingly contrary language in the Slaughter-House Cases is 
directed primarily to the question of whether the clause vests any rights 
unrelated to interstate movement. Faced with the claim that Louisiana 
butchers could invoke "privileges and immunities" against a Louisiana 
statute regulating actions in Louisiana, the Slaughter-House Court re-
jected the notion that a citizen can claim this constitutional protection of 
an undefined set of natural rights against the laws of her own state. 2 10 
The Court's opinion, however, does not speak to the situation where 
claims of interstate migration or travel are at issue. 2 11 
A flat rule that a citizen holds no article IV "entitlements" against 
her home state would be understandable if the sole value protected by the 
clause were a concern for bias against non-residents arising from the fact 
that "nonresidents are not represented in the . . . legislative halls. " 212 
Any state resident subjected to an objectionable rule by her home state 
has, of course, the opportunity to seek redress from her state legislators. 
210 Slaugl11er-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77. 
211 The quoted language from the Slaughter-House Cases is followed by the comment that 
the clause's "sole purpose was to declare to the several states that whatever those rights are as 
you grant or establish them to your own citizens, ... the same, neither more nor less, shall be 
the measure of the rights of citizens of other states within your jurisdiction." I d. at 77. 
As Justice Roberts articulated the matter in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939), 
"(a)t one time it was thought that this section recognized a group of rights wh ich, according to 
the jurisprudence of the day, were classed 'natural rights;' ... guaranteeing the citizens of 
every State the recognition of this group of rights by every other State .... It has come to be 
the settled view that Article IV § 2 [guarantees) ... that in any State every citizen of any other 
State is to have the same privileges and immunities which the citizens of that State enjoy." See 
also Bogen, supra note 171 , at 850-51 ("If citizens of a state were to be protected on ly in states 
where they were not citizens, the article should have used the phrase 'in any other of the 
states.' ... [Recognition of a right to travel) would not necessarily revive fu ndamental rights 
analysis" which troubled the Slaughter-House majority.). 
212 Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975); see Baldwin v. Montana Fish & 
Game Comm'n., 436 U.S. 371, 402 (1978) (Brennan, J., di~senting) (quoting Austin); United 
Bldg. & Constr. Trade, 465 U.S. at 2 17 ("New Jersey residents have no claim under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause .... But New Jersey residents at least have a chance to remedy 
at the polls any discrimination against them. Out-of-state citizens have no similar opportu-
nity."). 
This conception has i.Jeen at the core of Dean Ely's vision of the clause. See generally 
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 83, 90-91 (1980); John Hart Ely , Choice of Law and 
the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 173, 189-9! (1981) [herein-
after Ely, Choice of Law). See also Gary Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and 
the Priv ileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 384 (1979) (argu-
ing that laws disadvantaging nonresidents epitomize government without consent of gov-
erned); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Note, State Parochialism, the R ight to Travel and the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1568, 1586 (1989) (arguing that 
traditional view of privileges and immunities clause as protecting "only current nonresidents" 
is problematic). 
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But, as the history of the clause makes manifest, concern with the polit-
ical vulnerabilities of out-of-staters does not exhaust the purposes of the 
clause, designed as it was to "fuse into one nation a collection of in-
dependent sovereign states" and to "constitute the citizens of the United 
States one people. "21 3 
In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper , the Court held that 
New Hampshire's exclusion of a Vermont citizen from legal practice on 
grounds of non-residency violated the privileges and immumtles 
clause. 2 14 If one took seriously the Slaughter-House dictum that the 
21 3 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall. ) 168, 180 (1869), overruled on other grounds by 
United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass 'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The Court has in recent years 
remarked on the "mutually reinforcing relationship between the privileges and immunities 
cl ause of article IV, section 2 and the commerce clause-a relationship that stems from their 
common origin in the fourth Article of Confederation and their mutual commitment to the 
proposition that 'in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.' " 
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 51 8, 534 (1 978); see also Baldwin , 436 U.S. at 379-80 (common 
origin of commerce and privileges and immunities clauses); id. at 383 (distinctions prohibited 
where they " hinder the form ati on, purpose or development of a single Union of those sta tes"; 
immunities protected which " bear upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity" ); Austin v. 
New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656, 66 1 ( 1975) (describing "force of the clause in fashioning a 
single nation"). 
My erstwhile colleague Gerald L. Neuman articulated the point with characteristi c 
clarity: 
[T]he Court has interpreted the privileges and immunities clause as serving a broader 
purpose than merely compensa ting for lack of representation .... Both the wording of 
the clause and its interpretation suggest as a paradigm the right of a citizen of state A, 
while physically within the bord ers of state B, to interact with citizens of state B on the 
same legal terms as those that govern their interaction among themselves .... Nonresi-
dents who are known to carry their domicile's Jaw with them cannot participate as 
equals in the life of the state. 
Gerald Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection and Self-Determination, 135 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 261, 320-24 (1 987) (footnotes omitted); see also Douglas Laycock, Equality and 
the Citizens of Sister States, 15 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 431, 438-39 ( 1987); Laycock, supra note 32, 
at 261-66 ("The Clause is first and foremost a national unity provision" with the dual purpose 
of " achieving national unity and preserving states as separate polities."); Jonathan Varat, State 
"Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487, 518-19 (1981) ("The framers 
adopted the constitutional ban on state discrimination against non-residents primarily as an 
instrument of national unification. [It] fosters cumulative attachment among people in differ-
ent states ... and leaves people free to make their home in one state without sacrificing the 
opportunity to share in the bounty found in others." ). 
Dean John Ely acknowledges, despite his affinity for the " representation" theory, see Ely, 
Choice of Law, supra note 212, at 191 , that "one might maintain that Article IV's general goal 
of making us more one nation is sufficiently disserved by gearing choice of Jaw determinations 
to residence ... to justify invalidating such references under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause," but views this as better characterized as an argument that there is "something some-
how out of accord with ... our small 'c'onstitution--Dut of accord in particular with the 
reasons we as a nation decided to supersede the Articles of Confederation." I d. at 192. 
Professor Tribe also seems sympathetic to Justice O'Connor's position. See Laurence 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 542-43, 545 (2d ed. 1988) (viewing a "national cohesion" 
argument as a crucial element of article IV, although he retains the claim that the "core con-
cern" of a1ticle IV is "the protection of outsiders"). 
214 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985). In Barnard v. Thorstenn , 489 U.S. 546, 557-59 (1989), it 
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clause does not "control the power of State governments over the rights 
of its own citizens," 2 15 New Hampshire likely could achieve an identical 
Balkanization by simply showing respect for the professional monopoly 
of the Vermont bar. New Hampshire could induce Vermont to prohibit 
its attorneys from practicing in New Hampshire in exchange for itself 
forbidding local attorneys from practicing in Vermont. Such an incen-
tive to reciprocal protectionism is the precise opposite of the goal of "fus-
ing the states into one nation. " 2 16 
The outcome would be one that directly burdens only those who are 
"represented in the legislative halls." The Court, however, has twice 
held that the mere fact that the disadvantage an out-of-state resident suf-
fers can be cured by actions in her home state is insufficient to avoid a 
privileges and immunities challenge: " [a] State may not barter away the 
right, conferred upon its citizens by the Constitution of the U nited 
States, to enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens when they go 
applied the same principle to invalidate a similar residency requirement in the Virgin Islands, 
and in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 70 (19 88), it invalidated a refusal 
to admit non-residents to the bar "on motion." 
215 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 ( 1872). 
216 The public-choice style analysis is this: the sellers in each state gain more from the 
preservation of a local monopoly than they lose from foregoing the opportunity to trade in 
other states. If one assumes that the concentrated bar or interest groups can predominate over 
the diffuse consumer interest, the fact that the consumers in both states lose from the Balkani-
zation does not make the outcome improbable. 
On a slightly different tack, the Court struck down a statute requiring out-of-state resi-
dents to obtain a license not required of Maryland residents before offering goods for sale in 
Maryland. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 41 8, 430 (1870). From the privileges and 
immunities clause, said the Court, "it fo llows that the defendant might lawfully sell ... any 
goods which the permanent residents of the State might sell." I d. 
Another provision of the Maryland law prohibited both residents and non-residents from 
permitting unlicensed non-residents to sell goods at their "store, warehouse or place of busi-
ness." Id . at 420, 424. Is it conceivable that the outcome would have been different if the case 
had come up as an appeal from conviction of a Maryland resident allowing her warehouse to 
be used rather than as an appeal from conviction of a New Jersey resident offering harnesses 
for unlicensed sale? If not, then it can hardl y be the case that article IV cannot give rights 
against one's home state. 
Professor Kramer's analysis of the clause, see Larry Kramer, Myth of the Unprovided-for 
Case, 75 Va . L. Rev. 1045, 1066 (1989), views the "central purpose" of the clause as "reducing 
interstate friction," and takes the position that "the privileges and immunities clause does no t 
require State A to extend the benefit of its law to a State B resident if State B wants State B law 
applied." Thus, ignoring the fact that avoidance of intersta te friction was viewed as a means to 
national unity, K ramer, apparently, would a llow reciprocal protectionism, as well as home 
state prohibitions on travel. 
On the other hand, Professor Gergen 's suggestion in The Selfi sh State and the Market, 66 
Tex. L. Rev. 1097, 1128 (1988), that "the Framers sought by the privileges and immunities 
clause only to ensure outsiders the right to engage in trade and commerce free from discrimi-
natory tax or regulatory burdens," although at odds with the text of the clause and the "in-
gress and egress" heritage generally acknowledged in the half century after the framing, would 
appear to prevent reciprocal barriers. 
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into other States. " 217 Even less should it be able to prohibit directly the 
enjoyment of those privileges and immunities. 
Moreover, even if we take the Slaughter-House dictum at face value, 
the efforts of Utah to prosecute her residents upon return must still deal 
with the S laughter-House holding: that the fourteenth amendment's pro-
hibition of abridging the "privileges or immunities of citizens" protects 
the rights which "owe their existence to the Federal government, its N a-
tional character, its Constitution or its laws." 2 18 The example of such a 
right given in the Slaughter-House Cases was the right to travel recog-
nized in Crandall v. Nevada. 2 19 
The "entitlement" of Utah residents under article IV to obtain an 
abortion in California on a basis of equality with Californians is also a 
right which "owe[s its] existence to ... the Federal government, its Na-
tional character, its Constitution." Utah's effort to prevent its citizens 
from taking advantage of that entitlement by prosecuting them for doing 
so, even if it does not violate article IV, would "abridge" that entitlement 
in violation of Utah's obligations under the fourteenth amendment. 220 
This was the reasoning in Colgate v. Harvey, 221 where a majority of 
the Court struck down a Vermont statute imposing a higher tax on in-
come from out-of-state investments. 
The right of a citizen of the United States to engage in business, ... or 
to make a lawful loan of money in any state other than that in which 
the citizen resides is a privilege equally attributable to his national citi-
zenship. A state law prohibiting the exercise of these rights in another 
state would, therefore, be invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment 
. .. . The purpose of (the article IV privileges and immunities clause] 
was to require each state to accord equality of treatment to the citizens 
of other states .. .. One purpose and effect of the privileges and immu-
nities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, read in light of this inter-
pretation, was to bridge the gap left by that article so as also to 
safeguard citizens of the United States against any legislation of their 
own states .. . . (When] a citizen of the United States residing inVer-
mont goes into New Hampshire, he does not enter foreign territory, 
but passes from one field into another field of the same national do-
main. When he trades, buys or sells . . . across the state line, when he 
... exercises rights of national citizenship which the law of neither 
217 A ustin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 667 (1975) (quoting Travis v. Yale & Towne 
Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60, 82 ( 1920)). 
21 8 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872). 
21 9 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1868). 
220 Cf. Bogen, supra note 171, at 849 ("As a right secured by Article IV to all citizens, 
under the Fourteenth Amendment [the right to travel] is also a privilege and immunities [sic] 
of Uni ted States citi zenship."). 
221 296 U.S. 404, 431 (1936). 
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state can abridge ... . 222 
The holding of Colgate was a casualty of the New Deal Court; the 
decision was overruled four years later in Madden v. Kentucky, 223 a case 
which upheld a differential tax on out-of-state bank deposits. The demise 
of Colgate's reasoning is less clear. The lvfadden Court reaffirmed that 
the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause extends " to 
rights which are inherent in national citizenship," 224 but, invoking the 
reluctance of the Court to " restrict the power of the states to manage 
their own fiscal affairs," held that "the right to carry out an incident to a 
trade, business or calling such as the deposit of money in banks is not a 
privilege of national citizenship."225 If, with Justice O'Connor, we reaf-
firm the "ingress and regress" heritage of article IV as inherent in na-
tional citizenship, then the specific rejection of Colgate on the ground 
that "an incident to a trade" is not a privilege of national citizenship 
222 Id. at 430-31 , 433. Justice Stone's dissent, joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, 
denied that the " movement of persons across state lines" for purposes other than nat ional 
business was a privilege of national citizenship protected by the fourteenth amendment. See id. 
at 445. In the alternative, the dissent denied that the "privilege of acquiring .. . investments 
without the state is a privi lege of federal ci tizenship," id. at 447, on the ground that a tax on 
investment " has no necessary relat ion to his movements interstate." 
Justice Stone also sought to rely on Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 278 (1900), which 
upheld against a fourteenth amendment challenge a Georgia tax on persons hiring laborers 
employed outside of the state. The Court in Fears, however, relied on the fact that the tax was 
comparable to taxes levied on other occupations, and that " the intention to prohibit this par-
ticular business cannot properly be imputed from the amount of the tax payable." Id. at 275. 
223 309 U.S. 83 (1940), overruling Colgate v. Harvey, 269 U.S. 404 (1 93 6). 
224 Id . at 91 ; see also Snowden v. Hughes, 32 1 U .S. 1, 6-7 (1 944) (citing Madden for propo-
si tion that " [t)he protection extended to citizens of the United States by the privileges and 
immunities clause includes those rights and privileges which, under the laws and Constitution 
of the United States, are incident to citizenship of the United States, but does not include 
rights perta ining to state citizenship and derived solely from the relationship of the citizen and 
his state established by state law"). 
225 Id. at 92-93. This reading finds support in Justice Douglas' concurrence in Bell v. Mary-
land, 378 U.S . 226, 250 (1964): 
There has been a judicial reluctance to expand the content of national citizenship beyond 
racia l discrimination, voting rights, the right to travel, safe custody in the hands of a 
federal marshal, diplomatic protection abroad, and the like. See Slaughter-House Cases, 
83 U.S . (16 Wall.) 36 (1 872); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); United States 
v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 ( 1941); Kent v. 
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (195 8). The reluctance has been due to a fear of creating constitu-
tional refuges for a host of rights historically subject to regulation. See Madden v. Ken-
tucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940), overruling Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935). But those 
fears have no relevance here, where we deal with Amendments whose dominant purpose 
was to guarantee the freedom of the slave race and establish a regime where national 
citizenship has only one class. 
Cf. Head v. New Mex ico Board, 374 U .S. 424, 433 n. 12 (1 963) (upholding New Mexico's 
prohibition on New Mexico radio station broadcasting from New Mexico advertisements of 
Texas optometrist, and asserting that "[t)he Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not create a naked right to conduct a business free of otherwise valid 
state regulation"). 
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ieaves untouched Colgate's reasoning that a home state's efforts to inter-
fere with interstate equality impinge on the fourteenth amendment rights 
of national citizenship. 22 6 
CONCLUSION 
In a federal republic which takes seriously the claims of state sover-
eignty, we must expect and indeed revel in variations in moral commit-
ments from state to state. But the federal system , as it has been 
understood since the founding of our republic, demands that the moral 
commitments of each state be tempered by a regard for the commitments 
of its neighbors; the moral sovereignty of each state ends at its borders. 
From the founding, this limitation was understood not only as protection 
for state prerogatives, but for individmd liberty. The effort to prosecute a 
citizen at home for taking advantage of the options permitted by a sister 
state is at odds with this understanding of federalism . 
Equally important, the American Constitution as reformulated after 
the Civil War contemplates a national citizenship which gives to each of 
its members the right to travel to other states where, on a basis of equal-
ity with local residents, they can take advantage of the economic, cul-
tural and moral options permitted there. The effort of any political 
subdivision of the nation to coerce its citizens into abjuring the opportu-
nities offered by its neighbors is an affront not only to the federal system, 
but to the rights that the citizens hold as members of the nation itself. 
The right to travel to more hospitable environs could not, after the four-
teenth amendment, be denied to former slaves seeking a better life. 
Under the same principles, even if R oe continues to erode or is ultimately 
overruled, that right cannot be denied to women seeking to choose their 
future. 
226 The reluctance in Edwards to reaffirm Crandall as a national citizenship case also seems 
to be a thing of the past. Even if article IV does not by itself protect against abridgment by a 
home state, it is perfectly plausible to argue for such protection of citizens travelling in other 
states from the structure of national citizenship contemplated by the constitutional design , 
including the fourteenth amendment's citizens hip clause. See, e.g ., United States v. Wheeler, 
254 U.S. 281, 299 (1921) ("Nor is the situation changed by assuming that ... a State has the 
power by depriving its own citizens of the right to reside peacefully therein and to free ingress 
thereto and egress therefrom . . . . The proposition assumes that a State could, without violat-
ing the fund amental limitations of the Constitution other than those of Article IV enact legisla-
tion incompatible with its existence as a free government and destructive of the fundamental 
ri ghts of its citizens ... the existence of federal power to detriment the repugnancy of such 
action to the Constitution is not disputed."); Ely, Choice of Law, supra note 212, at 19 1-93 
(arguing that general goals of article IV of "making us more one nation" and "the reasons we 
as a nation decided to supercede [sic] the Art icles of Confederation" are inconsistent with "a 
system of 'personal law' wherein people carry their home states' legal regimes around with 
them" ). 
